Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs
December, 15  1999

 

Greek -Turkish relations

In 1973, Turkey initiated a policy of aggressively contesting Greek sovereignty, sovereign rights as well as the legal status quo in the Aegean. To realize its objectives, the Turkish State systematically ignores fundamental provisions of International Law and existing international treaties. As a result, bilateral relations between the two countries have deteriorated drastically.

Furthermore, Turkish claims against Greek sovereignty and Greek sovereign rights have been steadily increasing over the years. To this day, Turkey has disputed Greek sovereignty over a number of islands in the E. Aegean Sea and over the island of Gavdos, south of Crete, the right of Greece to expand the width of Greek territorial waters (GTW), the Greek National Airspace (GNA), Greece’s competences in the Athinai Flight Information Region (FIR), the right of Greek islands to their own continental shelf.

The Imia case: Turkish invasion of Greek territory: In January 1996, Turkey invaded the Greek Island of Imia, an action that led the two countries to the brink of war. Ever since, not only does she reject Greek protests over violations of Greek territorial waters in the area by Turkish military vessels, but she also protests the presence of Greek military vessels, arbitrarily claiming that the Imia Islands constitute Turkish territory.

Turkish claims against Greek sovereignty :

A.“Grey Areas” : Since recently, Turkey has been contesting Greek sovereignty over hundreds of islands in the Aegean (“grey areas” theory) by both acts, i.e. violations of national airspace including provocative overflight of islands, and statements of high officials. In a way that indirectly questions the fundamental legal framework (Lausanne and Paris Peace Treaties) on which Greek sovereignty is based, Turkey claims that any island, which is not mentioned by name in the treaties, belongs to her -being the successor state to the Ottoman Empire- or, at best, is of undefined sovereignty. Even on the eve of the Helsinki European Summit, Turkish military aircraft committed 53 violations of Greek airspace in the S-E Aegean in a single day (29/11). Moreover, 13 of those violations were overflights above Greek islands. Similar provocative behaviour was demonstrated a few days after the Helsinki Summit (16/12/99), where Turkey was named an Applicant Country for the European Union.

PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS BY TURKISH HIGH OFFICIALS

Mentioned hereunder are some of the most recent statements:

President Demirel (15.5.1999): “ As far as we are concerned there is, indeed, a grey area in the Aegean. The sovereignty over the islets and rocks within this grey area has not been settled by existing treaties. As things stand at the moment, the heir to the Ottoman Empire is the Turkish Republic, and, therefore, according to international practice, when treaties are not clear about the status of certain territories that once belonged to a particular state, these tend to be handed over automatically to the successor state.” (meaning Turkey)

Prime Minister Ecevit (1.6.1999): "Overall, the territorial status of certain islets in the Aegean is based on a series of contradictory treaties and agreements. In this respect, a comprehensive dialogue between Greece and Turkey is needed. Nevertheless, Greece, instead of resorting to dialogue presents Turkey with faits accomplis and this practice needlessly increases tension between our countries"

Foreign Minister Cem (2.6.1999): [" We would like to make known that all islands the sovereignty of which has not been clearly stipulated in international treaties, have to be regarded as ex-Ottoman territories which were naturally handed over to the Turkish Republic."]

 

B. Claims that Greek Sovereignty over E. Aegean Islands is “Conditional on Unfulfilled Demilitarization Obligations” :

Turkey contests Greek sovereignty over the Eastern Aegean islands by claiming that this sovereignty is linked to their demilitarization. More specifically, she maintains that these islands were ceded to Greece by the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947) on the condition that they should be demilitarized. Such a linkage, being absent from these treaties, constitutes an invention serving Turkey’s intentions to contest Greek sovereignty by all means.

Greece underlines that: (a) in accordance with all relevant international agreements, sovereignty over eastern Aegean islands was ceded to Greece without being linked to any conditions whatsoever and (b) military restrictions do not apply to all Eastern Aegean Islands.

More specifically, (I) the Montreux Convention (1936) canceled the demilitarized status of the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace which was established by the Convention of Lausanne (1923),

(II) the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), and specifically article 13 provides for certain restrictions in militarizing the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Icaria and Samos (which are fully respected by Greece), without mentioning any sort of demilitarized status, and

(III) the Treaty of Paris (1947) with regard to the Dodecanese, does not concern Turkey, which is not a party to it. (Res inter alios acta). Furthermore, the demilitarized status provided for by this Treaty, should be viewed in connection with military threats stemming from Turkey and with Greece’s right to individual and collective defense as described in the UN Charter (art. 51). The Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the presence of the Aegean Army in Western Turkey (near Izmir) are the most eloquent examples of Turkish policy in the Area.

The Width of Greek territorial waters: Threat of use of force. According to the Convention for the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982), Greece has the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, (from 6 n.m. today). Turkey, on the other hand, has bluntly declared that any move on the part of Greece to extend its territorial sea any further than the 6 n.m. limit, will be perceived as an act of war (casus belli). The Turkish government was authorized to act accordingly by resolution of the Turkish National Assembly (June 1995). Thus, attempting to blackmail Greece to give up a legal right emanating from an International Treaty, Turkey is violating Article 2, par. 4, of the U.N. Charter (on the use and the threat to use force). Moreover, Turkey itself has already expanded its territorial waters to 12 n.m. in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

Continental shelf: Turkey claims that the dispute consists in dividing the entire continental shelf of the Aegean Sea in two equal parts, on the basis of the principle of equity. That would enable Turkey to acquire rights to the continental shelf to the west of Greek Islands, extending up to the median line of the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, Turkey does not recognize the fact that islands are entitled to their own continental shelf. (as provided by the Convention of the Law of the Sea).

In Greece’s opinion, the delimitation of the continental shelf is the only existing dispute between Greece and Turkey. Given the legal nature of this dispute, Greece has proposed its relegation to the International Court of Justice (the Hague) since 1975, which has been persistently rejected by Turkey.

Greek National Airspace: In 1931, a Greek Presidential Decree fixed the country’s National Airspace at 10 N.M. For more than 40 years, until 1974, Turkey had respected this width of the Greek National Airspace. Since then, however, she has suddenly begun challenging Greek sovereignty over the national airspace between 6 and 10 N.M. by both official statements (verbal notes) and acts (violations of 6-10 N.M. national airspace by military aircraft). It goes without saying that Greek fighters intercept all Turkish aircraft.

Athens FIR: Though recognizing the Athinai FIR boundary, which was fixed by ICAO regional agreements, Turkey systematically rejects the obligation to submit flight plans for military aircraft flying within Athinai FIR, thus infringing ICAO rules and regulations.

 

Ankara's stance on Greek-Turkish relations

The Turkish side seeks passionately a dialogue with Greece “in order to solve the Greek-Turkish differences”. As it has already been noted, the sole outstanding difference concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf. All other issues constitute unilateral Turkish claims, which Ankara baptizes as “differences”. Greece maintains that issues that have already been settled, either by International Law or international treaties, cannot become a subject of negotiation between Athens and Ankara.

Greece has no objection to a Greek-Turkish dialogue, given that both sides accept International Law and existing international treaties.

Contrary to Athens, Ankara sees Greek - Turkish disputes through a strictly political spectrum, i.e. outside the domains of prevailing international law. In this context, she desires to engage in dialogue without any preconditions whatsoever and without taking into consideration the provisions of International Law. Under these circumstances, it is impossible for any country, let alone Greece, to engage in bilateral negotiations in which one side aims at gaining concessions which amount to no less than an actual confinement of the sovereign rights of the other.

It should be noted that from 1993 until June 1995 Greece and Turkey were involved in discussions held by the Political Directors of the respective Foreign Ministries. The agenda included economic issues, trade, tourism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, etc.The dialogue came naturally to an abrupt end due to the authorisation passed on by the Turkish National Assembly to the government of Turkey to resort to all the necessary measures, including military action, in the event that Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 miles. Such a development amounts to no less than a casus belli (cause of war) against Greece expressed by Turkey without any reservations whatsoever.

In response to the initiative taken by the Dutch Presidency (1st semester 1997) calling for the establishment of a Group of Wisemen, Greece appointed Professors Krateros Ioannou and Argyris Fatouros and Turkey former Ambassadors Suat Bilge and Sukru Elekdag.

At the end of December 1997 the Turkish experts forwarded a letter directly to their Greek counterparts bypassing the EU presidency, which was responsible to handle all memoranda. This move, which, in actual fact, terminated the Wisemen process, was part of the implementation of the Turkish Government's decision to freeze all dialogue with the E.U. following the unsatisfactory (from Ankara's point of view) Luxembourg European Council of December 1997.

 

Recent Initiatives aimed at the Improvement of Greek - Turkish Relations

Greek proposals: Prime Minister K. Simitis proposed in April 1996, during his visit to Washington, a “step by step” approach as a means to better relations between the two countries. The proposal included the three following points: a) Turkey should refer her territorial claims over the Imia islands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); b) Greece and Turkey should sign an agreement to the delimitation of the Continental shelf to the ICJ; and c) the resumption of the dialogue between the two countries on a number of bilateral issues (i.e. economic affairs, trade, drug trafficking, etc.).

In order to break the impasse in Greco-Turkish relations on April 17th 1996 the Greek Foreign Minister put forward certain proposals. These were: a) that Turkey should recall all threats of war against Greece stating unconditionally and unreservedly that a war between the two countries is out of the question; b) Turkey should make known whether she accepts in their entirety the body of the Treaties which set the current borders and general framework for the conduct of relations between the two countries (Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, Turkish-Italian Treaties of January 4th and December 28th 1932, as well as the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947) and, finally, c) in the those cases where agreement between the two parties is cannot be reached (e.g. on the interpretation of current international law and its application) matters will be refered to the ICJ.

The Madrid Joint Statement of July 8th 1997 was an important development in Greek-Turkish relations. The Joint Statement came as a result of a meeting between Turkey's President S. Demirel and the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. K. Simitis, at the margins of the NATO summit in Madrid.

It sums up to a declaration of principles. However it clearly expresses the commitment of the contracting parties to the respect of the sovereignty of each country, to the fundamental principles of International Law and stresses, moreover, the mutual desire to settle differences through peaceful means.

Simitis - Yilmaz meeting: In the beginning of November 1997 Prime Minister Simitis and Prime Minister Yilmaz met in Crete, in the margins of the informal Summit of Southeast European Heads of State. Although the meeting did not produce tangible results, it was agreed, nevertheless, that the principles governing the Joint Declaration of Madrid must hold. The United States expressed thereupon their satisfaction for this development.

Recent developments: Greece, in an attempt to show goodwill towards Turkey, encouraged cooperation between the two countries, which was sparkled by the exchange of letters between Turkish Foreign Minister Cem and Minister Papandreou. The two sides agreed (30 June, 1999) to hold meetings between high officials from the respective Foreign Ministries on issues concerning tourism, culture, the environment, trade and commerce, multilateral cooperation, especially in the regions of the Black Sea and Southeastern Europe and, finally, organized crime, illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. The first round of talks took place between July 26 and July 30, 1999 both in Ankara and Athens. The ensuing earthquake in Turkey (August 17,1999) coupled by the Athenian quake of September 7, caused an unprecedented wave of popular support for earthquake victims both in Greece and in Turkey. Both countries, either through official channels or through private initiative, rallied to the side of each other dispatching medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams to alleviate the plight of earthquake - torn Greeks and Turks.

The second and third round of talks took place both in Athens and Ankara between 9-16 September and 21-26 October respectively . The two delegations agreed to create a steering committee to overlook the development of the process while six working groups were set up to work on compiling mutually acceptable Draft Treaties. The Steering Committee met in Athens on December 8, 1999 and reviewed the progress in Greek - Turkish talks which was deemed as satisfactory and promising.

Turkey's European Perspective: It is fully endorsed by Greece, considered an important step towards reducing tension between the two countries. [However a full normalisation of bilateral relations will only take root if Turkey rejects once and for all its aggressive policy towards Greece and takes concrete measures and commitments to strengthen its European orientation]. Turkey's road to full membership should entail specific undertakings on her part and should include the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ for the settlement of disputes and the adoption of measures to improve the human rights situation. Furthermore, as the Prime Minister Simitis stated on November 18, 1999 during talks with Mr. Ecevit, the Cyprus issue continues to play a major part in shaping the relations between Greece and Turkey.

Turkey has, from time to time, accused Greece of obstructing the forging of closer relations between Ankara and the European Union. However, the positive stance Greece adopted at the Helsiki Summit (December 10 - 11 1999) should shed any doubts concerning Greece's commitment to encourage Turkey's European vocation. To be sure, this vocation amounts to nothing if it is built on weak foundations and does not entail structural changes to be undertaken in order to bring Turkey on a par with the E.U. countries on all fronts. To this effect, Greece held its ground in Helsinki and endorsed a real candidacy to the benefit of all parties involved, most notably Turkey's. It remains to be seen whether the seeds sown in Finland will bear any fruit to the benefit of stability and prosperity for Greece, Turkey and Europe as a whole.

ATHENS, DECEMBER 15 1999.