Throughout the Summer of 1976 the Turkish ship Sismik conducted
research in areas of the Aegean shelf appertaining to Greek islands.
Because of opposition at home and the danger of an armed confrontation
with Turkey, the Greek government appealed to the UN Security
Council and simultaneously sought arbitration unilaterally by
the International Court of Justice. The Security Council did not
attempt to deal with the substance of the dispute but tried to
lessen the tensions by asking both sides to abstain from hostile
acts. On 11 September 1976 and 19 December 1978 the International
Court indicated its inability to come to a decision on the substance
of the Greek application.
The 1978 Karamanlis-Ecevit meeting in Montreux, diminished tension
on this specific issue. Both sides agreed to discuss the problem
and to abstain from activities (such as magnetometric studies
for discovering oil in disputed areas) which would cause friction
between them. Although bilateral discussions did not lead to a
solution they did at least lessen the possibility of recourse
to violence. Turkey continued to reject the median line between
the islands and the mainland and insisted on her formula of equity,
but refrained from pressing her own argument.
Air Traffic Control
While refusing to accept an extension of Greece's territorial
waters, Turkey pointed out that the existing six-mile limit should
set the standard for Greek air space, which since 1932 has extended
four miles beyond the limit of Greece's territorial sea.
By constantly violating the ten-mile limit of Greek air-space
with her fighters, Turkey has since 1974 embarked on the dangerous
practice of unilaterally redefining the Aegean air-space. This
systematic testing of nerves has repeatedly caused deadly accidents
and could lead to general conflagration.
A regional convention of the International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO) in Paris decided in 1952 that the Aegean controlled air-space
(except the band of Turkish national air-space off the coast of
Asia Minor) should form part of the Athens Flight Information
Region (FIR) for air traffic control purposes. All planes flying
west (civil or military) were required to file flight plans and
to report positions as they crossed the FIR boundary after leaving
the coast of Turkey. Planes coming from the opposite direction
were required to report to the control centre in Istanbul as they
entered the Turkish FIR. As Andrew Wilson pointed out: "To have
placed the FIR boundary further to the west would have obliged
Greek aircraft to pass through a Turkish zone of control on flights
to the Greek islands. To this extent the arrangement was consistent
with geography and seems to have worked well for 22 years".(6)
On 6 August 1974 the Turkish Authorities issued NOTAM 714 (notice
to ICAO for transmission to air users) demanding that all aircraft
reaching the median line of the Aegean report their flight plan
to Istanbul. Greece refused to accept this contravention of ICAO
rules and, on 14 August 1974, issued NOTAM 1157 declaring the
Aegean area of the Athens FIR dangerous because of the threat
of conflicting control orders. All international flights in the
Aegean between the two countries were suspended. On 22 February
1980 Turkey withdrew her claim to air-traffic rights in the eastern
half of the Aegean, and the air corridors were subsequently reopened.
The NATO Framework
Greece's withdrawal from NATOÕs military structure
after the failure of the western alliance to react to the captivity
of northern Cyprus, was more of a trial separation than a divorce
since the country remained in the political arm of the Alliance.
As early as August 1975, and after the normalisation of Greece's
return to a democratic regime, Karamanlis' government expressed
its willingness to reenter the military structure of NATO. However
reintegration attempts were vetoed by Turkey, which having raised
a claim over the reallocation of the Athens FIR, was in effect
also demanding a reallocation of the operational control zones
of the Aegean air-space. According to the pre-1974 arrangements,
NATO has ceded the military control over the Aegean air-space
(Greek and international sea waters) to Greek command. Any other
arrangement would result in placing Greek territories under Turkish
protection.
The reintegration of Greece into the military structure of NATO
in October 1980 was achieved after Turkey was persuaded to postpone
her claims on the operational status quo in the Aegean. In his
interview with the Financial Times (24 February 1982), Andreas
Papandreou admitted that, as Turkish pressure had diminished since
the advent of military rule in Ankara, Greece could perhaps exchange
her right to extent her territorial waters for the withdrawal
of Turkish objections to the pre-1974 operational responsibilities
in the Aegean. Such operational arrangements that exist within
the NATO framework, however, are without international legal status,
and if Greece had chosen to ignore Turkish demands, there was
nothing that Turkey could do to impose her claims short of war.(7)
All Greek governments have made clear that they can not tolerate
arrangements that would affect the air-space of the Greek islands.
In his September 1979 Harvard speech, George Rallis (then Greek
Foreign Minister) expressed his country's fundamental concern
over the Aegean problem in the following terms: "Claims
that could result in the enclavement of the Greek islands of the
Eastern Aegean in a Turkish continental shelf and in a Turkish
controlled air-space are obviously unacceptable to Greece, all
the more so since such claims have no basis either in International
Law or in International practice".(8)
The most persistent Turkish demand in the Aegean is the demilitarisation
of the Greek islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos
and the Dodecanese. Turkey invokes the relevant provisions of
the Lausanne Treaty and Convention (1923) as well as the Paris
Treaty (1947) while Greece argues that Samothrace and Lemnos were
relieved of their demilitarised status through the Montreux Convention
of 1936 and the other islands were fortified after the establishment
of the Turkish Fourth Army based in Izmir. According to US estimates,(9)
the Fourth Army had had a peacetime force of 35,000 combat personnel
and is equipped with landing craft and an amphibious capability
which is the second largest among NATO members.
In the past Greece has repeatedly cancelled its participation
in Aegean NATO exercises, refusing to accept the exclusion of
the Lemnos air-field from NATO scenarios. In an attempt to overcome
the deadlock, Papandreou tried another approach by the end of
1984.
Greece officially notified the presence of its forces on the island
in the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) and asked that they
be placed under NATO command but failed to override Turkey's
veto.(10)
On 27 March 1987, Greece and Turkey came as close to an armed
confrontation as they had been for years. The cause of the crisis
was Turkey's decision to send a research vessel escorted
by warships to explore for oil in the disputed continental shelf
around Lesvos, Lemnos and Samothrace.(11) This author had been to
Turkey a few days before the crisis and realised that the Turks
were misreading Papandreou's pronouncement that he would
nationalise the North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) consortium
prospecting for oil in the northern continental shelf of Greece.
As the late Evangelos Averoff pointed out to this author,(12) Papandreou
was clearly trying to prevent NAPC from drilling in a disputed
area in order to avoid trouble with Turkey.
The crisis was defused after Greece's firm stand, but both
sides agreed to abstain from oil exploration in a large part of
the Aegean continental shelf.
The question of Turkey's relationship with the West is
a recurring theme in Turkish history, especially at times when
the Middle Eastern option appeared to recede. Turgut Ozal made
his own western preference clear from the outset of his term in
power but the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan and the declining fortunes of the oil
producers, relieved his foreign policy from its eastern distractions
and made the European Community a more desirable prospect.
The meeting of Papandreou and Ozal in Davos in February 1988 heralded
a brief but significant detente in Greek-Turkish relations.
The move elicited relief from the Greek public and was based on
a consensus among the Greek political parties. In Turkey its acceptance
was less obvious. Ozal's Motherland Party had only secured
35% of the electorate in November 1987 while the position of the
other political forces on Davos remained unclear.(13)
There was also confusion between the two sides. Before the meeting,
Papandreou had declared his commitment a) to a "compromise"
between Greece and Turkey which was the sine qua non for referring
the Continental Shelf dispute to the Hague and b) to the withdrawal
of the Turkish forces from Cyprus, as preconditions for any progress
in Greek-Turkish relations. These, according to Papandreou, were
the only two issues he intended to discuss in Davos. Instead he
agreed with Ozal to create two committees that would, a) review
all pending problems between the two states and b) would deal
with questions of cooperation in commerce and tourism.
On the Turkish side, Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz, appeared to
be in tune with his Ministry's establishment when in the
spring of 1988 he reiterated standard Turkish positions on the
"Turks" of Greek Thrace and refused to consider
a troops withdrawal from Cyprus before the two communities came
to an agreement. On the Greek side, there was increased reluctance
to discuss issues which threatened the status quo, although they
constituted points of friction between the two states and technically
belonged to the competences of the first committee.
The demise of communism and the unity of the Soviet Union temporarily
deprived Turkey of its vital role in the western alliance. The
prospect of a withdrawal of US interest brought Europe into Turkish
focus. The year 1989 therefore could have been a good one for
a genuine Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Turkey was preparing for
the final attempt to enter the European Community and Greece was
looking for a principled solution to the problems that strained
relations with her neighbour and burdened her own ailing economy.
Unfortunately the Davos process between the two Prime Ministers
-Papandreou and Ozal- came a year too soon and the detente that
was generated by it had expired by the time (20 December 1989)
that the Turkish government received a negative reply from the
European Commission to its 14 April 1987 application for full
membership in the EC. Since further negotiations for entry were
deferred, a major incentive for seeking immediate improvement
of relations with Greece was removed form Turkish desiderata.
The Gulf crisis which commenced in the summer of 1990, was yet
another turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Between the winter
of 1989 and the fall of 1990, there was considerable change of
attitude on the part of Turgut Ozal, who had already secured his
election as President of the Republic through the majority of
his Motherland Party in parliament. Whereas in the past Ozal had
projected the image of a moderate technocrat, dedicated to his
country's European vocation and therefore open to a Greek-Turkish
detente, during the Gulf crisis he was transformed into a gambler
who pursued opportunity wherever it occurred in order to establish
Turkey's role as a peripheral power. At the same time he
continued to give the Islamic element a free hand in areas which
under the Ataturk tradition had been off limits to devout Moslems.
He thus managed to extend his country's influence in Azerbaijan
as part of Turkey's old Turanian claims to the inhabitants
of Transcaucasia and used this foothold as a leverage to extract
Soviet compliance on such items as the exclusion of the Southeastern
part of Turkey from the CFE disarmament talks in Vienna.
Throughout the Gulf war, Ozal succeeded in becoming a standard
bearer for the cause of the alliance against Saddam. Via CNN,
he championed western values, lectured on democracy and liberalism
and admonished the Germans for their passivity throughout the
conflict. This stance won his points with the American administration
which were soon turned into economic benefits.(14) Despite Ataturk's
policy, Turkey in the post-war period had often vacillated between
a Middle-Eastern and a European vocation according to opportunities
arising in each instance. Criticised by a small westernised elite
as well as by the military and the dedicated Moslems for his departure
from neutrality, Ozal chose to appeal to his wider public's
instincts by promising a windfall of benefits for his contribution
to the war effort. He also might have hoped that a disintegration
of Iraq would yield the oil-rich province of Mosul to Turkish
influence.
Ozal's transformed image as a dynamic politician with a
daring foreign policy, prompted such statements as that of March
1991 questioning the status of the Greek Dodecanese islands. He
was also quick to embrace the initiative of the UN Secretary General
on Cyprus in order 1) to counter the EC PresidencyÕs (Luxembourg)
effort at a solution, and 2) to provide a justification to members
of the State Department and Congress trying to abolish the 7:10
ratio in military aid to Greece and Turkey.(15)
Ozal's successor as Prime Minister (and later as President)
Suleyman Demirel, was an old conservative who disliked his predecessor's
innovations. His presence in power was conducive to a rapprochement
in Greek-Turkish relations. On February 1, 1992 he met with Prime
Minister Constantine Mitsotakis in Davos. Their joint communique
stated that they had agreed to prepare a "friendship, good-neighbourliness,
cooperation treaty" and pledged support for UN efforts
in Cyprus. Although Mitsotakis was criticised at home for not
insisting that a Cyprus settlement was the precondition for improved
relations with Turkey, he insisted that bilateral disputes and
a solution of the Cyprus problem must follow separate, but parallel
paths. The friendship treaty however did not materialise. Demirel's
moderating influence did not alter the predicament of his successors
who were absorbed by Turkey's internal metamorphosis. Transition,
from the Ataturk legacy into an era of Islamic influence became
the main challenge for the new generation of center-right politicians.,(16)
Ms Tansu Ciller and Mr. Mesut Yilmaz were too preoccupied with
domestic developments to bother striking an improved relationship
with Greece. Ciller in fact, encouraged and exploited a strain
in relations as a diversion to her own insoluble problems at home.
In March 1995, Greece raised its objections to Turkey's
entry into the EU Customs Union agreement, with the understanding
that the application of Cyprus for membership would be discussed
after the Intergovernmental meeting of 1996. Greece's move,
although celebrated in Turkey, elicited no positive response from
Ciller's government towards Greece. A series of incidents
between the two states that began in 1994, over the twelve mile
issue, reached their high point on 8 June 1995 when the Turkish
parliament granted the government license to take whatever action
it deemed necessary (including military) if Greece exercised its
right, foreseen by the International Law of the Sea Convention,
to extend its territorial waters. Although such a decision had
not been made, Greece refused to give up a potentially important
bargaining chip by relinquishing its right to extend its territorial
waters.
When a Turkish vessel ran into a reef near the islet of Imia on
December 26, 1995 and refused to be tugged by Greek boats insisting
that this was Turkish territory, and after in Ancara Turkish diplomats
officially supported this view, the Mayor of nearby Kalymnos decided
to plant a Greek flag on the islet. The flag was subsequently
removed by a team of Hurriyet journalists in January 1996, and
a Turkish flag was hoisted on the barren islet. Greek soldiers
replaced the Greek flag and the incident led to an escalation
that added another yet negative item in the already burdened agenda
of Greek-Turkish relations. Was the Turkish move designed to bring
the Greeks to the negotiating table over all the Aegean claims
raised by Turkey, or an opportunity to allow Ciller a way out
of her political impasse? Since 1994, "casus belli"
threats became the Turkish Prime Minister's favourite expression
when addressing relations with Greece.
The problems over the Imia issue continue to surface.(17) This is
the first occasion that Turkey lays claims on Greece's
land territory and chooses to do so within the Dodecanese islands
whose regime has been described in the 1932 treaty between Italy
and Turkey. The sea borders agreed upon was a continuous median
line from north to south, between the islands and the coast of
Turkey. After the Dodecanese were ceded to Greece, the latter,
as the successor state inherited the agreed regime of 1932.
The pattern has become predictable: Every so many years since
1973, a new item is forcefully introduced in the Greek-Turkish
agenda, followed by invitations to bilateral negotiations. In
1973 Turkey refused to accept that Greek islands are entitled
to a continental shelf, in 1974 the territorial integrity of Cyprus
was violated and the island was divided in two. The same year
the Turkish aviation authorities challenged the 1952 ICAO decision,
according to which, for air-traffic control purposes, most of
the Aegean airspace was considered part of the Athens Flight Information
Region (FIR). At the same time the violation of Greece's
ten-mile air- space (established in 1931) began in earnest by
Turkish aircraft and this practice continues to this day. Fighters
traversing Greek islands off the coast of Turkey has become a
routine. In 1978 Turkey refused to abide by the 1964 NATO decision
that the operational responsibility of most Aegean air-space was
assigned to Greece. Far from considering the Aegean a Greek sea
(since much of it consists of international waters and air-space)
the above arrangements were based on the rationale that between
Greece and Turkey flights must go over the Greek islands.
Questions and objections concerning the regime of the islets can
only be brought to the International Court of Justice, since this
is obviously a legal question. If Turkey would agree to submit
the issue to the Court, the Greek government has stated its willingness
to actively take part in the procedure. However, Turkey's
refusal to accept international litigation on one issue is not
new. In 1976 Greece applied to the International Court of Justice
over the question of the Continental Shelf, but Turkey insisted
on bilateral negotiations. The bilateral talks between 1976-1981
failed to produce a tangible result. It was Greece's view
then, what is valid today, that international legal processes
will preclude confrontational attitudes and will spare politicians
on both sides from going back on their word.
According to Greek perceptions, Turkey is forever burdening the
agenda with new claims so that if bilateral negotiations occur
it will be only on Turkish demands. Of course this strategy precludes
any credible discussion and inches towards armed conflict with
each passing incident. The most recent, following the Imia crisis,
was centered on the inhabited Greek island of Gavdos. During the
planning of NATO exercise "DYNAMIC MIX 1996" in
Naples (Italy) to take place in the area of Crete, the representative
of the Turkish General Staff submitted a statement (dated May
30, 1996), according to which Turkey opposed the inclusion of
the Greek island of Gavdos (situated Southwest of Crete) in the
exercise "due to its disputed status of property".
The Turkish Representative also suggested that NATO officials
should refrain from becoming involved in what he termed as a Greek-Turkish
dispute. The claim was endorsed in the following days by senior
officials of the Turkish Government and Prime Minister Yilmaz
himself. Seventy three years after the signing of the Lausanne
Peace Treaty, Mr. Yilmaz referred to unspecified islets of the
Aegean and questioned Greece's sovereignty over the island
of Gavdos, the legal status of which was defined in 1913, by the
Treaty of London. According to that document Turkey renounced
all sovereign rights over Crete (and Gavdos in this respect),
with article 4 of the London Peace Treaty. As far as the Aegean
Sea is concerned, the Treaty of Lausanne provides that Turkish
sovereignty extends only to those islands that lie within 3 miles
from the Turkish coast as well as on the islands of Imbros, Bozcaada
and Rabbit Islands. With the same Treaty Turkey renounced all
rights and titles over all territories and islands beyond the
three miles limit.
On 7 August 1996 the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet, printed excerpts
of a Turkish academy report, according to which any Aegean island
under six miles from the Turkish coast "by law belongs
to Turkey, a successor of the Ottoman empire" and "Turkey
still retains sovereignty over the islands which were not given
to Greece under article 12 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty".(18)
Greece is accused of allegedly "claiming all of the Aegean
islands that are not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty and the
1947 treaty of Paris" which settled the sovereignty over
the Dodecanese islands. Although the content of the academy report
(most probably addressed to cadets and officers) has neither been
affirmed nor refuted by the Erbakan government, it appears to
reflect accurately a sense of disappointment from international
reaction to the Imia incident. "Greece has succeeded in
disputing the Turkish sovereignty over Kardak (Imia) which is
Turkish territory according to international law. Turkey must
persuade Greece to sit at the negotiating table about the status
in the Aegean" it said.(19)
After the Erbakan-Ciller government of July 1996 was formed, widespread
criticism against various aspects of Turkish policy, previously
downplayed by the western media, was unleashed. Jim Hoagland of
the Washington Post turned his guns against Ciller for striking
a "cynical" deal to save her skin and because it
was during her term in power that Erbakan's Welfare party
went from 7 percent of the national vote to 21 percent. "Ciller
never attempted to gain control over the Turkish military, still
a dominant force in the country's politics. The military
has in fact been throwing its weight around in this time of domestic
uncertainty, stoking the fires of nationalism by aggressively
courting confrontation with Greece and smacking around Turkey's
own Kurdish citizens and Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq and Iran".(20)
Western coverage of the two Greek Cypriot's murder by "Grey-Wolf"
paramilitary groups in mid-August 1996, also constitutes a departure
from the relative apathy of the Western media to similar phenomena
in the past. No doubt Erbakan's decision to visit Iran
in the midst of President Clinton's advisory to US allies
that they should abstain from relations with the maverick state,
has added fuel to the fire.(21)
In the meantime, Greek vigilance must focus on the protection
of the Greek islands off the Turkish coasts. In an August 1996
article of Air-Force Monthly, three options of a Turkish attack
on Greek territory were aired: "The first would be to occupy
some of the inhabited Greek islands close to mainland Turkey.
Kastelorizo, the most easterly of the Dodecanese chain and barely
two miles (3 km) from the Turkish mainland is an obvious choice,
but this seems hardly worth the effort. The much larger islands
of Lesvos, Chios and Samos would give much greater long-term strategic
gains by opening up afar larger portion of the Aegean".(22)
The second Turkish option, according to the author of the article
"would be a limited offensive in mainland Thrace. While
this seems unlikely, the fact is that both countries are better
equipped to fight a series of massive land battles than anything
else".(23) The third option, "which would hurt Greece
badly, would be the conquest of the remainder of Cyprus ... (however)
should Turkey seek to occupy the whole island, it would be faced
with a hostile population and an extremely active resistance movement.
The game is simply not worth the candle".(24) In conclusion,
the author does not exclude an attack on a couple of the larger
Greek islands which "might well prove to be a useful bargaining
counter for the future, if they can be taken at a reasonable price".(25)
What, not too long ago, appeared by occidental commentators as
Greek paranoia, is now being discussed in earnest.
At the end of every incident the US urges Greece to accept bilateral
negotiations over Aegean questions with Turkey. Given the declared
importance to which the US attaches to its own relations with
Turkey, the leasing of flight refuelling tankers that allow constant
refuelling of Turkish planes in the air, and the sale of ATACMs,
Greek officials view American mediation with concern. At the same
time the EU partners of Greece have made few credible efforts
to mediate and some British TV station asked this author if fighting
over a rock in the Aegean made any sense. Images of the armada
sailing across the globe to affirm British rights in the Falklands,
and the solidarity displayed then towards a fellow member by all
European Community states, immediately spring to mind. Yet Greece
must still point out to its NATO and EU partners that it is impossible
to discriminate over sovereignty, be it in Syntagma Square Athens,
or in a barren Aegean islet.
It is also Greece's task to convince her allies that they
have a significant vested interest in improving relations between
the Aegean neighbours. This can be achieved if the EU sets the
usual concrete standards for Turkey's entry, with no mix
of nebulous references to cultural factors. Improved relations
between Greece and Turkey besides opening up a new vista of economic
prospects, will also facilitate Turkish efforts at full EU membership.
This will in time secure the acculturation of Turkey into the
ways of the west and will therefore reduce Aegean problems to
their true dimensions.
Western pressure on Greece to submit to bilateral discussions
with Turkey on the basis of an agenda that has no Greek input,
will inevitably lead to a conflict that will destabilise the Aegean
for the years to come, will add to the economic tribulations of
the adversaries and will ultimately destroy Turkey's European
prospect.
1. For a full discussion of the legal problems in the Aegean see,
Christos Rozakis, "An Analysis of the Legal Problems in
Greek-Turkish Relations 1973-88" YEARBOOK 1989, ELIAMEP,
1988. pp. 193-251.
2. Van Coufoudakis, ÒTurkey and the United States: The
Problems and Prospects of a Post-War AllianceÓ, Journal
of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall 1981,
pp. 179-194.
3. Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990, p. 193.
4. Andrew Wilson, The Aegean Dispute, ADELPHI Papers, No. 155,
London, IISS, Winter 1979/80.
5. See joint Brussels CommuniquŽ of 31 May 1975 to resolve
problems peacefully "by means of negotiations and as regards
the continental shelf (through) the International Court".
In February 1976 Turkey rejected a Greek proposal for a non-recourse-to-force
pact.
6. Wilson, op. cit., p. 6.
7. Christos Rozakis "Dyo yposimioseis sti sizitisi yia
epanentaxi", Ikonomia kai Kinonia, No. 15, December 1980,
pp. 42-3.
. The speech was circulated by Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
in 1979 with no other indication.
9. US Senate, Turkey, Greece and NATO: The Strained Alliance,
Washington DC: US Government printing office, 1980, p. 57.
10. T. Veremis, "Greece and NATO: Continuity and Change"
in John Chipman (ed.) NATOÕs Southern Allies: Internal
and External Challenges, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 270.
11. New York Times, 28 March 1987.
12. Interview with Evangelos Averoff in his home in Kifissia,
1 March 1987.
13. P. Loukakos, "Sti gonia I kikloi tou polemou",
ELEFTHEROTYPIA, I February 1988.
14. "Since the beginning of this crisis Turkey has received
grants and low interest loans totalling $ 1.9 billion and modern
weapons and equipment totalling some $ 8-9 billion". In
addition to the $ 553.4 million budgeted for this, Turkey is to
receive an additional 4 82 million in US aid. James Brown, "Turkey
and the Persian Gulf Crisis", Mediterranean Quarterly,
Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 48.
15. As Bruce Kuniholm put it, "the high proportion of grant
assistance to Turkey (as distinguished from concessional loans
to Greece) essentially cancelled any semblance of the seven-to-ten
ratio" "Turkey and the West", Foreign Affairs,
Spring 1991, p. 38.
16. For Turkey's ideological crisis and its implications
on relations with the West see, Shireen T. Hunter, Turkey at the
Crossroads: Islamic Past or European Future, Brussels: CEPS Paper,
No. 63, 1995.
17. The Citizens' Movement & ELIAMEP. Borders Sovereignty
and Stability, New York: Melissa Media Associates, 1996. See also
Ekavi Athanasopoulou, "Greece, Turkey, Europe: Constantinos
Simitis in Premiership Waters", Mediterranean Politics,
Vol. I, No. 1 (Summer 1996), p. 113-117.
18. Athens News, 8 August 1996.
19. Ibid. For a US legal evaluation of the dispute see, CRS (The
Literary Congress) June 17, 1996. The validity of the December
1932 protocol delineating the territorial line between Greek islands
and the Turkish coast particularly with regard to the jurisdication
over the islets of Imia/Kardak. 15p.
20. Jim Hoagland, Washington Post, 11 July 1996, p. A25. Having
admonished the Clinton administration for pretending "that
instability is not stalking this vital country" he concludes
that "The Turks cannot be allowed to think their cynical
machinations go unnoticed and uncensured". The 16 August
1996, Wall Street Journal "Get Serious about Turkey"
makes no bones about its author's view of Turkeys democracy.
"While the West waits for the seemingly inevitable collapse
of this government (Erbakan's), its strategy should be
to reaffirm its commitment to a Western-oriented Turkey without
conferring undue legitimacy on its titular head. That includes
affirming in every way possible to Western commitment to Turkey's
military, which strongly values its relationship to NATO".
The Washington Post article of 26 March 1997, Turkeys Overblown
Islamic Threat, by John Tirman, takes an entirely different view
on the role of the military in a democratic state.
21. Eric Rouleau, ÒTurkey Beyond AtatŸrkÓ,
Foreign Policy, Summer 1996, p. 84.
22. Mike Spick, "Aegean Crossroads". Air Force Monthly,
August 1996, p. 42.
23. Ibid., p. 43.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
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