A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues
The cold war was distinguished by a linear division between East
and West and by the presence of a clear and distinct threat against
the western and American interests.
The Soviet Union and its geopolitical
allies were threatening western interest in Europe, the Middle
East and Asia. The Soviet threat and the American reaction created
a bipolar world-two superpowers locked in a head-on confrontation,
with many of the other countries adhering to the coalitions created
by the two superpowers. In such an environment, the foreign policy
doctrine elaborated by the American leadership was the "containment
doctrine", namely the attempt to contain the Soviet Union
and restrict its expansion in the hope that the inherent weaknesses
of the Soviet system would lead, sooner or later, to its collapse.
In this framework, the U.S. created a network of multilateral
or bilateral alliances (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS) that successfully
lined up against the Soviet coalition. The U.S. created an international
economic system through a series of agreements, aid programmes
for their allies and economic organisations-such as, the Bretton
Woods conference, the Marshall Plan and OECD respectively-the
establishment of which contributed to the reinforcement of the
western coalition, and finally, to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. (2)
Today, things are different. The U.S. is facing a more complex
international system which, unlike the linear and inflexible bipolar
system, is fluid and unpredictable. The threats to this new international
system are not clear and one-dimensional, but are diffused to
many poles, are expressed at different levels and have different
levels of intensity. There is no longer a large and obvious threat,
similar to that of the Soviet Union against the western community.
On the contrary, there are multiple, low-intensity threats and
the consensus for dealing with them is much more difficult to
achieve, both among the western allies and in the domestic political
scene of America itself.
The security and defence issues that concern the American foreign
policy have risen sharply. Military power is now only one of the
factors of national power, while competition among the great powers
has moved from the military to the economic field. Today, economic
issues, energy, trade and technology issues claim priority in
the design of the post-cold-war American strategy.(3) This expanded
definition of "national security" further complicates
the design of the new American grand strategy.
In this new form of competition, apart from the structural economic problems that have arisen after half a century of development with emphasis on war industry, the U.S. must also deal with the harsh competition its traditional allies, such as, Europe and Japan, that no longer depend on the American military coverage.
Some analysts have maintained that this is one of the reasons
that the American defence expenditure remained at very high levels
after the end of the cold war. This argument was put forward rather
bluntly in a document of the American Pentagon which was leaked
to the American press and which claimed that "the U.S.
should discourage the industrialized countries from questioning
the American leadership or claim a bigger regional or international
role".(4) The official version was different: "the
U.S. should responsibly maintain the possibility to respond to
threats against its interests and the interests of its allies,
which could destabilise international relations".(5)
Another factor that further complicates the American plans concerns
the new form of the international system. The international system
is evolving, as shown by the dramatic changes in actors, actions
and the distribution of power. The result of these changes is
even more indistinct and uncertain. Will they lead to policies
of balance of forces after a redistribution of power among the
great powers (Germany, China, Japan, USA, Russia)? Will the present
situation develop into a new competition between West and East?
Or, on the contrary, will there be a continuous and peaceful understanding
among the great powers?
The fact is that we find ourselves in a strategic intermezzo that
does not seem to favour the presence of a crystallised American
grant strategy similar to that of the cold war. Besides, historically,
the containment strategy took at least five years to be established.
In any case, the priority remains of the formulation of the American
relations with Europe, Russia, Japan, China and the other great
powers of the post-cold-war era, as well as the promotion of stability
at strategic parts of the developing world.
International Interventionism or Isolationism?
The isolationist tendency has always been a clear trend in the formulation of the American foreign policy. This trend is due to two reasons, a cultural and a geopolitical one. The first one is the deeply established conviction for the American exceptionalism, namely that America was created on the basis of democratic and humanitarian principles and is radically differentiated from the intrigues and balance of power considerations of the "old world" of the European continent. The second reason is the advantageous geographic position of America which offers security from foreign threats.
The supporters of this trend were marginalised during the cold
war, as the American foreign policy successfully combined interest
with morality in the eyes of the American people and secured people's
support for a series of presidents, from Truman to Bush, thus
legitimizing its international interventions. In order to legitimise
the expansion of its international intervention in the post-cold-war
era, the present American leadership has to formulate a foreign
policy that would combine the promotion of American national
interests with the messianic perception of morality, democracy
and human rights and do it in a convincing way, as they did during
the cold war.
Interest or Morality?
The two ideologies that have traditionally fought to control the
formulation of American foreign policy are liberal idealism and
political realism. Liberals think of the state as a factor of
reform and aspire for it to have an expanded role, even supporting
military interventions, provided that they are carried out to
serve democratic ideals and promote the American values. On the
other hand, the more conservative realists are in favour of "less
state" and support international interventions when they
concern security matters and the promotion of American national
interests.
This distinction was more difficult during the cold war, as the
conservatives supported the continuous interventions against the
communist regimes, often with the assistance of states with reactionary
and even oppressive regimes. This "amoralism" led
many liberals to a form of neo-isolationism.
At the end of the cold war things were restored up to a point.
Liberals tilt towards to international interventionism again,
while conservatives have become more selective. The war in Bosnia
is an example of this development. In this case, the liberals
who were opposed to the involvement of America in Vietnam were
the ones to demand American military involvement in favour of
the independence of Bosnia. On the contrary, with the disappearance
of the communist threat, the conservatives said that no "vital
interests" were at stake so as to justify the American
involvement. The same distinction was made in the case of the
American invasion for the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
In the post-cold-war era, the neo-liberals support the expansion
of democracy and free market economy, as well as the establishment
of the international legal order. Tony Smith has argued that the
promotion of democracy was and still is part of the national security
policy of USA.(6)
Concerning political realism, the most basic geopolitical aims of USA after the cold war refer to controlling Eurasia, controlling the energy resources in the Middle East and Central Asia, containing China, and attempting to prevent the creation of local powers in regional subsystems, especially if they are hostile to the American interests.
What the realists are searching for is the way to implement these
aims. Realists, such as, David Abshire, director of the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, have argued
in favour of a flexible and selective international interventionism,
based on which the U.S. will get involved only in cases when its
strictly defined vital interests are ad stake.(7)
Other realists speak openly for the establishment of the "third
American empire" which includes the control of Eurasia
through the extension of the American domination in Eastern Europe
and the Balkans, its active presence in Central Asia and the reinforcement
of its presence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.(8) In general,
this school of thought maintains that the U.S. may choose and
impose any strategy it wishes, since it is the only superpower
remaining in the world.(9) Threats against such a form of American
domination may come from a nationalistic Russia which has led
many analysts that belong to this school of thought to argue in
favour of the immediate expansion of NATO.(10)
In the long term, another threat against American interest may come from China, the economic development of which shows that this country will be an important economic competitor in the first quarter of the 21st century. The rapid economic development of China, the continuous increase of its military power and the promotion of its geopolitical interests in the South China sea have led some Washington analysts to talk about the need of a "latent containment" doctrine.(11) Such a strategy would presuppose continuous American presence in the area, and perhaps, the revival of an organisation, such as, SEATO.(12)
This realist strategy is completed with a number of pivotal states
that will supervise and promote the American interests in varius
regional subsystems, reducing the cost of the American military
presence.(13)
Finally, we should assess the influence of the work of Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations" or "The West against the rest" on the formulation of the American foreign policy. Huntington's central argument is that the notion of internationalism of the western civilisation is deceptive, that several civilisations maintain their uniqueness, and at points of friction, have violent conflicts, and finally, that the West should be armoured against the corrosive influence of other civilisations, and if need be, defend its cultural identity with all means(14).
In conclusion, the co-existence of opposite ideologies and strategies
for America's international role complicates the formulation
of its foreign policy and makes it even more unpredictable than
during the era of bipolarity. The efforts of a small country,
such as, Greece, to predict the type and intensity of the American
reactions in the event of a crisis between Greece and Turkey,
for example, or even in programmatic relations, such as, the aid
programmes, which have always been strenuous because of the many
factors that enter into the final formulation of the American
foreign policy (President, State Department, Pentagon, Security
Council, Congress) now become particularly difficult. The development
of American studies, special research by think tanks and the creation
of a group that will assist the exercise of the Greek diplomacy
in Washington could be steps in the right direction.
1. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1995)
2. ibid.
3. A report drawn up in 1993 by the American Pentagon on the American
defence policy after the Cold War stated that, after the collapse
of communism, "he most significant dangers for American
security would be economic ones" See Robert S. Borosage,
"Iventing the Threat" World Policy Journal 10,
no.4 (Winter 1993-1994), p.9.
4. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, supra, p.55.
5. Patrick E. Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring
No Rivals Develop", The New York Times, March 8, 1992.
6. Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and
the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the 20th Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
7. David M. Abshire, "US Global Policy: Towards an Agile
Strategy", The Washington Quarterly 19, pp.41-61; Robert
Art, "A Defensible Defence: America's Grand Strategy
After the Cold War", International Security, VOl.15, no.4
(Spring 1991), pp. 5-53; Stephen Van Erera, "Why Europe
Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy
After the Cold War", Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.13,
no.2 (June 1990), pp. 1-51.
8. Jacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind, "The Third American
Empire", The New York Times, January 2, 1996.
9. Barry P. Posen & Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions
for US Grand Strategy", International Security, Vol.21,
no.3 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 5-53.
10. Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now", Washington
Post, December 19, 1994.
11. "Containing China", Economist, July 29, 1995,
pp.11-12.
12. Thomas L. Friedman, "Dust off the SEATO Charter",
New York Times, June 28, 1995, p.19.
13. Paul Kennedy, Emily Hill, Robert Chase, "The Pivotal
States", Foreign Affairs, June 28, 1995, p. 19.
14. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the
Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)
and Samuel P. Huntington, "The West Unique, Not Universal",
Foreign Affairs 75 (Nov/Dec 1996), pp. 28-46, and for a Greek
view concerning positions of Huntington, see D. Konstas, "Out
with the Disagreeable", Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, February
2, 1997, p. 58.