A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues
Thus the waiting room is crowded. What is meant by waiting room?
Usually a place where one sits patiently in expectation of what
is about to happen. Here this is not the case at all: on the contrary,
the EU has set in train a series of initiatives together with
the applicant countries to prepare actively for their future accession.
Through the "pre-accession strategy", practical
steps are being taken to create the conditions for negotiations
actually to begin in the short term. Association agreements have
been concluded with each of the candidate countries, economic
and technical support is provided through the PHARE programme,
and the countries concerned are being prepared for integration
in the internal market through the White Paper programme. In addition,
a permanent dialogue has been established between those countries
and the EU on a range of subjects involving common political and
economic interests.
Never before in the Community's history has there been
such intensive preparation for the accession of new member countries.
And quite rightly, as there is a great deal at stake. It is a
matter of accepting the consequences of the fact that in a short
period new democracies have come into being on the European continent,
which wish to give form to their political and economic independence
by linking themselves to what they see as an anchor of stability
and prosperity, namely the EU.
Expectations are high. The question is whether Brussels is capable
of meeting those expectations. The Maastricht Treaty has undoubtedly
given an important stimulus not only to economic integration within
the Union but also to the effort to give real meaning to the Union's
political role. But there are no grounds for complacency. While
it is true that the internal market is approaching completion,
and the European Monetary Union appears closer than ever, Europe
is at the same time wrestling with an unprecedented credibility
crisis when it comes to making its voice heard on the world political
scene. The drama of Yugoslavia painfully exposed the weakness
of the Union. Not only does decision-making leave something to
be desired; the democratic component of integration should be
strengthened, and efficiently and transparently increased.
"Maastricht" must acquire more substance through
the IGC. If that does not happen, the Union of the 15 will run
into serious difficulties. The consequences would indeed be incalculable
in an enlarged Union with perhaps 25 instead of 15 member countries.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that decision-making in Brussels threatens to become gridlocked if business is not regulated more flexibly. It is no longer acceptable for the weakest lick to determine the tempo for all. It must be possible to maintain the unity of the EU while allowing for diversity in the achievement of jointly decided objectives. The EMU as defined at Maastricht is already a practical example of this. It must also be possible to differentiate in other policy fields, particularly as regards foreign policy and certainly also with regard to justice and home affairs-the so-called "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty.
To sum up, the Union must be better equipped, it must develop a capacity for absorption which makes enlargement possible without the Union collapsing under its own weight.
This was expressly stated by the heads of government in Copenhagen
in June 1993, in connection with the future accession of the central
and eastern European countries:
"The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries".
On that occasion, however, other conditions were also stipulated.
They concern the applicant countries themselves, i.e. their capacity
to carry through the political and economic reforms needed to
make them capable of functioning as full members of the Union.
One condition is full democracy, including respect for human rights
and protection of minorities. Moreover, there can be no question
of accession without a functioning market economy able to face
up to competition within the Union.
In other words, it is ultimately the applicant countries themselves
which must decide what actual accession can be considered. They
are primarily responsible for creating the conditions for a political
and economic system which can in due course be integrated with
that of the EU Member States without too much friction.
To that end, it will be necessary to act consistently. Difficult
choices cannot be avoided, e.g. as regards the privatisation,
modernisation and restructuring of the various economic sectors.
Decades of Communist mismanagement cannot be corrected from one
day to the next. It is, of course, difficult to generalise here.
The level of development of the countries concerned differs considerably
in almost every aspect. Ultimately each of these countries deserves
to be judged on its merits, although they have a number of comparable
problems. The Union has a duty to help lay the basis for the necessary
reforms. This cooperation will prove fruitful for the Union itself,
while considerations of solidarity must also play a part. When
the applicant countries have to make important sacrifices, it
is clear that they can call for substantial support. Political
stability and economic prosperity in that part of Europe will
be to our advantage too.
When will the first applicant countries join? There is as yet
no clear answer to this. At the moment we assume that negotiations
will start about six months after the end of the IGC. This timetable
is already fixed as regards Cyprus. It should become clear in
the coming year whether the same is also possible for the central
and eastern European countries.
In an optimistic scenario, the first accession could take place
by the year 2002, assuming a negotiating period of between one
and two years, followed by ratification by all the Member States'
national parliaments and the European Parliament.
A fascinating prospect. Europe is on the move. There is now a
historic opportunity to give European unification a new dimension.
It would be a historic mistake to seize this opportunity together.