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Greek Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era

By Dr. Thanos Dokos,Ph.D. in Strategic Studies, University of Cambridge.


Today, the post-Cold War global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy-makers in small countries are attempting to identify and to predict trends as well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns.

The challenge for Greece, a medium-size, strategically located, and status quo country is to safeguard its territorial integrity and to protect its democratic system and values. Greece can be described today as democratic, internationalist, Western, status quo, free enterprise oriented, and a sensitive strategic outpost of the European Union and NATO in the troubled regions of the Balkans and the Central-Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece is located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia and Africa). It is an integral part of the Balkans (where it is the only country also a member of the European Union, the WEU and NATO), and is in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Aegean Sea is a very important shipping route, connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and a major transit route for the transportation of energy products (after the construction and operation of pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus). Furthermore, Greece's position in the Mediterranean enhances its strategic importance. The Mediterranean region constitutes a crucial area of contact (a "faultline") between what is seen by many analysts as the emerging great division of the world: the North and the South.

As a result of two "cataclysmic" changes, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of their surrounding regions are in the midst of a rapid geopolitical evolution without, however, a clear direction. Analysts discern an "arc or triangle of crisis, extending from the Balkans to Central Asia-Transcaucasus and the Middle East". Most regimes in those regions are or will soon be faced with a crisis of political legitimacy.

Furthermore, and this is of great interest for Greece, the transition from loose bi-polarity to polycentrism, after the end of the Cold War, has increased the autonomy of regional actors and has led to the intensification of peripheral disputes. The new environment presents the "actors" with new dangers and opportunities.(1)

Greece's strategic position accounts for its NATO membership (in 1952). During the Cold War, Greece provided an essential link in NATO's southeastern flank.

Turkey, for example, could have been isolated from the other NATO members if Greece had not also participated in the Alliance. In the opinion of many Greek decision-makers, the country's strategic importance to the West has been underestimated and, at times, even neglected. Successive Greek governments have, however, continued to contribute to Western defense strategy.


Due to the rather anarchic nature of the international system, small states, with their limited capabilities, are trying to deal with their security problems through the development of strategies based on balancing (internal and external) and/or bandwagoning. As small states have fewer options and less freedom to maneuver than the great powers, in order to promote its security interests most effectively, Greece has sought to aggregate its voice and to integrate its policies with those of its European Union partners and its NATO allies.(2) Historically, the main strategic dilemma for Greek decision-makers was whether to ally themselves with the sea power dominant in the eastern Mediterranean or the land power dominant on the Balkan Peninsula. In most cases, mindful of their responsibility for the defense of two thousand Greek islands stretching from the Eastern Aegean to the Adriatic Sea, they have chosen to ally themselves with the sea power.(3)

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between conservatives and liberals (the communists had been outlawed as a result of the Greek Civil War) on security issues and NATO was one of emphasis. Both groupings basically believed that Greece's main security threat emanated from beyond its northern borders and that communism (external and domestic) threatened mutually cherished values. NATO was viewed, therefore, as indispensable for the defense of the country and the United States was treated as Greece's natural ally and guarantor.

The orientation of Greece's defense until the mid-1960s was based on the US credo that the main security concern be internal rather than external. The Greek Armed Forces (in contrast to the Turkish ones) were primarily supplied and organized to face a domestic communist threat. According to NATO planning, Greece was only expected "through certain limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in case of global war".(4)

Even as early as the late 1950s, NATO's southeastern flank had been experiencing periodic cycles of great tension. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, the Greek-Turkish crises of the 1960s, the Greek Junta-sponsored coup of 1974, and the Turkish invasion and occupation of the island (which continues to the present day),(5) has been complicated by a series of Greek-Turkish frictions in the Aegean region, caused by Turkey's pressure for the revision of the Aegean status quo. This has led to the re-orientation of the Greek defense doctrine, with the official declaration of the "threat from the East" as the main security concern for Greece.

The restoration of democratic rule in 1974 was, indeed, a major turning point in Greek security policy. This new period of Greek political history, lasting from 1974 to the present, has been characterized by the diversification of Greece's external relationships, including a relative weakening of its ties with the US in favor of closer economic and political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe.


In the post-Cold War era, Greece is faced with what she considers a major security threat and a number of risks: the threat is perceived to emanate from her Eastern neighbor (Turkey)(6) and the risks are seen as resulting from Balkan and Mediterranean instability. Furthermore, Greece is involved in a dispute on the issue of the recognition of the official name of FYROM and is concerned about the respect of the human rights of the Greek minority in Albania.(7)

a. The Turkish threat

The perception of a potential military threat from Turkey has been widely shared by public opinion and reflected in expert debates as well as Greek security planning(8) for at least the last two decades.(9) The 1974 Cyprus crisis can be regarded as the major turning point in post-World War II Greek security considerations: the Turkish invasion and subsequent occupation of the northern part of Cyprus was for Greece a highly traumatic experience, but also a basis for "new thinking" in terms of security.(10)

Greek security planners are concerned about Turkey's revisionist aims towards Greece expressed through official statements, diplomatic initiatives and military actions (including the "offensive" deployment of its armed forces in Thrace and the Aegean). Geography and its small population in comparison to that of Turkey further increase Greek insecurity.

As one analyst points out, "Turkish official declarations, usually making headlines in Greek mass media, have been intensifying Greek fears. For instance, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel stated in 1975 that "...half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so...We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked". Official Turkish references to a "growing Turkey" and to the 21st Century as the "era of Turkism" have caused increasing concern. Moreover, direct challenges (e.g., "the group of islands that are situated within 50 km of the Turkish coast...should belong to Turkey"), as well as indirect questioning of Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands, have been viewed with great alarm.(11)

Turkish "revisionist actions" include violations of Greek airspace, refusal to submit the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, threats of war in case of Greek extension of the territorial-water limit from six to twelve miles (according to the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention), and challenges of the Aegean status quo as codified by a number of international treaties (the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, the 1932 Agreement between Turkey and Italy, and the 1947 Paris Treaty which led to the Imia crisis in January 1996).

Greek policy-makers see Turkey as backing its "non-friendly" intentions with significant military capabilities. Since 1991, Turkey has launched an impressive modernization program of its armed forces. It has acquired advanced fighter (a fleet of up to 320 F-16) and transport aircrafts, attack and transport helicopters, Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV), Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems (MLRS), frigates, submarines, etc., while it has developed the capability to co-produce some of the aforementioned weapon systems. Such a sizable increase in military expenditures in an era when other European states, the US, and Russia have been cutting on their defense budgets in an effort to benefit from the "peace dividend", is a cause for concern for neighboring countries, including Greece.(12)

The full implementation of the Turkish armament programs threatens to alter fundamentally the bilateral Greek-Turkish balance of power, despite Greece's economic sacrifices.(13) Unless successful external balancing [through diplomatic means/maneuvering] can offset prospective Turkish military superiority, the only option for Greece will be to follow Turkey in a costly and destabilizing arms race, which could create economic problems for both countries and accentuate their security dilemma.

According to Greek security planners and analysts, the focal point of any Greek-Turkish armed conflict is expected to be the Aegean islands, Greek Thrace (to "protect" the Moslem minority), and Cyprus (with an extension of the occupation zone southwards or even an attempt to control the whole island), or even simultaneous attacks in more than one theater. One of the major Greek concerns is the contingency of a Turkish seizure of Greek islands in the eastern part of the Aegean. This move could result from a number of factors such as, for instance, a Greek extension of the territorial waters limit from six to twelve miles, according to the provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Turkey has repeatedly threatened that such an act would be considered a casus belli.(14) Particularly worrisome is Turkey's insistence that a number of Greek islands in the Aegean and the Dodecanese must revert to a status of total demilitarization, ignoring Greek claims for the right of self-defense against Turkey's Fourth (Aegean) Army, Special Forces units, and large landing craft fleet (over 70 craft).

The Moslem minority (ca.120,000, or just over 1 percent of Greece's total population), living mainly in Greek Thrace (northeastern Greece), consists of 49.9 percent of Turkish origin, 33.6 percent Pomaks and 16.5 percent Gypsies.(15) Occasional threats–in certain extremist quarters–calling for intervention in Thrace "to liberate oppressed kin" have not been matched by Turkish government authorities. There is concern, however, that, under certain circumstances, Turkish territorial aspirations vis-a-vis Greek Thrace may in the future become the most important challenge to Greek security.

b. Instability in the Balkans

The end of the Cold War has affected Greek security in a profound way. Although her strategic value was probably enhanced, she was faced with considerable fluidity and uncertainty in her northern borders. Yugoslavia's disintegration and civil war released a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social and economic tensions that were the subject of considerable concern in Athens. Proximity and the fear that Balkan instability (whether limited to former Yugoslavia, or more general) would inhibit the integration of Greece within the European mainstream, created a sense of vulnerability. The economic parameters of the problem were quite significant. Greece had relied on road and rail communications through Yugoslavia for some 40 percent of its trade with the European market. Prolonged disruption of this vital link has had direct economic consequences for Greece, as has had the imposition of EU sanctions against the Yugoslav federal government. Greek authorities estimated that the imposition of sanctions resulted in losses of up to $10 million per day. (16)

Furthermore, it was feared that a violent disintegration of the southern part of the former Yugoslavia could engage outside powers into the conflict, or trigger the flight of waves of refugees into Greek territory. There are today nearly half a million economic immigrants from Eastern Europe in Greece–nearly two-thirds originating from Albania. In a period of recession and high unemployment, large numbers of illegal workers add an extra pressure on the strained Greek economy.

Greek-Bulgarian consultations on security matters had been encouraged by the sense of insecurity felt by both countries in relation to Turkish military power and political interests in the Balkans (Bulgarian-Turkish relations had been particularly difficult as a result of the mistreatment of the large Turkish minority under communist rule in the mid-1980s). In this context, commentators began to talk openly of an Athens-Sofia axis. Bilateral relations reached a high point in 1986 with the "Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation", which provided for consultation when the security of either country was in danger (a provision exercised by the Greek side during the Greek-Turkish crisis of March 1987). This rapprochement was in the framework of Greece's policy of external balancing for the perceived Turkish threat. Greece adopted a policy of "vigorous balancing" with Bulgaria, i.e., improvement of relations (short of an alliance) with a third power.(17)

In the "post-Dayton" era, Greece is attempting to play a stabilizing role in the Balkan area by formulating a comprehensive and co-operative approach to the region's problems. The changes introduced to the Balkan political scene since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism, the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the emergence of a number of successor states (in the post-Dayton era), and the Kossovo problem clearly highlight the magnitude of the stakes that the new regional environment has brought to the fore; they also render imperative the need to define an appropriate strategy to meet the new threats and risks that the 21st Century will entail.


To deter threats to its security, Greece relies on internal (strong armed forces) and external balancing (participation in all West European security and political organizations [NATO, WEU, EU], as well as the OSCE, and signature and adherence to practically all multilateral arms control agreements and international export control regimes [such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CFE, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee, Australia Group MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, etc.]).(18)

More specifically, in order to deter the perceived Turkish threat, Greece relied for many years mainly on international law and agreements, as well as on the mediating role of the US, NATO, and the UN. As this policy proved rather ineffective, Greece began to place more emphasis on internal balancing (through the strengthening of its armed forces) and less on membership in NATO and the bilateral relationship with the

United States (mainly as a result of Turkey's membership to the former and "privileged" relationship with the latter). In the last decade or so, Greece had placed increased importance on its "European card" (membership to the EC/EU and the WEU). Today, Greece relies on a mixture of diplomatic maneuvering, the strengthening of its armed forces, and its membership in the European Union in order to balance Turkish military superiority.

1. Military doctrine

Greece's military doctrine is defensive on the strategic level, in accordance to NATO's posture. The objective is to deter any threat or actual attack against Greece and to protect Greek national interests. Greece, as a status quo country, aims at persuading any revisionist power that the cost-benefit analysis would not be favorable for the latter in the event of aggression. The deterrent threat should be credible and can take many forms, including denial of battlefield objectives, damage to military forces, and other values.

The doctrine of forward defense has been adopted by the Hellenic Armed Forces, due to the country's geography (inadequate defensive depth in Thrace and many islands in the Aegean). On the tactical level the doctrine may have a defensive or a counter-offensive orientation, according to circumstances.

After the impressive performance of the US armed forces in the second Gulf War, Greece decided to reorganize its land forces, with emphasis on smaller units (from divisions and regiments to brigades and battalions), with increased mobility and firepower (in an effort to apply a version of the Air-Land Battle Doctrine).

In 1994, Greece and Cyprus announced the Doctrine of the Joint Defense Area. According to this doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an oc-cupation force of more than 30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot defense would increase their level of co-operation. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a casus belli for Greece. The initiative (actually, a policy of extended deterrence) currently being implemented has a clearly defensive character and aims at averting or facing an eventual aggression against the contracting parties through improving co-operation and common training between the armed forces of Greece and Cyprus.(19)

Greece is aiming at the qualitative improvement of its armed forces. According to Greek Minister of National

Defense Akis Tsohatzopoulos, "Considering the dimensions of our country, the condition of our economy and the demographic problem, quantitative armament competition with any hostile power would constitute a particularly costly effort for Greece with an uncertain outcome. Emphasis, therefore, should be put on quality, by adopting a modern strategic and operational doctrine (with emphasis on combined/joint operations), improving personnel training, restructuring combat units (with the aim of successfully carrying out defensive operations, but also with the ability to transfer operations on enemy territory), obtaining the necessary modern weapon systems (smart weapons and especially force multipliers), and rapidly integrating them in our Armed Forces. The main element of our defense planning is the achievement of maximum cost-effectiveness. We also intend to gradually increase the participation of the domestic defense industry in armament programs for the Greek armed forces".(20)

2. Defense expenditures

Since 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied 37 percent of its territory, Greece has maintained a high level of defense expenditures (with an average of 6 percent of GNP, which is the highest among NATO countries). High military expenditures and intensive training have been deemed necessary to compensate for Turkey's quantitative advantage in military equipment and manpower. Although there is consensus among major political parties and the Greek people that this "sacrifice" is necessary for national defense, military expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy at a time when Greece is implementing an economic austerity program in order to join in the next phase of the European monetary union. However, as a result of the Imia crisis and the Turkish announcement of a (10-year) $31 billion armament program, Greece was forced to announce a (five-year) $14 billion program.(21)

3. Greece's external balancing efforts

A. Greece's participation in NATO Greece had been a loyal member of the Alliance until 1974, when it decided to withdraw from the military structure of NATO in protest against NATO's perceived acquiescence to Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus. After lengthy negotiations, Greece was fully re-integrated into the Alliance in 1980, with the Rogers Report. However, the provision of the agreement for the activation of the land and air headquarters in Larissa (LSE and 7ATAF) was never implemented due to Turkish objections. As a result a "gap" was created in the Alliance's military structure on its southern flank. Today, Greece participates in the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). Furthermore, she is contributing one division to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and will participate in the Multinational Division in the Southern Region-MND(S).(22) Greece is also contributing troops to the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force (AMF).

Greece supports the efforts for the internal adaptation of NATO, which provides, among many other things, for a Southern Command with four Sub-Regional Commands [Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey] and two Component Commands [Air & Naval in Italy].

B. Greece and the WEU

In 1995, Greece became the tenth member of the WEU. Initially seen as the European pillar of NATO, the WEU's role was "upgraded" by the Maastricht Treaty with the objective to turn it into the defense arm of the European Union. Greece supports an expanded security role for the WEU as a means towards strengthening the European defense "identity" within a strong NATO of two pillars.(23) In this framework, Greek forces would be available for participation in the WEU's multinational land and naval forces(24) whose missions would include crisis management, peacekeeping operations and protection of the WEU's nationals abroad.

The WEU, despite its increasingly important role in the development of a European defense identity, will, at least for the near future, remain "linked" to NATO because of its structure and capabilities. However, in matters directly affecting European member-states of NATO and only indirectly affecting non-European member-states, the former should have prime responsibility. Furthermore, the creation of a mechanism, in the framework of the WEU, is necessary for defining the mission and the required force structure if IFOR-type forces are to be deployed in the future.

C. Greece and peacekeeping

In recent years, Greece has evolved from a firm supporter into an active participant of United Nations peacekeeping efforts and operations. Greek military personnel have participated in peacekeeping operations in Somalia (UNSOM I) and other missions in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Western Sahara, former Yugoslavia (IFOR & SFOR, with an upgraded Greek presence), and Albania (Operation ALBA).(25) Greece is also prepared to participate in the UN readiness system and will soon create an all-volunteer unit for peacekeeping missions. Finally, it should be noted that Greece pays a large share of the costs of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).


Greece, despite being a member of the EU, the WEU and NATO, is geographically situated in a conflict-prone region (Balkans & Mediterranean) where the use of force in inter-state relations may be considered an option. Therefore, in order to safeguard its security, the challenge for a status quo country like Greece in the early 21st Century will be to broaden and deepen its ties with its EU, NATO and WEU partners, at a time of internal and external adaptation of these organizations.

The current Greek government has repeatedly expressed its willingness to improve relations with neighboring Turkey. The sole requirement set on the part of Greece is the respect of international law and agreements. Despite some lessening of tension (mainly as a result of US and NATO efforts, which resulted in the Madrid Declaration and in negotiations for the establishment of CBMs in the Aegean) (26) the majority of Greek analysts and government officials find little reason for optimism about the Greek-Turkish relationship.

Therefore, to deter the Turkish threat, Greece's emphasis will continue to be on internal balancing (strengthening of its armed forces through increased emphasis on quality with the adoption of a modern strategic and operational doctrine with emphasis on combined/joint operations, improved personnel training, and acquisition of modern weapon systems (including smart weapons and especially force multipliers), and on its membership in the European Community/Union and the WEU. Greek membership in NATO and its strategic relationship with the US would be essential in facing other regional challenges. Indeed, for Greece, a functional security relationship with the US based on mutual interests would be a valuable asset in times of regional instability. In this framework, Greece is willing to contribute politically and militarily to the Alliance's efforts to deter out-of-area threats in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

In the context of North-South relations, Greece is slowly becoming more actively involved in the shaping of the EU's Mediterranean policy on the basis of its traditionally good relations with Arab countries and its recent–if belated–improved relations with Israel.

Furthermore, in the "post-Dayton" era, Greece is attempting to play a stabilizing role in the Balkan and Black Sea regions by formulating a comprehensive and co-operative approach to the region's problems.

1) Arvanitopoulos, Constantine. "Greek Defense Policy and the Doctrine of Extended Deterrence", in Theophanous & Coufoudakis (eds.). Security and Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Intercollege Press, Nicosia, 1997, p. 153.
2) Couloumbis, Theodore & Yannas, Prodromos. "Greek Security in a Post-Cold War Setting", The Southeast European Yearbook 1992. ELIAMEP, Athens, 1993, p. 52.
3) Stearns, Monteagle. "Greek Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Old Signposts, New Roads" in D. Constas & N. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the 21st Century, p. 64.
4) Veremis, Thanos. Greek Security Considerations, Athens, 1982, p. 79.
5) An abortive coup staged by the Greek dictatorship against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in 1974 offered Turkey a much sought-after pretext to invade the island and impose themselves by means of force. (D. Constas, "Challenges to Greek Foreign Policy: Domestic and External Parameters" in D. Constas & N. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the 21st Century, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 73).
6) It is argued that the Turkish threat does not take the form of an imminent, all-out war, but consists of a well-concerted strategy of intimidation manifested through a series of low level threats in a number of issue areas. (Arvanitopoulos, p. 154.
7) On both issues, there has been progress during the last few months.
8) Despite differences in style, both major parties (PASOK and New Democracy), showed remarkable continuity in handling core foreign policy questions.
9) Rivalry and military conflict have characterized the Byzantine/Greek-Ottoman/Turk relationship since the 11th Century. Mainly as a result of the Ottoman occupation of Greece for four centuries, and the Cyprus problem, Greeks are highly suspicious of Turkish intentions. The same, to a lesser degree, is true of the Turks.
10) Valinakis, Yannis, Greece's Security in the Post-Cold War Era, SWP-S394, April 1994, p.27.
11) Valinakis, p. 30. See also, A. Platias. "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence", in D. Constas (ed.), The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, Macmillan, 1991, p. 93.
12) For a detailed analysis of the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces (doctrine, equipment and order of battle), see Dokos, Thanos & Protonotarios, Nicholas. Turkish Military Power: The Challenge to Greek Security (in Greek), Athens, Tourikis Publishers, 1996 (2nd edition).
13) In fact, during the last years of the Cold War era Greece had ranked first among NATO countries in military expenditures in relation to GDP (6.6 percent in constant prices compared to a 5.6 percent figure for the US), and, as noted by a DPC report, "its defense effort in terms of inputs, was one of the best in the Alliance" (Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks, and Responsibilities in the Alliance. A Report by NATO's Defense Planning Committee, Brussels, December 1988, pp. 13 & 50).
14) Since September 1994, and shortly before the entry into force of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which calls for a territorial waters width of up to 12 miles, the then Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and other senior government officials explicitly and repeatedly stated that such an extension by Greece would be considered a casus belli. This became official policy through a Resolution of the Turkish National Assembly.
15) According to official figures released by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
16) Lesser, Ian. Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy, RAND. Santa Monica, 1992, p.75.
17) Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance Or To Bandwagon? Alliance Decisions in 1930s Europe", Security Studies, Vol.1, no. 3, spring 1992, p. 420.
18) Greece has also signed agreements with several former Eastern-bloc countries in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Initiative, as well as some Mediterranean (Egypt, Israel, Tunisia) and Black Sea/Transcaucasus countries (Georgia, Armenia, etc.).
19) At the same time, in view of the overwhelming superiority of the Turkish forces on the island, the Republic of Cyprus is strengthening its own armed forces through the acquisition of modern equipment, including an order for the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system (with a purely defensive capability).
20) Statement to the Greek Parliament (November 1996).
21) This program provides for the acquisition of up to 60 modern fighter aircrafts, the modernisation of 38 F-4Es, additional transport aircrafts, helicopters, attack helicopters, MBTs, MLRS, SHORADS, frigates, corvettes, submarines, smart munitions, etc. In the foreseeable future, Greece will continue to import its defense equipment mainly from the United States (especially as far as land and air force weapon systems are concerned), although there will be a stronger emphasis on European programs, with France (and perhaps the UK) as a secondary source, whereas Germany will remain a major supplier of naval equipment. The possibility of defense co-operation with Russia and Israel and the purchase or co-production of equipment should not be excluded, especially if the US is not willing to supply certain weapon systems.
22) Greece has offered to provide the HQ for the Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) in Thessaloniki.
23) The Greek position is that the development of a common European foreign and security policy should be based on continued close co-operation and reliance on NATO, and should allow, through its procedures, European states, collectively and individually, to shoulder their share of responsibility in trying to promote peace and stability in Europe and the development and well-being of its people.
24) Greece has repeatedly expressed its willingness to actively participate in the WEU's EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.
25) Greece contributed one destroyer/frigate to Operation Sharp Guard and sizable contingents in the cases of Somalia, Bosnia and Albania.
26) The two sides have agreed on a two-month moratorium on exercises in the Aegean (during the high-tourist season). Although the Yilmaz government initially appeared more accommodating, mainly because of US and European pressures and the need to concentrate on internal problems, it has eventually hardened its position, especially on the Cyprus issue.
27) Approximately one-third of Turkey's territory in the southeast of the country is excluded from numerical restrictions under the CFE Treaty.