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BOSNEWS digest 495 - 10/12/95

From: Dzevat Omeragic <dzevat@ee.mcgill.ca>

Bosnia-Herzegovina News Directory


CONTENTS

  • [01] THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT AND ON THE GROUND IN THE BALKANS

  • [02] BALKAN MONITOR Analysis and Opinion from the Balkan Institute

  • [03] ICRC TOLERATED AND CONCEALED GENOCIDE, SAYS BIJEDIC

  • [04] PROTEST OF BISHOP KOMARICA TO IVAN MILAS

  • [05] MILOSEVIC PROTECTED SERB INTERESTS, SAYS MILAS

  • [06] OSCE WILL SUPERVISE ELECTIONS IN B-H

  • [07] SECRET MEETING OF SERB AND CROAT OIL DEALERS

  • [08] RAJIC AND ILIJASEVIC ACQUITTED

  • [09] GOLDSTONE CRITICIZES ACTING OF BELGRADE

  • [10] DISPUTES OVER SARAJEVO, TERROR AROUND BANJALUKA CONTINUES

  • [11] PARALLEL AUTHORITIES IN ZAGREB

  • [12] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ACCUSES GHALI

  • [13] TRUCE VIOLATION IN NORTHEASTERN BOSNIA


  • [01] THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT AND ON THE GROUND IN THE BALKANS

    The U.N. Security Council demanded today that Bosnian Croat forces bring an immediate halt to looting and burning of houses in areas of western Bosnia due under the Dayton accord to be transferred to Serbian forces. Bosnian Croat forces have reportedly been conducting a "scorched earth policy" in the region since soon after the accord was initialed on November 21.

    The Bosnian government today called on the international community to remain steadfast in its pledge not to renegotiate the Dayton accord. Bosnian Serb nationalists intend to arrange for a referendum in occupied territory on whether or not to accept the Dayton accord. The Bosnian Serb leadership has repeatedly staged protests in Sarajevo and called for changes in the accord, particularly the planned reunification of Sarajevo under Bosnian Federation jurisdiction. The Bosnian government reiterated today its pledge to observe the rights of all Bosnian citizens, but also to pursue war criminals.

    The U.N. announced today that Serbian forces have for more than a week been blocking U.N.-escorted convoys from entering Gorazde, in blatant violation of the October cease-fire agreement and the Dayton accord. Western governments have reportedly made clear to UNPROFOR Bosnia commander Gen. Rupert Smith that UNPROFOR should not confront the Serbs militarily, lest it upset the "peace process" before the Dayton accord is signed in Paris on December 14.

    Representatives of the Contact Group and dozens of other states and institutions today opened the two-day London Conference to plan for the implementation of the Dayton accords. Carl Bildt, EU mediator for the former Yugoslavia, was confirmed today as High Representative to oversee the implementation of civilian provisions of the accords.

    France today renewed its insistence that the Dayton accords be collectively known as the "Elysee Treaty" after the location in Paris where they are scheduled to be signed on December 14. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns dismissed the French demand as "very imaginative."

    The U.S. military today began sending equipment via air and rail to staging and forward positions in and around Bosnia. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic again assured the U.S. today that all foreign fighters would be removed from Bosnia within thirty days as provided for in the Dayton accords. Several observers have suggested that foreign Islamic fighters, whose assistance Bosnia accepted with some reluctance during the worst phases of the war, might resent the presence of U.S. troops. There are at least several hundred such fighters in Bosnia. Izetbegovic also said that further steps would be taken to reassure Bosnian Serbs living in occupied territory to be returned to the government's control under the accords would have their rights protected. Bosnian Serb leaders intend to orchestrate before the December 14 signing ceremony a "popular referendum" among Bosnian Serbs in occupied territory on whether to accept the accords.

    Serbia today announced a drastic increase in military spending. Under the Dayton accords, Serbia is committed to report its holdings of weapons and military equipment to be used as a baseline for an arms reduction and control regime for Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. Under the regime, Serbia's military advantage would be preserved at a ratio of 5:2 over Bosnia and Croatia each. In addition, one third of Bosnia's quota would be allocated to the Bosnian Serb forces, thereby instituting an even larger military advantage for Serbia over Bosnia.

    Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole may introduce as early as December 12 a bill to support the U.S. troop deployment to Bosnia on the condition that the Clinton Administration presents a credible exit strategy and plan for U.S. forces and commits itself in writing to take an active and direct role in arming and training the Bosnian Army.

    [02] BALKAN MONITOR Analysis and Opinion from the Balkan Institute

    December 8, 1995 - Issue No. 7

    Dubious Deal in Dayton: A Nation Betrayed -by Branka Magas-

    The precise implications of the settlement imposed by the United States at Dayton, Ohio, remain to be analyzed by all those who put their signatures to it, in particular by all those in the area of the former Yugoslavia whose whole future will be determined by it. This is not going to be an easy task, given the length of the final document and the hundreds of pages of accompanying maps.

    The settlement was put together in haste and by commissions that worked largely autonomously from each other as they drafted a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, divided the country internally, and worked out the practicalities of implementing the agreement. It was inevitable that the final text would have inconsistencies, contradictions, gaps, and gray areas affecting all crucial issues, something which is in turn bound to lead to continuing confusion and new problems. Yet enough is clear about the Dayton outcome to enable us to pass a considered judgment on it and, in the context of that judgment, answer the crucial question: will it or will it not bring about a lasting peace?

    The case against Dayton is easy to construct. To begin with, it amounts in practice, if not necessarily in intent, to a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. That this is the reality is indicated by the close involvement of Serbia and Croatia in the negotiations, appearing not as guarantors of the country's borders but as active participants in the intense struggle surrounding the distribution of Bosnian territory and the principles of Bosnia's constitutional arrangement.

    The decision by President Clinton and America's allies in Europe to send around 60,000 troops to patrol the settlement points the same way. More is at stake than a simple delineation of internal political authority between the country's two projected constituent entities: Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. ("Bosniak" is the term now used to describe the Bosnian Muslims.)

    This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole will have neither an army to protect its international frontiers, nor a police force to secure order throughout its territory: both these crucial instruments of sovereignty will be wielded by the two entities, in a manner regulated by separate and mutually contradictory constitutions. If one adds the fact that the army of Republika Srpska was raised and maintained by Serbia (originally in the guise of the Yugoslav People's Army), and that its officer corps has been acting throughout the war under the instructions of the Serbian general staff, then it becomes clear that the Dayton settlement leaves Serbia in exclusive control of the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro.

    As for the Bosnian-Croatian border, clearly it will be controlled on both sides by Croatia (with the exception of a small section north and west of Bihac). For the Bosniak-Croat Federation will have not one but rather two armed forces one derived from the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the other from the Croat Defense Council, which is effectively an integral part of the Croatian Army. Further proof that this is partition can be seen in the Dayton arrangements for the shared presidency. For the Serb member will be commander-in-chief of the army of Republika Srpska, the Croat member the commander-in-chief of the Croat Defense Council, and the Bosniak member the commander-in-chief of what has been the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    If the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had indeed been a civil war, then the least one could have expected of Dayton was to produce a blueprint for the creation of an integrated army over time. This, after all, is what was sought in such diverse cases as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

    In the absence of any such solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, what will happen when the international Implementation Force departs at the end of what is intended to be a year-long deployment? In other words, what value should one attach to the formal commitment, also incorporated in the Dayton document, that Bosnia's international borders will be preserved and further war thus avoided?

    The most pernicious feature of Bosnia's internal division is that it involves separation along ethnic lines, ratifying the violent destruction of a highly intermingled and ancient society. The transformation of Bosnia's ethnic mosaic into three ethnically homogeneous areas could not have been achieved without resort to genocide, nor can it be maintained without a permanent displacement of the vast majority of Bosnia's population. The Bosniaks will not be allowed to return to eastern Bosnia, where they once formed a compact majority; the Serbs will never again be able to live in the once majority-Serb parts of western Bosnia; the Croats are to be excluded from the once majority-Croat areas of Posavina. Every major Bosnian city will remain either devoid of a good part of its pre-war population (half, in the case of Banja Luka), or permanently partitioned (the likely fate of Mostar). Patrolling the new internal borders will thus entail enforcing a policy of apartheid on hundreds of thousands of dispossessed civilians.

    To be sure, the Dayton settlement does speak of freedom of movement of goods and people, and of the right of refugees to return to their homes. Yet the overall settlement precludes any guarantee of security for those wishing to return. The openness of Bosnia's international borders with Croatia and Serbia is likely, therefore, to be complemented by a near-complete closure of the internal boundaries. This, in turn, will serve to highlight not only the injustice that the Dayton map-making has caused to the current generation of Bosnians, but also the long-term economic unviability of divided Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, as well as of the particular areas to which Bosnians of different ethnic backgrounds will be confined in the future.

    Herein lies a further basic weakness of the Dayton agreement. For Bosnia's envisaged partition cuts across its traditional and geographically well-defined axis of economic development the basins of the Bosna and Neretva rivers while leaving central Bosnia without free and easy access to the River Sava in the north and the Adriatic coast in the south. As an economic unity, Bosnia-Herzegovina will survive only to the extent that internal borders become permeable, which considering how the territories are controlled, as already explained is unlikely to happen. Nor are any of the constituent units economically viable in themselves. Indeed, as a glance at the projected map of division shows, the western wing of Republika Srpska is only barely connected with its eastern wing; the Bosniak-majority area in the north-west is cut off from the Bosniak-dominated center; and the Croat entity can do little more than serve as a military buffer zone for Croatia. Clearly, mere economic aid for the reconstruction of some of the infrastructure cannot solve inherent problems on this scale.

    Reason suggests that the Dayton settlement favors further wars rather than permanent peace in the Balkans. The unavoidably negative verdict on the Dayton settlement as a whole, however, must to an extent be tempered by reference to those of its elements that allow the possibility of a more constructive, and hence more durable, outcome. The unwillingness of the American mediators to cross the Rubicon and sanction an open partition has provided, at least in principle, elements on which it would be possible to build: the maintenance of Bosnia-Herzegovina's international borders and identity; some provisions for the unity of its capital city, Sarajevo; the retention of a central legislature and government, however limited their powers; the proclaimed right of people to return to their towns and villages; supervised local and general elections; promised economic assistance; and cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. Hopefully, also, the United States will stand by its promise to build up the Bosnian Army, so that it can provide for the security of the nation after the foreign troops have gone.

    The main responsibility for ensuring that peace rather than war prevails in the Balkans thus lies with the Contact Group countries, who now have a second chance to remedy their past Bosnian misdeeds, and above all with the United States, which has imposed this settlement. If Congressional support for sending American troops to Bosnia is now forthcoming, it should be conditional upon a far more forthright commitment than hitherto on the part of the Clinton Administration to those parts of the settlement that could promote stability, justice, and democracy in Bosnia. If this does not happen, then Dayton will be remembered only as another Munich.

    Munich has been remembered as a moment of shame only because of the defeat of the National Socialist policy that produced it in the first place. Had that policy succeeded, it is possible that many of Europe's small nations would have been wiped from the map forever. This is the fate once again faced by the Bosniaks, who having only just escaped the danger of biological extermination or national destruction coming from Serbia, now face the prospect of becoming a stateless minority on the edge of an enlarged Croatian state.

    What has happened in Bosnia should more properly be described not as a tragedy, but as a triumph of evil. Unless Western policy towards Bosnia is altered, we in Europe and the United States will have to rewrite a good deal of our history, omitting all claims to having been at the end of the twentieth century, however imperfectly, a civilized society.

    [Dr. Branka Magas is a historian and author of The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-1992. She is a frequent analyst, commentator, and writer on developments in the former Yugoslavia. This article originally appeared in The Tablet (London), December 2, 1995.]

    Rewarding Serbian Aggression: The U.S. "Piece" Plan for Bosnia -by Phyllis Kaminsky-

    If successful, the Clinton Administration's Balkan peace plan would finally halt or at least achieve a pause in the fighting in Bosnia. In the process, however, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be dissolved and partitioned into two entities: one for the Serbian aggressors, and the other for their victims.

    Chief U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke and other Administration officials insist that this is not a "partition" plan because, at least temporarily, a nominal federal entity would be preserved over all of Bosnia's territory. Early in the negotiations, a member of Holbrooke's staff even called the New York Times to demand that the "p" word, which had been used to describe the plan in an early edition of the paper, be removed.

    One can easily see why the Administration would want to dissemble. Under the Clinton plan, Serbia's forceful occupation of half of Bosnia will stand, thereby rewarding aggression and making a mockery of the UN Charter, the Convention on Genocide, and the Helsinki Final Act. Virtually all of the cities and towns that Serbian forces have brutally purged of non-Serbs will be allowed to remain "ethnically pure" that is, under Serbian control. Indeed, by buying into Serbian ultranationalist leaders' grand plan of ethnic separation, the peace agreement will legitimize ethnic cleansing throughout the Balkans.

    Administration protestations to the contrary, the U.S. plan will not preserve a unitary Bosnia. Legally, the federal entity with which the Administration is replacing the internationally recognized Republic will be unable in the long term to function as a state, in large part because virtually all of the functions of a state are being devolved to the two sub-entities, the Bosnian-Bosnian Croat Federation and the "Republika Srpska." By allowing the "Republika" to operate autonomously under its own "constitution," the Administration will transfer Bosnia's sovereignty over half of its territory to a Serbian supremacist entity independent of any federal government operating out of Sarajevo.

    Practically, the U.S. plan opens the door for drawing the Serbs back into a single Bosnian state, but it is highly unlikely they will ever walk through it. The Administration is not going to force the Serbs to rejoin Bosnia. Since it failed to stop Serbian genocide or even to allow the Bosnians to get the necessary weapons to act on their own one cannot believe that it would use force to compel the Serbs to reintegrate politically with the Bosnian state. And, while the plan provides the Serbs with a disproportionately large voice and even veto power in a central parliament, presidency, and government, they are also being given what amounts to a state of their own. They therefore have no incentive to participate in a unitary state.

    On this point in particular, the Administration seems to have lost all sight of recent history. Ever since the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences' infamous 1986 "Memorandum," Serbian leaders have made no secret of their plan for a Greater Serbia purged of non-Serbs and carved from Bosnian and Croatian territory.

    In 1991, the deputy leader of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's party declared that if the Bosnian "Muslims" seceded from Yugoslavia, they would be "encircled by Serbian territory." In 1992, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic called for the erection of a "new Berlin wall" in Sarajevo. More recently, as the details of the U.S. peace plan were revealed, he declared, "Our final goal is a unified state of all Serbs in one, two, or three steps."

    Prewar elections in Bosnia in 1990 were the first step. Candidates then were identified not only by name and party, but also by ethnicity. As in Lebanon in 1975, the West's acceptance of ethnically based proportional representation was a recipe for disaster. Having successfully played an ethnic card that had, until then, been anathema to Western principles and practice, Serbian ultra-nationalists boycotted the 1992 independence referendum.

    They then dramatically upped the ante with a second step: a three-year genocidal war fought largely against unarmed civilians. The third step is the reduction of Bosnia to a politically and militarily unviable federal entity and the establishment of an ethnically based Serbian republic on its territory in short, the creation of a "Greater Serbia." This step was the main "achievement" in Dayton. Just as Munich is remembered for British and French appeasement of Hitler, Dayton will be remembered as the birthplace of a "Greater Serbia."

    The Administration's continued insistence that it is preserving the Bosnian state is either deception, disingenuousness, or wishful thinking. None is the basis for sound or just policy.

    [Phyllis Kaminsky, an international consultant, led the U.S. election monitor mission to Bosnia in 1990.]

    [03] ICRC TOLERATED AND CONCEALED GENOCIDE, SAYS BIJEDIC

    Geneva, Dec 9, 1995 (Press TWRA) - During the international conference of the Red Cross and Crescent, its chairman several times interrupted the speech of B-H ambassador Mustafa Bijedic, preventing him to finish it explaining the speech was politicized being incompatible with humanitarian character of the conference.

    In the unfinished speech, M. Bijedic succeeded in saying as follows: "(..) The lack of vision, poor leadership, policy on daily basis, manipulation with mass, incompetence often impeded humanitarian organizations like the International Red Cross to meet their task of protecting the victims eg. in the UN safe havens. The question is, can the fact that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNHCR knew for the concentration and death camps and did not release the truth, be accepted, or the fact that the ICRC officials in the POWs exchange registered old women and new born babies as POWs to exchange them for Karadzic's soldiers captured in fighting.(..)

    At the press conference, Bijedic said: "True, my speech was politicized but who can tell that watching people being killed without saying a word of protest is not politicizing? They could criticize me as much as they want to, say that I politicize and exaggerate but they should let me finish my speech. We appreciate humanitarian efforts of the ICRC officials on the ground, risking often their life. Still, there is a great disproportion between those generous efforts and policy that the ICRC Secretariat in Geneva conducts. I am afraid that some people, concealing their mistakes, will try to hide what actually happened. Do not forget that after Croat army operation Oluja, the ICRC president Cornelio Sommaruga took the first flight to Belgrade and Banjaluka to secure the air bridge for those whose flight was organized. But he was nowhere near Tuzla to help people fleeing from Srebrenica namely, those who had survived the massacre."

    Bosnian humanitarian official Zlatko Hurtic late in May 1992 submitted to ICRC in Geneva a list of Serb camps in B-H, while K. Trnka, the B-H govt. official for relations with ICRC and the B-H Red Cross president Muhidin Alicehajic in two letters of June and on 29, July 1992 warned ICRC on the existence of the camps calling for common visit to those places, ICRC did not even send a reply. When journalists released Serb camps, the ICRC officials said that "all sides to B-H are running the camps. "Ms Bonjour did not inquire about the fate of detainee who just disappeared between her two visits and for whom Serbs claimed that escaped. During the appointment of T. Mazowiecki as UN special rapporteur on the state of human rights in ex-Yugoslavia three years ago, C. Sommaruga equaled the three warring parties to B-H by the crimes they perpetrated although his speech in writing did not include that part. The others conducted in the same way. (Mr Dubois...).

    Bosnian media, commenting the Geneva incident, remind that ICRC knew for the holocaust against Jews in WW II but hid it including Auschwitz while some ICRC high officials till recently tried to diminish the range of that genocide. /end/ A.S.

    [04] PROTEST OF BISHOP KOMARICA TO IVAN MILAS

    Banjaluka, Dec 9, 1995 (Press TWRA) - The Bishop of Banjaluka Franjo Komarica sent a letter to the president of MP' Clubs of HDZ in Croatian parliament, Ivan Milas being also a holder of the Croatian state's seal. Milas, close associate of Croatian president Tudjman, in previous years, often claimed in TV programs and parliamentarian disputes that coexistence and tolerance among nations had never existed in B-H. On Croatian TV program broadcasted on Dec 5, 1995 to the viewer's question: "What will happen with the Bosnian refugees who should return to their homes being, by the Dayton agreement in the Serb entity?" Milas replied: "None of the expelled Croats would like to live under foreign government, ie. military and police."

    Komarica writes: "(...) According to your replies, it seems that you know better what our people, Croats, catholics from the Banjaluka, Sarajevo and Mostar-Trebinje bishopric who are coming under local Serb authorities, want or do not want than they themselves or their priests and bishops who are days and nights with them sharing good and evil with them, shedding blood for them giving lives for them! I claim with full responsibility that you have no right to speak on behalf of all our refugees who do not want to give up one of their basic human right - the right for their homes.(...) If, regretfully, the foreigners force their plans on us regardless of our will, is it you who should do the same, you, as our fellow ethnic Croat, from whom we fully expect to respect us as people having basic human right, among which is the right for home, homeland, freedom of movement and making decision by their consciousness. We, entirely innocent, have been for too long oppressed by ones and neglected by "ours"...Do not be the one who deprive us of our rights. (...) If you do not want to help us as people with dignity trying to uphold the honour both of our fellow Croat people and Catholic church we belong to, I beg you, on behalf of many tens thousands of believers of my bishopric (and on behalf of all others), not to hinder us by issuing such statements!" /end/ A.S.

    [05] MILOSEVIC PROTECTED SERB INTERESTS, SAYS MILAS

    Zagreb Dec 9, 1995 (Press TWRA) - In the interview for today's Croatian daily "Vecernji List", Ivan Milas spoke about a part of Croatian opposition saying: "They have never said they were against Yugoslavia only against Milosevic as he destroyed their dream by protecting Serb interest destroying in that way their dream of Yugoslavia."

    Croatian authorities - president Tudjman and his associates frequently accuse opposition of not being enough against Yugoslavia although their opponents deny that. The ruling Croatia's party, unlike the opposition, rarely and unwillingly criticizes S. Milosevic as well as R. Karadzic. Critics of Tudjman's regime claim that it is rather compatible with Milosevic's. /end/ A.S.

    [06] OSCE WILL SUPERVISE ELECTIONS IN B-H

    Budapest, Dec 8, 1995 (Press TWRA) - Annual session of OSCE in Budapest is over. Next year, presiding state of OSCE will be Portugal and in 1977, Denmark. Next annual session is to be held in Dec 1996 in Lisbon.

    The decision brought for OSCE mission in B-H is to be active in the following years to prepare and supervise elections for the Union Parliament and the Parliament for both entities. OSCE mission will also supervise the observance of human rights in B-H, the measures taken to return trust and security as well as compliance with the agreement on armament control in the region if such decision is reached. The OSCE mission head to B-H has not been appointed yet although the US diplomat Robert Frolich was announced. It was prevented by France which holds that too great influence of the USA on the peace process in ex-Yugoslavia might be negative. Observers connect such French view with traditional attempts of Paris to act as rival to Washington but also with French demand for the peace process for ex-Yugoslavia to be named after Elysee Palace where it is to be signed. The State department spokesman, N. Burns has described the Paris demand as imaginative but added that 21 days of hard negotiations to Dayton has already determined the name after which history will remember the agreement. It is announced that the OSCE mission leader will be appointed soon.

    Despite Russian Federation's demand, OSCE membership is still denied to FR Yugoslavia which is trying to take over the membership of ex-Yugoslavia instead of making request for new membership as Slovenia, Croatia, B-H and Macedonia did.

    Among the guests of the host-state was Israel which is not the OSCE member but took advantage of the meeting to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia which this autumn became the OSCE member. The notes of such contents were exchanged by diplomacy heads Crvenkovski and Barak. Israel has diplomatic relationships with two states in ex-Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Macedonia. /end/ A.S.

    [07] SECRET MEETING OF SERB AND CROAT OIL DEALERS

    Rijeka, Zagreb, Dec 6, 1995 (Press TWRA) - Quoting top diplomatic anonymous sources, Croatian daily Novi List writes that in Zagreb yesterday, managers of Croatian INA (firm with the monopoly on providing oil and gas supply for Croatia) and of matching Serb firm "Jugopetrol" had a secret meeting. "Novi List" writes the meeting was carefully prepared to avoid any publicity - without cars with Serb number plates; the guests from Belgrade entered the INA building through the back door, while directors of INA A. Kojakovic and I. Djerek refused any statement on it. /end/ A.S.

    [08] RAJIC AND ILIJASEVIC ACQUITTED

    Mostar, Dec 6, 1995 (Press TWRA) - The HVO leaders Ivica Rajic, Dominik Ilijasevic and Vlatko Trogrlic are acquitted of having killed five HVO soldiers two years ago. When the acquittal was given, relatives and friends of the suspects and groups of extreme Croat nationalists celebrated in the area around the Court - the HVO held part of Mostar.

    The three led "elite" HVO units west of Sarajevo "Maturice" & "Apostoli". B-H authorities suspect the Kiseljak HVO of ties with Karadzic's Serbs, smuggling and impeding deblockade of Sarajevo. Last year, D. Ilijasevic "Como" in the interview for Croatian daily "Slobodna Dalmacija" described the action in which "Maturice" & "Apostoli" under his own and Rajic's command, killed tens of civilians in Stupni Dol in a sudden, unprovoked assault. Ilijasevic is proud of the action in that Bosniak village nearby Vares, north of Sarajevo regarding that "cleansing of the terrain is part of war", accusing the HVO unit in charge of removing the corpses of "having complicated it all" which had not done their job before UN Swedish and British soldiers entered the village. For the Stupni Dol massacre, The Hague Tribunal accused I. Rajic Rajic who HVO refuses to extradite at the moment. /end/ A.S.

    [09] GOLDSTONE CRITICIZES ACTING OF BELGRADE

    The Hague, Dec, 7, 1995 (Press TWRA) - Main prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), R. Goldstone put the deadline to the authorities in Belgrade for tomorrow to provide data on Bosniak fighting in HVO, suspected of committing genocide against Serb civilians in B-H. The suspect has been imprisoned in the Netherlands for two weeks and Serb authorities denied ICTFY access to the witnesses. Goldstone stresses that was the fourth time that Serb authorities refuse cooperation with ICTFY warning that UN sanctions on "FR Yugoslavia" could be reimposed if such obstruction of the Tribunal continues. /end/A.S.

    [10] DISPUTES OVER SARAJEVO, TERROR AROUND BANJALUKA CONTINUES

    Sarajevo, Dec 7, 1995 (Press TWRA) - In the statement issued for German radio, Bosnian prime minister Silajdzic warns that the dispute over Serb leaving or staying in the occupied parts of Sarajevo distorts reality. Only Karadzic's terrorists could expel Serbs from there, as they have already done with Bosniaks who were majority population till this war but were not mentioned at all in the dispute about Sarajevo.

    Meanwhile, terror in Karadzic controlled areas against a small number of the remaining non-Serbs continues. UNHCR reports that about 6O Bosniak families have been recently expelled from Dubrave near Bosanska Gradiska. Serb authorities did not permit the Vatican nuncio to B-H Francesco Monterisi to visit the bishop Komarica as it was planned. /end/ A.S.

    [11] PARALLEL AUTHORITIES IN ZAGREB

    Zagreb, Dec 7, 1995 (Press TWRA) - The Zagreb authorities headed by the mayor Branko Miksa, held a session today to discuss the common issues referring to the town. The session followed the annulment of constitutive session of the town Assembly proclaimed by Croatian government on Dec 2, as well as the Assembly oF the Zagreb region proclaimed afterwards. Last Saturday, work of the town Assembly, was boycotted by 17 HDZ and 2 extremely rightist delegates of Croatian Party of Right (HSP). Others, 31 of them, members of the opposition parties, elected a liberal Goran Granic as the mayor and governor and a social-democrat Zdravko Tomac as the president of the Zagreb Assembly. HDZ proclaimed the elections invalid as well as the session, referring to the temporary statute of the Assembly which requires two thirds of all delegates at the constitutive Assembly. Granic and Tomac warned that the law came ahead of the Assembly statute calling all town services to continue their work and not to obstruct governing of ex-mayor B. Miksa (HDZ) although being illegal. Opposition also sent a complaint to the Constitutional Court against the decision of government which called another constitutive session for Jan 3, 1995. /end/ A.S.

    [12] HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ACCUSES GHALI

    New York, December 8,1995 (Press TWRA) - Organization for protection of human rights, Human Rights Watch, accused the UN General Secretary B. Ghali that he severely violated its duty to defend human rights in the world. "Repeating that he is only servant with 85 masters can not cover up the abandoning of leading role in that area", says the HRW annual report.(end) S.K.

    [13] TRUCE VIOLATION IN NORTHEASTERN BOSNIA

    Tuzla, Sarajevo, Dec 8, 1995 (Press TWRA) - UNPROFOR alleges that the UN military observers have recorded a number of the armed incidents around the village of Sapna, Mt. Javornik and Mt. Majevica, east of Tuzla. The UN spokesman to Sarajevo Ch. Vernon said that the reason for sporadic fire and occasional detonation was inexplicable.

    Sapna and Vitinica are situated western from Zvornik, the most important town in northern part of the river Drina bank being also the border between B-H and Serbia. The town of Zvornik was occupied in spring 1992 and western part of the county - including Bosniak village of Sapna as a center, remained free being a link towards free territory around the village of Teocak, north of which is Serb stronghold Ugljevik. /end/A.S.

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