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RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 146, 97-10-24Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next ArticleFrom: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>RFE/RL NEWSLINEVol. 1, No. 146, 24 October 1997CONTENTS[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
[C] END NOTE
[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA[01] YELTSIN SAYS HE FIRED YEREVANGATE CULPRITSSpeaking at a press conference after the CIS summit in Chisinau, President Yeltsin said he has dismissed "many" Russian military officials responsible for the clandestine transfer to Armenia of arms worth $2 billion, Interfax reported. Yeltsin did not give the names of those fired. Azerbaijani President Heidar Aliev had earlier announced his intention of raising the issue at the summit, arguing that a trilateral intergovernmental commission created to investigate the arms shipments had failed to identify those responsible. At a session of the CIS foreign ministers in the Moldovan capital, Armenia's Alexander Arzoumanian angrily protested the demand by his Azerbaijani counterpart, Hasan Hasanov, that participants view the 29 August Russian-Armenian treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance as a "military pact."[02] U.S. PREDICTS KARABAKH SETTLEMENT IMMINENT...U.S. Under-Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat on 23 October said Washington believes a "first-phase" agreement on resolving the Karabakh conflict is possible before the end of 1997, Reuters reported. The previous day, the Turkish newspaper "Hurriyet" quoted Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit as revealing details of the agreement on resolving the conflict that Armenian President Levon Ter- Petrossyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Heidar Aliev, reportedly reached in Strasbourg earlier in October, Asbarez-on-Line reported on 23 October, quoting the Turkish Armenian-language paper "Marmara." Under that plan, Armenian forces would be withdrawn from Kelbadjar and five other occupied Azerbaijani raions, whose displaced Azerbaijani populations would return to their homes. The Armenian forces would then withdraw from the Karabakh town of Shusha and the Lachin district between Karabakh and Armenia, where international peacekeepers under the OSCE aegis would be deployed.[03] ...BUT ARMENIAN DEFENSE MINISTER NON- CONCILIATORYIn an interview broadcast recently on Nagorno-Karabakh television, Vazgen Sargsian urged the Armenian people "to fight our last war to the finish," RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported on 23 October. Sargsian endorses Nagorno- Karabakh President Arkadii Ghukasyan's proposal that the unrecognized republic and Azerbaijan establish "horizontal relations" with the approval of the international community. Sargsian insisted, however, that the Karabakh Armenians will return neither Shusha nor the districts of Lachin and Kelbajar to Azerbaijani control because those districts are "vital for Karabakh's security." Sargsian, who is rumored to disagree with Ter- Petrossyan's 26 September endorsement of a phased solution to the conflict, affirmed that the "Armenian people from the president down...stand behind Karabakh's cause."[04] EBRD TO FUND INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN TURKMENISTANFollowing four days of talks in Ashgabat, a delegation from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has reached agreement with the Turkmen leadership on providing credits to fund several projects, Interfax reported. The bank will allocate a $50 million credit to fund reconstruction of the 180 kilometer Tedjen-Mary highway, which forms part of the "New Silk Road," linking Central Asia with the Caucasus and Europe. A $30 million credit is earmarked for rebuilding the goods terminal at the Caspian port of Turkmenbashi. Further credits will fund railroad repairs and the construction of a road and rail bridge over the Amudarya River.[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE[05] BULATOVIC CALLS OFF PROTESTS IN MONTENEGROOutgoing President Momir Bulatovic appealed to his supporters in Podgorica on 23 October to end their daily demonstrations in favor of a new presidential vote (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 23 October 1997). He said he will seek to have Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic's presidential victory overturned via institutional channels, not via demonstrations. Meanwhile in Belgrade, Serbian Television's reporting on Montenegro was more balanced that it has been for some time, an RFE/RL correspondent reported. Earlier that day, Western diplomats had urged Serbian Information Minister Radmila Milentijevic to moderate the state-controlled media's pro-Bulatovic coverage of Montenegrin affairs.[06] MILOSEVIC'S PARTY NAMES SERBIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATEYugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic will represent President Slobodan Milosevic's United Left Coalition in the 7 December Serbian presidential elections, the coalition's leaders announced in Belgrade. Elsewhere in the Serbian capital, Radical Party leader and presidential candidate Vojislav Seselj appeared in court for questioning in conjunction with a July incident in which a prominent human rights lawyer claims he was beaten by Seselj and his bodyguard. The court must decide whether to bring formal charges against Seselj.[07] AIDE TO MILOSEVIC'S WIFE KILLED IN BELGRADEUnidentified gunmen killed Zoran Todorovic, otherwise known as "Kundak," in the Serbian capital's Novi Beograd district on 24 October. Todorovic was the secretary-general of the United Yugoslav Left, a communist party headed by Mirjana Markovic, the wife of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. He was also a prominent businessman and managing director of the Beopetrol company, which imports fuel. Police are investigating.[08] KARADZIC AIDE TO HEAD BOSNIAN SERB ELECTION SLATEThe Serbian Democratic Party leadership agreed in Pale on 23 October that party chief Aleksa Buha will head the SDS slate in the parliamentary vote set for 23 November. Buha represents the party's particularly hard-line faction around former party leader Radovan Karadzic. Also in Pale, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic sent congratulations to Montenegrin President-elect Milo Djukanovic. Observers said the message was a sign that Pale wants good relations with Podgorica despite the political enmity between Djukanovic and Milosevic, on whom Pale also depends for support.[09] U.S. NAMES NEW AMBASSADOR TO CROATIAThe White House on 23 October announced that William Dale Montgomery will soon replace Peter Galbraith as ambassador to Croatia. Montgomery was ambassador to Bulgaria from 1993 to 1996 and had served in the 1970s at the U.S. embassy in Belgrade. Many observers credit Galbraith with being largely responsible for negotiating an end to the Croat-Muslim war of 1993 and for subsequently establishing the Croatian-Muslim federation in Bosnia. Galbraith also helped cement close diplomatic and military links between Zagreb and Washington and for much of 1994 and 1995 was widely regarded as the second most influential man in Croatia, after President Franjo Tudjman. Meanwhile in Split, a local court issued an international arrest warrant on 23 October for Cedo Blaskovic, the owner of the Rijeka-Nafta shipping company. He is wanted in conjunction with charges stemming from the explosion of one of his tankers earlier in October.[10] CROATIA ASSESSES WAR LOSSESA Croatian government spokesman on 23 October said that, according to an official commission, 2,197 people are still officially listed as missing in conjunction with the 1991 war. Observers said most of the missing are believed buried in mass graves in formerly Serb-held areas. As a result of cooperation with the Belgrade authorities, the cases of 350 individuals previously listed as missing have been cleared up. Also in Zagreb, a new book appeared that puts Croatia's total losses from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and from the following conflict at $45 billion.[11] FOUR ALBANIAN OPPOSITION DEPUTIES START HUNGER STRIKEFour opposition parliamentary deputies began a hunger strike outside the Albanian Radio and Television building in Tirana on 23 October. They are protesting what they say are the state-controlled electronic media's failure to cover the Democratic Party's daily anti-government protests over the past month, "Rilindja Demokratike" reported. The goal of those demonstrations is to force new elections. In other news, Prosecutor-General Arben Rakipi told "Gazeta Shqiptare" that investigations into the Gjallica pyramid scheme show that the Democrats and the daily "Albania" received donations from the company. Rakipi gave no figures but added that the recipients will be questioned and may be asked to return the money.[12] ALBANIAN LEGISLATURE TO INVESTIGATE SPRING ANARCHYThe parliament on 23 October appointed a commission to investigate developments leading to the lawlessness in the country between January and April, in which more than 2,000 people died. The commission is headed by Spartak Ngjela, a member of the Monarchist Party who was justice minister in the interim government this year, "Shekulli" reported. The commission will be assisted by 12 experts from the Prosecutor-General's Office, who will provide professional advice but will not be empowered to indict suspects. The parliamentary commission will decide whether legal charges will be brought against individuals (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 23 October 1997). Meanwhile, Deputy Defense Minister Perikli Teta said he will bring legal charges against all high-ranking army officers in connection with the disintegration of the army in the spring, "Gazeta Shqiptare" reported.[13] ROMANIAN PRESIDENT GIVES ADVICE TO GOVERNMENTEmil Constantinescu told a forum on youth problems in Sinaia on 23 October that the government must devote more attention to solving the country's economic problems and leave other issues to the parliament. He said the practice of ruling by "government ordinance," instead of passing regular parliamentary legislation, must be stopped, except when economic legislation is urgently needed. He also noted that ongoing debates such as those on the "revolutionaries'" hunger strike or on accessing the files of the communist-era secret services must be left to the legislature. Constantinescu added that Romania's politicians pay attention to young people only when youths stage "street protests." He added he has asked the government to present in November a report its first year in office, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported.[14] FINAL SPLIT IN ASSOCIATION OF FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERSThe Ticu Dumitrescu faction of the Association of Former Political Prisoners in Romania (AFPPR) re-elected Dumitrescu as its leader at a congress in Brasov on 23 October, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. Addressing the gathering, Dumitrescu accused the leadership of the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNTCD) of indulging in "politics of intrigue" and of having enlisted the support of former members of the fascist Iron Guard in order to stage his ouster as AFPPR leader at a recent rival congress of the association (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 October 1997). Cicerone Ioanitoiu, who was elected AFPPR leader by the rival congress, backed down from his announced intention to run for the position voted on in Brasov as well, declaring the gathering "illegal."[15] BULGARIAN LEADERS ADDRESS FOREIGN INVESTORSSpeaking at the opening of an investors' forum in Sofia on 23 October, Prime Minster Ivan Kostov promised to accelerate privatization and the liquidation of money-losing state enterprises in order to attract foreign investment, RFE/RL's Sofia bureau reported. Kostov said his government plans to eliminate 30 percent of loss-making enterprises by the end of 1998 and will have closed 90 percent of such companies by the year 2001. Also addressing the conference, President Petar Stoyanov said the Bulgarian reforms are an irreversible process that enjoy the support of the public and most political forces.[16] BULGARIAN MUSLIMS HAVE NEW LEADERBulgaria's Muslims have chosen a new spiritual leader, ending a long and bitter row between the country's two rival Muslim councils, RFE/RL's Sofia bureau and Reuters reported on 23 October. Mustafa Alish Hadzha, aged 35, was elected chief mufti at a conference that unified the two councils and approved the statues of a new High Muslim Council. Neither former rival Muslim leaders--Nedim Gendjev, appointed by the Communists in 1988, and Fikri Sali, elected by a rival council to replace Gendjev in 1995--ran for election. The unification conference also decided to launch court proceedings against Gendjev for alleged misappropriation of Muslim property.[C] END NOTE[17] LANGUAGE POLITICS HEATING UP IN CRIMEAby Mubeyyin Batu AltanThe 15 October decision of the Crimean parliament to make Russian the official language of the region highlights the difficult position in which the Crimean Tatars find themselves. Because the Crimean Tatars form only a minority in the local parliament, they could not block the measure; instead, they simply abstained. And because of the complex political history of the area, the Crimean Tatars are likely to face a dismal linguistic future unless they take a series of actions soon. For most of the post-World War II era, Russian has been the dominant language on the peninsula. The ethnic Russians there have always spoken Russian. Owing to Moscow's Russianization policies, even indigenous ethnic Ukrainians generally have gone to Russian-language schools and now speak Russian more often than Ukrainian in public, even if they learned their national language at home. The situation of the Crimean Tatars with regard to language is even more serious. Deported to Central Asia by Stalin in 1944, the Crimean Tatars did not have access to schools in their own language there or even when they first began to return to the peninsula. The Soviet authorities in Stalin's time refused to recognize Crimean Tatar as a separate language and did not allow the publication of a newspaper in Crimean Tatar until 1957 or a journal in that language until 1980. As a result, many Crimean Tatars now speak Russian far more often than they use their own language. Some younger Crimean Tatars do so because they have never been formally instructed in the language. At present, for example, there are only a handful of Crimean Tatar language schools in the Crimea, and there are none at all in Uzbekistan, where the majority of Crimean Tatars still live. Many older Crimean Tatars who know the language well and speak it at home increasingly have found it either easier or even necessary to use Russian in the workplace and in other public functions. Unless something is done soon, the situation may deteriorate beyond the point of no return for the Crimean Tatar language. Fortunately, there are three steps the Crimean Tatars can take to avoid the death of their language. First, the leaders of the community should encourage all Crimean Tatars to speak their language. To that end, the leaders should always use Crimean Tatar themselves when they are acting in an official capacity. Second, the Crimean Tatar leaders should insist that the Crimean parliament employ Crimean Tatar translators so that the Crimean Tatar members can use their language rather than being forced to speak Russian in order to be understood. There are plenty of graduates of the Crimean Tatar literature and language department of Simferopol State University who could perform this function. Consequently, if the Russian-dominated parliament refuses to agree to this step, the Crimean Tatars can argue that the rejection of their proposal is politically motivated and they can then appeal to the European Union or other international bodies. Third, the Crimean Tatars should insist that their national language rather than Russian or Ukrainian should be the exclusive language of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis (assembly). Once they take that step, they should also make sure that they prepare news items in Russian so that the ethnic Russian population of the region will not decide that the Crimean Tatars are using their language in order to conceal some broader political agenda. Obviously, the Crimean Tatars will find it hard to accomplish those goals. Resistance by local Russians and Ukrainians is certain to be great, and the Crimean Tatars themselves remain divided on this issue, with many of them viewing the language question as secondary to their political goals. But in fact, the language question is central to the survival of the Crimean Tatars as a nation. Unless the Crimean Tatars are able to maintain their own language, they will find it difficult to maintain themselves as a people or to gain recognition by local authorities in Crimea or further afield. The Russian decision to make Russian the official language in Crimea thus forces the Crimean Tatars to act or to concede defeat. Those Crimean Tatars who argue that it is more convenient to use Russian now and who oppose making the language issue a major one are sending the wrong message to everyone concerned. Indeed, they are perhaps without recognizing it raising the white flag of surrender of their national cause. The author is editor of the "Crimean Review." 24-10-97 Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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