RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 59, 00-03-23

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>

RFE/RL NEWSLINE

Vol. 4, No. 59, 23 March 2000

CONTENTS

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] MOSCOW CONDEMNS ATTACK ON KARABAKH PRESIDENT

[02] VETERAN ARMENIAN DISSIDENT ASSESSES POLITICAL SITUATION

[03] ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT AMENDS LAW ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

[04] AZERBAIJAN, U.S. PLEDGE TO EXPAND MILITARY COOPERATION

[05] AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA RESOLVE PIPELINE DISAGREEMENTS

[06] GEORGIAN CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION APPEALS ON BEHALF OF

[07] LEADING KYRGYZ OPPOSITION FIGURE ARRESTED

[08] UZBEK BORDER GUARDS AGAIN SEEK UNILATERAL DEMARCATION OF

[09] TURKMEN, AZERBAIJANI OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT TRANS-

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[10] CROATIAN PRESIDENT VISITS BOSNIA

[11] TUDJMAN'S PRESS EMPIRE CRUMBLING

[12] UN: STILL RESISTANCE TO MULTI-ETHNIC BOSNIA

[13] BOSNIAN MUHAJEDIN TO BE RESETTLED

[14] INTERPOL PUTS MILOSEVIC ON WANTED LIST

[15] SERBIAN OPPOSITION SETS PROTEST DATE

[16] NO RUSSIAN POLICE FOR KOSOVA

[17] FORMER ROMANIAN OFFICIALS DENY EXISTENCE OF HOT LINE TO

[18] ...BUT ROMANIAN DAILY TO PRODUCE PROOF

[19] ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONNECTS VISA PROBLEM TO ROMA

[20] GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS PROTEST OUTSIDE ROMANIAN MINE

[21] IMF REPEATS WARNING TO MOLDOVA

[22] BULGARIAN OPPOSITION MEMBERS TO MARK NATO BOMBING ANNIVERSARY

[23] THOUSANDS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT IN BULGARIA

[C] END NOTE

[24] CAN PUTIN MOVE RUSSIA BEYOND OBSTRUCTIONISM?

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] MOSCOW CONDEMNS ATTACK ON KARABAKH PRESIDENT

Foreign Ministry official on 22 March expressed "indignation"

over the previous night's assassination attempt in

Stepanakert against Arkadii Ghukasian, president of the

unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Interfax reported.

"This is not the way to handle political issues." the

official said. In Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Aram

Sargsian told the parliament that the situation in the

unrecognized republic is calm. Ghukasian and his wounded

bodyguard and driver were transported to Yerevan for medical

treatment on 22 March. LF

[02] VETERAN ARMENIAN DISSIDENT ASSESSES POLITICAL SITUATION

Determination Union Chairman Paruyr Hairikian, who also heads

the presidential human rights commission, said the

appointment of Aram Sargsian as prime minister was "a

political mistake" in the light of his lack of political

experience, Snark reported. Hairikian characterized the

present situation as a struggle for power by all political

parties and argued that there is a need to amend the

constitution to stipulate that both the president and the

premier are elected for a three-year term. Hairikian

expressed concern over the progress of the inquiry into the

27 October parliament shootings, in particular the arrest of

three suspects solely on the basis of testimony given by the

leader of the five gunmen who perpetrated the killings. LF

[03] ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT AMENDS LAW ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

voted on 22 March to amend the law on nuclear energy to

require that the government coordinate with the legislature

any measures on the operation of the existing nuclear power

station or construction of a new one, according to Snark, as

cited by Groong. Also on 22 March, an ad hoc commission

presented to the parliament the findings of an inquiry begun

last October that confirm suspicions that corruption and

inefficiency in the energy sector has cost Armenia millions

of dollars over the past eight years, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau

reported. LF

[04] AZERBAIJAN, U.S. PLEDGE TO EXPAND MILITARY COOPERATION

Force in Europe, met with Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliev

in Baku on 21 March and with Foreign Minister Vilayat Guliev

the following day to discuss expanding bilateral military

cooperation, Turan reported. Abbot expressed his appreciation

to Guliev for the participation of an Azerbaijani contingent

in the KFOR peacekeeping operation in Kosova, and presented

him with a program of measures Azerbaijan is to undertake in

the field of security, defense, humanitarian programs, mine-

clearing, and promoting democracy. LF

[05] AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA RESOLVE PIPELINE DISAGREEMENTS

in Tbilisi on 22 March, Azerbaijani President Aliev and his

Georgian counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, reportedly

resolved their outstanding disagreements over the export of

Azerbaijan's Caspian oil via the planned Baku-Ceyhan export

pipeline, AP and Turan reported. Aliev said at a joint press

conference that he has agreed to increase the transit tariff

that Georgia will receive per metric ton of oil transported

through the pipeline, but he did not say by how much. In late

February, Aliev said that Tbilisi's demand for 3 percent of

the crude transported plus 20 cents per barrel in transit

fees was "unrealistic." LF

[06] GEORGIAN CENTRAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION APPEALS ON BEHALF OF

The Central Electoral Commission

wrote to Adjar Supreme Council chairman Aslan Abashidze on 21

March demanding that he permit former Batumi Mayor Tengiz

Asanidze to campaign for the Georgian presidency, Interfax

reported. Asanidze has spent the past seven years in jail

after being convicted of theft of state property. He was

amnestied last fall by President Shevardnadze, but the Adjar

authorities refused to release him (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 7

and 12 October 1999). Meanwhile, the OSCE election observer

mission in Georgia has denied the claim by opposition

candidate Djumber Patiashvili's campaign manager Mamuka

Giorgadze that it detailed a special observer to accompany

Patiashvili on his campaign engagements, Caucasus Press

reported (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 March 2000). LF

[07] LEADING KYRGYZ OPPOSITION FIGURE ARRESTED

Mayor and opposition Ar-Namys Party Chairman Feliks Kulov was

taken on 22 March from a Bishkek hospital to the Ministry of

National Security for questioning, Reuters and Interfax

reported. Kulov was charged with abuse of office during his

term as head of the National Security Ministry in 1997-1998.

Also on 22 March, police dispersed several hundred

demonstrators in the town of Kara-Buura who had been

picketing the local administration building to protest

Kulov's defeat in the 12 March parliamentary runoff. Thirty

protesters were arrested, according to Interfax. LF

[08] UZBEK BORDER GUARDS AGAIN SEEK UNILATERAL DEMARCATION OF

Excavators and trucks crossed from

Uzbekistan 10 kilometers into the territory of the South

Kazakhstan Oblast on 22 March and began unsanctioned border

demarcation work, RFE/RL's Almaty bureau reported the

following day quoting an oblast Interior Ministry official.

It is the second such attempt by Uzbekistan this year (see

"RFE/RL Newsline," 28 January 2000 and "End Note," 2 February

2000). On 23 March, former Kazakhstan Customs head and

unsuccessful 1999 presidential candidate Ghani Qasymov noted

that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have similar border problems

with Uzbekistan. He called for the Kazakh leadership to begin

discussing the creation of a military bloc of Central Asian

states aligned against Uzbekistan. LF

[09] TURKMEN, AZERBAIJANI OFFICIALS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT TRANS-

Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov told

Shell Oil officials on 22 March in Ashgabat that the

proposals submitted earlier this week by Shell's partner, the

U.S. company PSG, for proceeding with construction of the

Trans-Caspian gas export pipeline are unacceptable, Interfax

reported. ITAR-TASS had reported on 20 March that Niyazov

refused to extend PSG's mandate for the project, which

expired in February. Niyazov said that "with virtually no

support at state level," it is unlikely work on the pipeline,

tentatively scheduled to begin in early 2001, will start in

the near future. In Baku, Azerbaijan state oil company

president Natik Aliev similarly expressed doubt that the

Trans-Caspian pipeline will be completed on schedule in late

2002, according to Interfax. He said "long and detailed"

negotiations will be needed before construction can begin.

But he denied that plans by Azerbaijan to export gas from its

Shah Deniz Caspian deposit by alternative route will render

the Trans-Caspian pipeline unnecessary. LF

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[10] CROATIAN PRESIDENT VISITS BOSNIA

Sarajevo on 23 March for a two-day visit. It is his first

official trip to another country as Croatia's leader. He told

"Oslobodjenje" that his country will no longer interfere in

Bosnia's internal affairs or finance the Herzegovinian para-

state known as Herceg-Bosnia. He argued that the para-state

must be dissolved, calling it a throwback to the days when

Croatia's previous leadership sought to partition Bosnia. The

president pledged that he will restore full legal status as

recognized national minorities to Croatia's Slovenes and

Bosnian Muslims, which the previous leadership abolished.

Mesic is slated to meet with Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian

members of Bosnia's central government. He will also hold

talks with Cardinal Vinko Puljic and Father Petar Andjelovic

of the influential Franciscan fathers. PM

[11] TUDJMAN'S PRESS EMPIRE CRUMBLING

appointed a committee on 22 March to investigate how

individuals close to the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)

of the late President Franjo Tudjman acquired ownership of

"Vecernji list" several years ago, "Jutarnji list" reported.

The individuals, whose identities have never been made

public, have long used the mass-circulation Zagreb daily as a

mouthpiece of the HDZ. The government previously announced

plans to sell the Zagreb daily "Vjesnik," which also

represented the HDZ's views. On 22 March, the Split-based

"Slobodna Dalmacija" reported that nearly 100 members of its

staff protested against the pro-HDZ polices of the

newspaper's management. PM

[12] UN: STILL RESISTANCE TO MULTI-ETHNIC BOSNIA

Secretary-General Hedi Annabi told the UN Security Council on

22 March that the progress achieved toward integrating

Bosnia's three ethnic communities since the end of the war in

1995 is primarily the result of actions by the international

community. He added that there has been "significant

resistance by entrenched nationalistic and backward-looking

elements, which continues to be encountered at every stage,"

AP reported. The council began to discuss a report by

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in which he noted that the UN

"has had to take strong action to seek to overcome continued

obstruction, resistance, and delay in some key areas." Those

problems include setting up a joint border police force, the

refusal of the Herzegovinian Croats to integrate their police

with those of the Muslims, and the lack of non-Serbian

members in the Republika Srpska police. PM

[13] BOSNIAN MUHAJEDIN TO BE RESETTLED

in Maglaj told "Oslobodjenje" of 23 March that Bosnia's

Muslim leaders have agreed to resettle Bosnian and foreign

Islamic fighters currently living in the village of Bocinja

Donja. The Muslim authorities will "urge" some 89 Bosnian

Muslim families there to return to their former communities.

The authorities will also ask foreign fighters married to

Bosnian women to resettle in their spouse's home community or

to return to their own country. The officials added that

Bosnian law grants the right of abode to any foreigner who

has become naturalized through marriage to a Bosnian citizen.

Observers note that the presence of the fighters remains a

sore point in relations between the Sarajevo leadership and

NATO. PM

[14] INTERPOL PUTS MILOSEVIC ON WANTED LIST

call on the Internet for the arrest of Yugoslav President

Slobodan Milosevic for genocide and war crimes, RFE/RL's

South Slavic Service reported on 22 March. The appeal also

includes a call for the arrest of four other high-ranking

officials of the Belgrade regime whom the Hague-based war

crimes tribunal indicted in 1999. PM

[15] SERBIAN OPPOSITION SETS PROTEST DATE

Serbia's main opposition parties agreed in Belgrade on 22

March to hold a protest rally there on 14 April (see "RFE/RL

Newsline," 22 March 2000). A joint demonstration originally

planned for March never took place because the opposition

leaders could not agree on the order in which they would

speak. Also on 22 March, leaders of the pensioners' union

held a protest meeting to call attention to the poverty

affecting many of Serbia's elderly. PM

[16] NO RUSSIAN POLICE FOR KOSOVA

statement in Moscow on 23 March that Russia will not send any

police to Kosova. "The position of the United Nations

[leadership] about the speediest deployment of an

international police force in the province causes

incomprehension. On the one hand, attention is constantly

drawn to an acute shortage of police forces there. On the

other, various pretexts are being found to delay for several

months the arrival of Russian Interior Ministry officers for

service in the contingent of the special police of the United

Nations mission," AP reported the statement as saying.

Repeating a view that Russian officials have frequently

expressed, the statement added that "negative

tendencies...have gone too far. The situation regarding

ensuring the security of the non-Albanian population is

constantly growing worse, while the activity of [ethnic

Albanian] separatists, terrorists, and criminal structures is

on the rise." PM

[17] FORMER ROMANIAN OFFICIALS DENY EXISTENCE OF HOT LINE TO

Alliance for Romania Chairman Teodor Melescanu,

who was foreign minister under former President Ion Iliescu,

told journalists on 22 March that he is "not aware" that a

"hot line" between Bucharest and the Kremlin existed or that

negotiations with Russia aimed at reviving links between the

former Warsaw Pact capitals have "ever been conducted."

Likewise, Romanian National Party Chairman Virgil Magureanu,

who was head of the Romanian Intelligence Service under

Iliescu, told journalists in Suceava that a hot line "never

existed" and that the "scandal surrounding this problem is

stupid." Former Foreign Intelligence Service head Ioan Talpes

told journalists that "parleys, not negotiations" were under

way with Russia against the background of the pending basic

treaty. He said that "only the Kremlin" was interested in

resuscitating the line, RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau and

Mediafax reported. MS

[18] ...BUT ROMANIAN DAILY TO PRODUCE PROOF

March to the Senate's Defense Commission, General Ioan Sima,

chief of the Special Telecommunications Service, said that

the equipment delivered by Russia in May 1995 (see "RFE/RL

Newsline, 22 March 2000) was not destined for a "hot line but

for "the modernization of international telegraph links' and

that the "hot line" had not existed. He refused to elaborate,

citing "state secrets." But Cornel Nistorescu, editor in

chief of the daily "Evenimentul zilei," said on Romanian

Television that on 23 March his newspaper will publish a

document proving that former Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu

and Melescanu proposed that the government approve an accord

with Russia "concerning specially encrypted international

telephone links." According to Nistorescu, the two were

implementing a decision taken by the Supreme Defense Council,

headed by Iliescu. MS

[19] ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONNECTS VISA PROBLEM TO ROMA

an obligation to "protect 23 million Romanians against the

few thousand Gypsies" who are damaging the country's image

abroad and hampering the country's efforts to get off the

EU's visa blacklist, Rompres reported. Roman was speaking

after returning from a meeting of the Romania-EU Association

Council. VG

[20] GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS PROTEST OUTSIDE ROMANIAN MINE

of about 25 Greenpeace activists from various countries have

blocked the entrance to the Aurul gold mine in Baia Mare,

which caused a recent cyanide spill into the Tisza River,

Rompres reported on 22 March. The activists unfolded a banner

reading "Stop Cyanide. Esmeralda Must Pay," in a reference to

the Australian firm that owns the mine. The management of the

Aurul mine has refused to hold talks with the activists. The

activists said they are prepared to protest for several days

if necessary. VG

[21] IMF REPEATS WARNING TO MOLDOVA

Dumitru Diakov on 22 March told the legislature Budget

Committee that the country will not receive funding from the

IMF if it does not fulfill every aspect of the memorandum

that the fund signed with the Moldovan government, BASA-Press

reported on 22 March. Diakov was speaking after a meeting

with the IMF's permanent representative in Moldova, Hassan al

Atrash. Prime Minister Dumitru Braghis noted that the Budget

Committee's decision to raise expenditures in the draft

budget runs counter to the IMF's conditions. VG

[22] BULGARIAN OPPOSITION MEMBERS TO MARK NATO BOMBING ANNIVERSARY

Members of the Bulgarian Socialist Party have

decided to attend ceremonies in Serbia to mark the

anniversary of the beginning of the NATO bombing campaign

against Yugoslavia last year, BTA reported. The other parties

in parliament have refused to attend the ceremonies,

according to Union of Democratic Forces deputy Dimitur

Abadzhiev. Meanwhile, Aleksandur Tomov, the leader of the

Euro-Left, said on 22 March that his party will send

representatives to a congress of the opposition Social

Democrats in Belgrade. VG

[23] THOUSANDS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT IN BULGARIA

than 6,000 people marched through the streets of downtown

Sopfia on 22 March to demand higher wages and protest the

country's rising unemployment rate. The rally was organized

by the Confederation of Labor Unions. Confederation leader

Zhelyazko Hristov told the demonstrators he will demand

negotiations with the government. Unemployment in Bulgaria

stands at 17 percent. In other news, the Bulgarian parliament

on 22 March voted to restitute 23,000 hectares of forests to

a medieval monastery in Rila, BTA reported. The forests were

nationalized by the communist regime. VG

[C] END NOTE

[24] CAN PUTIN MOVE RUSSIA BEYOND OBSTRUCTIONISM?

In Soviet times, the prevailing communist concept of

equality was based on the notion that it was fairer for all

to fail than for one to prosper. As Russia has slid from the

reform path and turned further inward over the course of the

past half decade, it is reasonable to ask whether Vladimir

Putin's Russia will rely on this old Soviet model or on one

based upon cooperation and mutual advantage. For Russia's

immediate neighbors, the stakes are particularly high. And

the Baltic countries are a case in point.

Indeed, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are among the most

interested parties in the intense speculation over how

Putin's ideological orientation and governing style will

evolve once he obtains an electoral mandate. The Baltic

countries want to anchor themselves in the West and intend to

fulfill this goal by joining key Western institutions, namely

the EU and NATO. Over the past several years, Russia's stance

toward the Baltics has been demonstrably uncooperative on a

range of matters, including sensitive border disputes as well

as citizenship and language issues. Whether or not Putin

believes there is a long-term benefit for Russia through

cooperation with its three Baltic neighbors will determine if

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia realize their ambitions to

join Western clubs according to their own timetable, rather

than one controlled by Moscow.

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's

collapse, there was a period of cooperation, at times even

characterized as a "partnership," between Russia and the

West. But since the successes of communist and nationalist

forces in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, Russia

has moved away from such cooperation.

In fact, the nature of Russia's obstructionism over the

past several years can be seen to fall into two categories:

one active, the other passive. Active obstructionism was born

of the failure of Western-style reforms to take root and the

steady erosion of Russian living standards. Nationalists and

Communists took advantage of a sour popular mood to slow down

cooperation with the West on a number of fronts. While NATO's

action in Kosova clearly annoyed Russia, Moscow's

increasingly uncooperative posture predated the NATO

campaign.

But perhaps more troubling is the variant of Russian

obstructionism that is passive in nature, resulting

principally from political gridlock and administrative

incompetence. Severely drained by Russia's financial

collapse, institutional exhaustion and corruption, Boris

Yeltsin's administration was catatonic in its final years.

Yeltsin himself was the clearest emblem of the overall

moribund state. During this period, diplomats from

neighboring countries routinely complained that they were

unable to obtain decisions from Moscow or often simply could

not locate an appropriate official in Moscow to answer their

calls.

Russia's negative behavior manifested itself in other

ways, including the conduct of military exercises with such

provocative names as "Operation Comeback" on its borders with

the Baltic countries or threatening to apply sanctions or

otherwise isolate countries with which it disagreed. Russia

has recognized that its poor relations with the Baltic States

may be used as a tool to keep the Baltics from advancing

toward western institutions.

Unless insufficient turnout somehow complicates matters

by requiring further voting rounds, Putin's victory on 26

March seems assured. Much of his popularity is derived from

the substantial support he enjoys as a result of the war in

Chechnya and what is best described as the remilitarization

of Russia. For the time being at least, it appears the

campaign in Chechnya has served Putin's purpose, allowing him

to garner considerable domestic political support, while

simultaneously diverting attention from Russia's serious

economic and social ills.

It remains to be seen whether the campaign in Chechnya

will restore Russia's sense of prestige in the longer term.

Should the campaign ultimately fail, Russia would find itself

enfeebled to an even greater degree. Success achieved on the

basis of abject brutality is similarly no source of comfort.

Despite claims of Putin's ostensible administrative prowess,

rigorous discipline, and high energy levels, he may not be

capable of modernizing Russia quickly enough to keep pace

with the rest of the world. And at the same time, Russia may

not be willing simply to watch its immediate neighbors in the

Baltics advance and join the former Soviet satellites in

Central and Eastern Europe on the road to the West.

Furthermore, Putin's stated intention of restoring Russia's

strength and national prestige may not be consistent with

integration into the community of nations and cooperation

with Russia's neighbors.

Thus, if Moscow is unable to formulate a cooperative

policy of its own--or otherwise come to terms with the fact

that the Baltics and other states formerly under Moscow's

domination will eventually join the West--Putin's Russia may

end up playing the only role it believes it can, namely that

of spoiler.

The author is a New York-based analyst specializing in

Eastern European affairs (intrel@aol.com)

23-03-00

Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
URL: http://www.rferl.org

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Newsline Directory - Previous Article - Next Article