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Cyprus PIO: Speech by FM at the Cyprus Independence Dinner, London, 96-10-29

Cyprus Press and Information Office: Statements and Announcements in English Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office Server at <http://www.pio.gov.cy/>


Speech by H.E. Mr Alecos P. Michaelides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus at the "Cyprus Independence Dinner" of the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood (London, October 29, 1996)

Once again it is with great pleasure that I am addressing this distinguished gathering organised by the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood of London. This is my fourth address since I became Foreign Minister. Evaluating on the basis of the number of members of the House of Lords and House of Commons every year, we have a new record. I want to thank you all for your very encouraging response and I want to congratulate the Chairman, Mr Sophoclides and the members of the Committee of the Greek Cypriot Brotherhood for organizing yet another most successful event.

Distinguished members of the House of Lords, House of Commons, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In my address to you last year, I emphasised that for a solution to be found for the Cyprus problem, Turkey must be given the convincing signal that the P5 have come to the end of the line, and if there is no co-operation, action will be taken. And effective action can be taken under Chapter 7 by the Security Council. If, however, the efforts based on hoping that Turkey would stop its intransigent policy continue, nothing will be achieved but we shall simply be going through the motions with no result.

Recent events indicate Turkey is continuing its negative and provocative attitude towards any effort for solving the Cyprus problem.

In the recent months we have lived through some very tragic and painful experiences. Since last June, four Cypriots have been brutally murdered. These cruel acts shocked everybody when projected world-wide by the international media. A fellow Foreign Minister told me that he was visiting Viet Nam in those days and he saw the murders on local television.

It is not my intention to project these brutalities again, but to try to understand what is behind these murders. In effect, what Turkey and Denktash were trying to achieve.

The analysis of the cause of those murders is not to increase the burden of responsibilities, but to try to see through these events.

Let me start by stating that all four murders were reported by the Secretary General and condemned in very strong language. They were also condemned by the Security Council, the European Union and the leading countries, among the permanent members of the Security Council.

Let us try and see through these tragic incidents. The first incident took place on 3rd June this year. When a young soldier in the National Service after handing over with his replacement, stepped into the buffer zone calling his Turkish Cypriot friend and specifically addressing him as brother to meet in the buffer zone. The young man was brutally shot by a Turkish soldier.

On August 11th, some Greek Cypriot demonstrators totally unarmed, went into the buffer zone in Dherynia, trying to voice their demand for bringing an end to the division of the island. The demonstrators were attacked by extremists who came from the Turkish side, all bearing steel bars and wooden sticks. A young man, seeing a friend of his cruelly beaten, ran to help him. The Turkish extremists attacked the young man and beat him to death.

On August 14th, the day of the funeral of the young man who was murdered three days ago, a demonstrator run into the buffer zone protesting against the continuation of the occupation of the island, run to the end of the buffer zone, and started climbing on the pole where the Turkish flag was hoisted. A team of UN soldiers ran after him and were trying to get him down. They would have done so, except that he was shot brutally from several directions until he was dead.

On 13th of October, a man went out very early in the morning with his son-in-law to collect snails. The area they went is in the British Bases, but without realizing it he stepped a few meters into the occupied area. There is no barb wire or anything to indicate that the area is occupied nor is there buffer zone at this position. The Turkish soldiers called him to halt. He raised his hands, but he was shot with one bullet that went through his neck. The poor man kneeled on the ground. Then he was shot again with a bullet that went into his arm, and while lying on the ground he was shot for a third time.

By itemising these murders I am not disclosing you anything you don't know, but I am trying to make some observations.

Observation one is that, the three who have gone into the buffer zone without the necessary contact with Unficyp, were not right, nor was it wise for the fourth one to enter into the occupied area, but is this a reason for murdering people?

Observation two: some might claim that the soldiers acted in defence. But the buffer zone is policed by UN peacekeeping force and nobody has the right to bear arms in this area, much less to shoot..

Observation three: Was the shooting an impulsive reaction? In all four cases they could react without murdering.

Let's go back to the instances. The young soldier last June was shot in the buffer zone. A British soldier, member of UNFICYP, went to the direction where the young man was lying wounded, but he was threatened by Turkish soldiers not to help the young man lying on the ground. The young man was bleeding for 25 long minutes and by the time the Unficyp's men reached him, he had died.

The case of the young man on August 11th. They put him on the ground and would not stop beating him until he died. Again, the object was not to stop somebody from a specific act, but clearly to murder a person.

The third murder was a similar case. If they only had given a few minutes to Unficyp's soldiers, they would have succeeded bringing him down from the pole. Instead, they shot him repeatedly and he came down dead.

The last case is a similar one. The man was surrounded for 15 minutes until the Turkish soldiers evidently received instructions and then shot him three times, until the man was dead.

Bearing in mind that the incidents took place at different places, except the two cases in Dherynia, and different times, it is evident that the instruction to the Turkish soldiers along the green line is to shoot and kill. The question is why.

First of all, let us be reminded that Mr Denktash had made a statement saying that along the cease-fire line he has replaced the Turkish soldiers with the Turkish Cypriot soldiers. Why did he have to inform us about this? Shortly there after, we had the four incidents.

Nothing tell us that the soldiers who shot the victims were Turkish Cypriots. We do know that three of those who were beating Isaac were terrorists that came in from Turkey. Solomou was shot by a Turk from Turkey who was honoured by Denktash three days later by being appointed as "Minister of Agriculture" in his illegal regime.

It is quite clear that what Denktash was trying to do was to give the message that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots hate each other and therefore they cannot live together. Plus, sent a signal to the United States, Britain and others who might be thinking to be engaged in the Cyprus problem that the issue is very complicated and therefore, they should be staying out of it.

Regarding the question as to whether we can live together with the Turkish Cypriots, I can only say this: If Mr Denktash looks around, he will find that his countrymen are disappearing to Britain and Canada. More so, if he asks his countrymen, they will tell him that the real problem is not living together with us, but with the settlers from Anatolia, with whom, as they themselves recognise, don't share the same lifestyle, cultural background or anything.

Furthermore, if Mr Denktash sticks to his life-time dream of becoming the Head of a separate independent state not realising that if the present immigration trend continues it will not be before long that Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus will become very scarce.

Let me now make a last note on this matter. In many of the statements by which the murders were condemned, there was also an appeal to both sides to refrain from aggressive actions.

We hoped that the experience of the last 22 years must have demonstrated convincingly enough that such policy only raises Denktash's hopes that eventually his illegal regime will be recognised as an independent state.

Unfortunately, the same approach has been applied in the case of the four murders. Does anybody have any information that we are pursuing aggressive acts? Is it in our interest to promote clashes and incidents at the buffer zone? Definitely not. Our commitment was and remains: working for a solution through political dialogue and not through force. So, the appeal, regardless of the motivations of those who did it, was used as an escape for Denktash and Ankara since in this way we too could be blamed for the murders.

In concluding, let me reiterate one more time. Murdering people, coercing people and building-up tension on the buffer zone, is definitely not conducive to the efforts for a peaceful and lasting solution and in the long run, is not in the interest of either the Greek Cypriots, or the Turkish Cypriots.

We now have some unique opportunities that open up prospects for Cyprus and for its people as a whole. It is the responsibility of the Leadership of both the Greek Cypriot community and Turkish Cypriot community to see the opportunities and meet the challenges.

I am referring to the prospect of Cyprus joining the European Union and the present active engagement of those that can effectively help to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Let me first refer to the prospect of Cyprus joining the European Union.

From day one, Glafcos Clerides became the President of the Republic of Cyprus and I had the privilege of being appointed as his Foreign Minister, we set as the focus of our foreign policy, the future accession of Cyprus to the European Union. Less anybody would consider this as a policy of abandoning efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem, I want to make reference to two statements.

The statement made by President Clerides on the day of his investiture when he said: "We shall give priority to actions which aim at promoting the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. We shall undertake every effort to persuade the European Union that progress in Cyrpus's accession assist in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem".

Two days later, at a ceremony of taking over the Foreign Ministry, I stated the following: "The main axis of our foreign policy is what we call the European Orientation. By this we do not only mean pursuing our accession to the European Union, but also the activation of the European factor in the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem."

This is why, whereas our vision is to see Cyprus becoming a member of the European Union, our deep agony is to see an end to the division of our land and our people.

Let me say that during the last 31/2 years we had a series of milestones decisions: the issuing of the opinion confirming the eligibility of Cyprus to join the European Union, the commencement of substantive talks with the Commission after the decision of the Council of 4 October '93, the decisions of the European Union at Corfu and Essen, that Cyprus and Malta will be in the next enlargement and finally the March 6, 1995 decision declaring that the accession negotiations will start six months after the end of the Inter-governmental Conference.

Let me say that we had worked hard to get the decision for setting the time- table for the commencement of accession negotiations because we hoped that it could be a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

This approach of ours was explained to all our interlocutors in the Union, emphasising, that in order to be a catalyst, the signal had to be clear.

The decision of the Council was indeed very clear and it placed Turkey before a dilemma. Either to continue the policy of blocking a solution which would result in depriving the Turkish Cypriots of the possibility of sharing the benefits of accession or alternatively to compromise and allow a solution which would mean that the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, united, would share the great prospect of Cyprus being a member of the Union.

We have observed a series of statements by officials of some of the European members which are either trying to re-write the decision of the Council of 6 March '95, or use such words that could be subjected to more than one interpretation.

For example, they are trying to tell us that without a solution, Cyprus would find it extremely difficult to join the Union.

We are fully aware that at the end of the negotiating process, each country will be called upon to cast its vote whether they accept the entry of a country or not. But, have we asked any countries to be committed from now as to how they will vote when the moment comes? So, why are they trying to build doubt as to the outcome of the process? Could it be they are trying to exercise pressure on us, to co-operate for a solution of the Cyprus problem? This is also strange, because as we said time and again, our top priority is not the accession, but the solution to the Cyprus problem. Besides, if we were reluctant for a solution, why are you appealing to everybody and especially to the European Union itself to be actively engaged for a solution?

With such statements they are not sending any meaningful signal to us. But they are sending a clear signal to Turkey that it should not worry since Cyprus will not join the Union if the Cyprus problem is not solved. Indirectly they are also letting Turkey understand that it holds an effective tool for blocking our access by refusing to co-opere in finding solution to the Cyprus problem.

I don't want to attribute dubious intentions to those who are making these statements, specifically I am not saying that they are trying to block a decision. Definitely not. But I am only saying that regardless of their good intentions, these statements are really damaging the prospect of the accession negotiations becoming a real catalyst for a solution of the Cyprus problem.

I wish to make an appeal. The decisions of the competent bodies of the Union are there and they are very clear. Our responsibility is to respect them and implement them. Let us give them a chance. They might truly become a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Let me now touch on another issue, that is the present activities and initiatives regarding the efforts to find a solution of the Cyprus problem.

During the last 22 years a lot of initiatives were undertaken by the Representatives of the Secretary General of the UN, trying to find an end to the Cyprus problem. All initiatives failed. The reason for this failure is reported by the Secretary General itself in his Report to the Security Council of 30 May 1994, which states: "the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to a lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side". I want to add: lack of political will by Turkey too! The same conclusion appeared in the Report of the European Observer tabled in January 1995. It is therefore crystal clear that no matter how anxious we are for seeing an end to the Cyprus problem for as long as there is lack of political will, we cannot succeed.

It is quite evident that Turkey's aim is clearly to maintain the fait accompli, ignoring the statement made by so many that the present situation is unacceptable. Turkey's objective is to maintain the occupation of 37% of our land, the Turkish troops and what is worse continue the demographic change which is speedily taking place at the occupied part of the island.

Therefore, for any initiative to succeed, it must send a clear signal to Turkey, that we have come to the end of the line and that the solution will be brought about. If this message is not effectively sent to Ankara, neither the ingenuity, nor the strong wish to help us, will bring results.

The second point I want to make is that in the last 22 years many initiatives were undertaken by the Secretary General of the UN, but not an inch of land is freed not a single refugee has returned home. We do not question the role of the Secretary General, nor his wish to see progress on the Cyprus problem. But it is evident that what is required is effective political leverage on Turkey and Denktash to make them cooperate.

This is why we had urged those who can play an effective role, to be involved. We appealed to the United States not merely because it is the superpower but primarily because it is the country that has the power and the determination to be involved and help dealing with crises. We appealed to Britain, because it is a guarantor and can play a significant role. We appealed to the leading European nations and to the European Union itself. We stated in every case that we need every support we can get, but such engagement must be concerted, to be effective.

Let me say that we have some encouraging signs. Public statements by President Clinton. Exchanges we had when we visited him last June. Plus the activities of various of the United States administration officials and the appointment of Mr Beattie as the Presidential envoy. All together give clear evidence that the United States will be definitely directly engaged on the Cyprus problem. How deep the engagement will be, remains to be soon demonstrated when the elections are over.

We are especially encouraged by the fact that Britain is showing special interest and trying to help on the peace process, as evidenced by the several meetings we had with Prime Minister Mr John Major, the forthcoming visit to Cyprus of the Foreign Secretary Mr Malcolm Rifkind for the purpose of the Cyprus problem, and of course the appointment of a Special envoy. The appointment of Sir David Hannay, whose capacity is highly recognized from the days he was the Representative of Britain at the UN is a significant contribution to the whole effort.

It is also encouraging that the number of MP's from all parties showing a keen interest in the Cyprus cause, is constantly growing as it is evidenced and by tonight's record of attendance to this event. The voices of British MP's at the Council of Europe are also another expression of increased interest on the Cyprus problem.

Last but not least, let me underline the great importance we attach to the role of the European Parliament and all the support and understanding we are getting from members of the Parliament from British Representatives, never failing express our appreciation to Pauline Green who has always fought for our cause and enthusiastically offered her support based on the principles of the respect of human rights and the rule of law.

Let me say that Sir David Hannay paid his second visit to Cyprus which I should underline was well prepared. He came with a long and exhaustive list of questions on all the key issues on the Cyprus problem and therefore, the exchange was substantive and underlined that he was seriously and deeply in the whole exercise.

Since the Italian Presidency, every Presidency appoints a Special envoy for Cyprus. I want to repeat what I said to Mme Agnelli when she was planning to proceed with the appointment of a Special envoy and I repeated to others too. We appreciate every gesture done by anybody regardless of whether the result is small or large. But the European Union, has a key role to play, especially in the internal aspects of the problem. The European Union can be a source of advice since it has 15 members, with 15 constitutions and I don't know how many problems and how many challenges.

Also it is vital that whatever is agreed during the negotiations for finding a solution should be in line with the aquis communautaire, in view of our future accession. Imagine if we solve the problem and then we find out that some instances do not fit into the aquis communautaire. But this engagement of the European Union to be effective, must have the endorsement of the Council and make use of the expertise of the Commission. Also key countries of the Union such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy and others are encouraged to make their contribution. In our mind this is the way for the European Union to be actively engaged.

Now let us make some comments on the approach we think appropriate to pursue in our efforts for a solution, in view of the process that has already started.

We said time and again that discussing elements of a solution in isolation and focusing exclusively on legalistic matters will not get us anywhere. We must go for a package solution trying, seeking agreement on the key elements of a solution.

I am referring to the issue of security, territory, basic freedoms and human rights, constitutional structures and of course part of the parcel of the agreement is the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. This approach is now widely accepted and is definitely the basis of the British and American approach.

As far as the process is concerned, we suggested that through an active consultation process we seek convergence on key issues, what we call common ground, which will show if direct negotiations have a chance for success. When we establish convergence, we will enter into direct negotiations. When we refer to direct negotiations we are not suggesting periodic meetings, but a very intensive dialogue.

Regarding the timing for this whole operation, we feel that the interim time until accession negotiations start, provides a unique opportunity . I cannot think of a more ideal arrangement than finding a solution of the Cyprus problem and all of us embark on the accession negotiations.

Regarding the interim time available, the accession negotiations, as we all know, will start six months after the Inter-governmental Conference, which means that they will start at the end of '97 or beginning of '98.

One has to bear in mind that from July or August next year, it will be the beginning of political activity for the forthcoming Presidential elections of 1998. With this in mind we consider that up until the end of February or March we should be able to complete the intensive consultation process and if all go well, embark on intensive direct negotiations from March or April onward. So, the period ahead of us can be truly a crucial period.

I want to assure you that we are doing all the necessary preparation work and we shall definitely do all we can for making the best of the opportunity arising. If all who have shown keen interest in the Cyprus issue, manage to send the necessary signals to the Turkish side and get them to really face the challenge to bring an end to the long standing problem, we can look forward to positive developments.

Because the timing is so crucial, I appeal to all our friends, to redouble their efforts and make this a great moment for a new beginning of efforts to bring an end to the division of our land and our people. To build a new common future for the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.


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