PRESS RELEASE OF MR. EVANGELOS VENIZELOS MINISTER OF PRESS AND MEDIA SPOKESMAN OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT (13.2.95) ========================================================== Mr. Evangelos Venizelos, spokesman for the Greek Government and Minister of Press and Media, answered questions related to Greece's foreign policy during a lunch-debate held on February 13th, 1995, at Fouquet's restaurant in Paris by the French Diplo- matic Press Association. Herewith you will find a summary of answers given by Mr. Venizelos to the journalists' questions. Introduction ------------ I am fully aware that my country does not have the best pos- sible image in the foreign Press, and in particular in the French -speaking Press. We are however conducting our country's foreign policy and not a campaign on international public relations. We are fully aware of our Geography. We are not bound by stereotypes or misunderstandings. We know the actual situation in the region as well as the real balance of powers and we are ready to contribute to the stability and peace in the Balkan peninsula. As you know, the Greek society is flexible and Orthodox, yet deeply Western and European. The surveys published every semester show that Greece staunchly supports the European perspectives and the idea of Europe's unification. For this reason, I believe, we can find a common language with our European partners and in particular with our French partners and friends. The links between Greece and France are not only symbolic or cultural, but also strong political and economic. Greece and the European Union ----------------------------- Few months after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, Greece ratified the latter, almost unanimously. In France, on the contrary, there was a hard political confrontation on the subject of the Treaty's ratification and we have witnessed an extremely delicate campaign on the referendum during which France seemed to have been split in two. Other countries have known similar situations. The Danish society, its electorate, simply rejected the Maastricht Treaty. Why then should one think that Greece is the country causing problems to the functioning of the European Union and to its perspectives? We are not isolated. We are the European branch in the Balkan peninsula and when Western Europe underestimates the Balkan and Mediterranean dimension, she loses financial opportunities, as well as investment opportunities. As for the costs-benefits balance, or the economic balance in that matter between the European Union and Greece, I happened to read some comments in which a simplistic view prevailed, name- ly that the economic relation between the European Union and Greece is unilateral. As if Greece was the poor relative from the Balkans and did nothing but receiving financial support and subsides from the European Union. Greece's market is the country's contribution to the European Union, marked by the comparative advantage of a flexible economy, that can be post-industrial and well adapted to the present situation of world economy. European companies have access to large public works. The Delors 2 package is a huge budget available to European enterprises, not to Greek ones. No Community country intends to give aid or subsidies. The tight economic balance between the European Union and Greece favours the former, not the latter. Common Foreign and Defence Policy --------------------------------- The Yugoslav question, the central issue of our days, constitutes a fundamental test for the common foreign policy of the European Union. Greece is the only European Union member-state in the Balkans and has a very good knowledge of the situation in the region. The question of Greece's proximity with Turkey, the problem of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the dismantling of Yugoslavia are major problems in the region. In view of its geographical position and of its experience, Greece is the only European Union member-state able to perceive this problem of instability and insecurity in its fullest. That explains the special sensitivity my country has when confronting the various political manipulations and options rising in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. Furthermore, Greece faces the problem of FYROM's usurpation of Greek national symbols and her official quasi-irredentist declarations made at the Constitutional level which, in the long run, threaten the stability and security of the region. We have to react and our analysis of the situation must be pertinent. This accounts for Greece's reservations, the particular Greek sensitivity. Do we accept the fact the European Union and the other 14 member-states have a special interest in the Balkan and Mediterranean dimension of the United Europe? Is the United Europe only Continental Europe, in the narrow sense of the word? It is Greece that bears and ensures the Balkan and a Mediterranean dimension of Europe and our European friends, our partners, must take this dimension into account. Each European Union member-state brings its own specificities into the universe of the Community. This gives to the cultural and political diversity of the United Europe, its grandeur. We have a 15-member European Union, not a two-member - with the French-German axis -, nor a three-member - with the British specificity. Why then are there reservations in relation to the Greek positions? Concerning the common foreign policy, the rule of unanimity is in force. Each country has the right to adopt a different attitude. This at this level, it is not Greece that creates problems. If we can rationalise the British attitude and its historical ties with America, if we can rationalise the predominant role played by Germany in European affairs, if we can rationalise the establishment of the French-German axis, then we can also rationalise the Greek stand. Customs union between Turkey and the European Union --------------------------------------------------- Immediately after Greece joined the EEC - presently the European Union - our position was to reject the process leading to a customs union between Turkey and the European Union on political grounds, namely Turkey's behaviour towards the Cypriot question and, above all, the continuous military occupation of the island since 1974. After the Copenhagen and Corfu summits, the perspective of Cyprus and Malta joining the European Union and the beginning of the negotiation process in view of Cyprus adherence changed the above mentioned situation. We can now ensure a commitment to the negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union; we can envisage in a parallel and simultaneous way the customs union with Turkey and the beginning of the negotiations for Cyprus' adherence. For this reason we have modified our stable and absolutely negative position on the customs union with Turkey and we have adopted a more flexible one. We now accept the customs union with Turkey if the Council of Ministers accepts that negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union begin six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. Our present position regarding the rapprochement of Turkey and the European Union is extremely flexible. However the issue of Turkey is not a Greek problem. There is a European institutional and political culture, there is a European sensitivity in relation to human rights and to the functioning of democratic institutions of representation in Turkey. These objections are fundamentally European and not Greek. In the last Council for General Affairs held in Brussels on February 6th, Greece while expressing great reservations and accepted "ad referendum" the Council's conclusion pertaining to the customs union on the one hand and the adherence of Cyprus on the other. But each word, in foreign -as well as in domestic policy- plays a role. Exactly because in our political universe words are deeds. Greece is thus asking for some minor changes in the text, easily applicable since the major countries of the Union accept our interpretation of the political commitment to start the negotiations between Cyprus and the European Union. The Greek requests, formulated in the letter Prime Minister Andrea Papandreou addressed to the heads of government of the European States, are the following: First point: The conclusion draft accepted "ad referendum" stipulates that the adherence negotiations "can be initiated" six months after the end of the Conference, taking the results of the same into consideration. Greece requests an amendment that could be qualified as a linguistic one. The suggested formula is the following: "That the adherence negotiations begin six months after the end of the intergovernmental Conference". At a political level the difference between the expression "can be initiated" and the expression "begin" is the difference between a decla- ration with nuances and reservation and a clear and stable decla- ration. This amendment van easily be made as there are neither nuances nor reservations in relation to Cyprus' adherence. Second point: As you know, the Cypriot administration has unilaterally carried out the legislative and practical harmonisa- tion between Cyprus and the European Union. Cyprus is a country almost fully harmonised in a great extend with the Community's attainments and intends to adopt in due time, concrete proposals pertaining to a specific strategy in view of the adherence, in- cluding a constructive dialogue. We ask for the "establishment of a constructive dialogue with this country similar to the dialogue between the European Union and the Eastern and Central European associate countries". Third point: The suppression in the text of the reference related to specific amounts, in the framework of the financial co-operation with Turkey, while stressing that this co-operation will be carried out subsequently. Greece requests the formulation of a reservation on the competence of the European Council and of the European Parliament in relation to the ratification of the annual European budget. It is a procedure that is already provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. One has to take into consideration the sensitivity of the European Parliament on human rights issues and the political and institutional situation in Turkey. Fourth point: There is also the issue of the textile industry in Greece. Obviously, it is a question of another nature and dimension, that is nevertheless very important for the Greek economy. It is necessary to envision ways to support the textile industry in Greece. At this point, no reference to figures or to concrete measures is made, as it is a modest formulation. Our position is reasonable in its nuances and is based on European data and not on some kind of Greek obsession or nationalism. The European perspective is approached with realism and pertinence. We hope that the French Presidency of the European Union - that views the Greek Prime Minister's letter in a very friendly and flexible manner - will find the appropriate way to guide the discussions and find a formula acceptable to all. The German Council of Ministers interpretation of the Council's conclusions in relation to beginning of negotiations was similar to ours. The Yugoslav crisis ------------------- Greece does not participate in the unfolding of the Yugoslav crisis. She does not take sides to the crisis, she is simply a neighbouring country having the same impartial attitude towards Serbia and towards the other former Yugoslav republics. We have friendly relations with Serbia, but also with Croatia. As a member of the European troika, Greece has played a highly moderating role in relation to the acceptance of projects and group contacts. Last Friday, our Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Papoulias met Mr. Jovanovic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia. Why does the European public opinion have the impression that Greece participates in the Yugoslav crisis, that she plays an active role in the evolution of the situation in former Yugoslavia? The answer could be Orthodoxy. This apparent conflict between the Croatian Catholicism and the Serbian Orthodoxy, and the fact that Greece is an Orthodox country, creates a situation where anyone could think that the two Orthodox countries, Greece and Serbia, maintain discreet, historical or even transcendental links and that this fact multiplies the problems in former Yugoslavia. That is not so... This is a metaphysical approach that oversimplifies the situation. On the other hand, as you know, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia does not participate at all in the Yugoslav crisis. The issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) -------------------------------------------------------------- FYROM is a small republic, a small country, with political stability and social instability but without military problems. Difficulties do not derive directly from the issue of the flag, nor form the quasi-irredentist declaration in the text of the Constitution of this Republic. Our concern derives from the fragility and instability of this artificial country, with an artificial society that creates daily acute confrontations between the Albanian, Slav, Muslim, etc. elements. History has already shown this and we are fully aware of it. This was the image of the region in the period between the two World Wars. A return to this situation is dangerous for the Balkans. For this reason our attitude is full of reservations. As far as the public, that is the state behaviour is concerned, the flag and the Constitution are the official codification of a hostile propaganda which could take greater dimensions and which we cannot accept. Let us formulate a work assumption: for the shake of an argument we can accept the name of Macedonia, the Constitution, the flag and we will thus find a modus vivendi. A month later, FYROM's hostile propaganda would cause violent confrontation between the two countries. Our constant position in relation to the flag, the Constitution and the name allows the problem to be solved at the level of the relations between the two States and at the same time at a social level. FYROM's society knows very well that she can have privileged relations with the Greek society, with the Greek market and its entrepreneurs. On the other hand, Greek investors will be present in FYROM's economic life. We participate in the mediation organised by the UN under the leadership of Mr. Cyrus Vance and we have placed on the negotiation table extremely flexible proposals on all the points of dispute between the two countries. We have proposals on the flag and the Constitution aiming at finding a modus vivendi in relation to the name. We have also submitted a global proposal that will permit, in a short while, the creation of an actual relation between the two countries. The U.N. Secretary General and Mr. Cyrus Vance realised a few months ago that the real problem was caused by the extremely rigid position taken by Mr. Gligorov and Mr. Ceverkovski, excluding any leeway in the discussion. The last meeting, in Geneva, was held right after the presidential and legislative elections in FYROM. We were expecting a change of attitude after these elections but the competent U.N. bodies notice a more rigid, more provoking attitude. We are now facing FYROM's total rejection on three levels: the name, the flag, the Constitution. Few words on the historical evolution of the problem. After the dismantling of Yugoslavia and FYROM's declaration of independence, we were facing only the problem of the name. A few months later, an amendment to the Constitution intensified the provocation as the new provisions were even more shocking than the old ones. And, months after that, the new flag, bearing the star of Vergina, was adopted - an artificial flag, without any tradition or reason of existence. It is not therefore an improvement of FYROM's attitude but, on the contrary, a continuous creation of more heavier and more complicated problem, caused solely by the Government of Skopje. As for the flag, anyone is free to use the national symbols which belong to his national tradition. The government of Skopje can thus choose a flag derived from FYROM's national and state tradition. In relation to the Constitutional provisions, their amendment should now be a very easy matter as President Gligorov has a qualified majority in the Parliament. Greece expects FYROM to use a formula similar to the one used in the Hellenic Constitution regarding the Greek Diaspora. As for the name, we do not accept a name that includes the word Macedonia or adjectives deriving from it. This is a condition for FYROM's legal recognition by Greece and not a condition regarding the actual state of affairs between the two countries. Finally, the economic embargo decided by Greece against FYROM is a political measure taken after the realisation that the attitude of Skopje's authorities is more rigid and provocative than before. We are ready to lift the embargo if FYROM's government accepts to amend the Constitution and change the flag. We never linked the embargo to the issue of the name. Differences between Bosnia and FYROM ------------------------------------- The problem of minorities belongs to the historical destiny of the Balkan peninsula. The national State is a reality present in the world after the collapse of the socialist regimes. Bosnia is a historical and political entity with a continuity and tradition, under the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, etc. FYROM's situation is not the same. This Republic, as a federal state of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was an artificial region, conceived and imposed by Tito for internal reasons. The society of this Republic is an artificial society because it combines Albanian, Slav and Muslim elements which do not have a tradition of coexistence. The situation in Bosnia cannot be compared to FYROM's. The great paradox is that Greece actually supports the existence and the prosperity of FYROM. In this region, we are the country most friendly disposed towards the society and the state structures of FYROM. We can have privileged economic, commercial, etc. relations between the two countries. Our position, in relation to the name and the minor problems of the flag and of the Constitution is an actual position which, in the historical perspective, allows this Republic to find more stable, less fragile solutions. The relations with Albania -------------------------- There has been an improvement in the relations between Albania and Greece after the freeing of the four leaders of the Greek Orthodox minority in Albania. We hope that in the upcoming weeks, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries will be able to hold a meeting in Tirana or Athens in order to solemnly ratify the improvement in bilateral relations. Moreover Greece investors in Albania are second only to Italians. It is certainly the good knowledge that Greece has of the Balkans which has promoted Greek-Albanian relations, with the international community supporting he Greek position. Results are there to be seen. The case of the imam Aga in Western Thrace ------------------------------------------- The President of the Turkish Republic, Mr. Demirel, wrote a letter to the President of the Republic of Greece, Mr. Karamanlis, on the subject of the imam Aga. In his answer, our president formulated a reserve in relation to the eventual exercise of the privilege of presidential pardon. Mr. Aga is an imam, an Islamic religious official, and he exercises his religious duties without any problem. In Greece, according to the internal legislation and in conformity with the Treaty of Lausanne, that forms the legal framework of the situation of Greek Muslims, the mufti is a state official with administrative and jurisdictional functions. As such, he must be nominated according to the procedure stipulated in the Treaty of Lausanne and the Greek legislation, that is firstly announcement of candidacy and then choice among candidates. Mr. Aga did not submit his candidacy and eventually anther imam has been nominated mufti. In Turkey, a secular state, muftis do not have jurisdictional and administrative competencies. The situation of muftis in Greece is therefore better than in Turkey.