Subject: 06 SEPT 95 (NATO) NEWS CONFERENCE - NAPLES From: James Mitchell TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE ADMIRAL LEIGHTON W. SMITH COMMANDER IN CHIEF ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE NATO RECOMMENCES AIR STRIKES AGAINST BOSNIAN SERBS NATO CLUB, HQ. AFSOUTH, NAPLES, ITALY 9 AM 6 SEPT 1995 As you know, NATO air assets recommenced strike operations against Bosnian Serb military significant targets in Bosnia Herzegovina. The reason for the recommencement is that NATO and the United Nations have collectively agreed on certain conditions which must be met. Those conditions 1, were not met, and 2, certainly there was no indication that there was intent on the Bosnian Serbs' part to meet them. Let me tell you that Gen. Janvier and I consulted very closely throughout the afternoon and night of the 4th; our assessment early in the evening of the fourth suggested that there was almost no indications of movement of heavy weapons. Later in the evening we did get some indications of heavy weapons moving, but unfortunately, the restrictions of movement on the part of Gen. Smith's forces, as well as inclement weather, prevented us from making a thorough assessment. Therefore, rather than miscalculate and recommence operations based on limited information, Gen. Janvier and I conferred and agreed that we should extend the period of assessment throughout the night and into the next day. On the morning of the 5th, we talked very early after daylight, we compared that information that had been put together by Gen. Smith's forces in Sarajevo, as well as that which had been gathered by NATO air assets after the weather cleared. I can assure you that the movement of heavy weapons was very insignificant, and by no means did it indicate any willingness to comply with Gen. Janvier's previous letter, and a letter from Gen. Smith to Mladic outlining the methodology by which he should withdraw those weapons. We therefore collectively decided at around 9:45 local yesterday that we should ask Gen. Ryan to recommence NATO airstrike operations, which as you now know started shortly after 1 o'clock. I must stress the fact that throughout this entire assessment process, Gen. Janvier and I conferred closely and we were never in disagreement on anything, to include what we were seeing, to include the extension of the assessment period, and to include the commencement of strike operations. I think that is a very good working relationship that I clearly enjoy at this point, in the sense that we communicate frequently, and again, we concur. Now there are three conditions and you know that they are: -(repeats them) Those objectives remain, they are not negotiable, and we have seen no evidence that the Bosnian Serbs are willing to comply. Let me just finish by telling you that it would be a very grave mistake indeed to doubt the resolve of NATO and the United Nations in proceeding until we achieve those objectives. Now you know that we are operating from bases in Italy. I continue to be extraordinarily thankful for the cooperation of out Italian hosts. All nations who have aircraft asigned are now participating in some form or other in Deny Flight operations. This flow chart refers to yesterday. It begins at roughly 1300 local, the times here are GMT times. We were hitting storage depots, ammunition depots, repair facilities, and communications command and control nodes. We followed closely on with additional strikes throughout the afternoon, but at this point here, the weather closed in, and so from that point, there were no strikes conducted into last night and early in the morning. However, the weather has cleared -- just before coming here, I spoke to Gen Ryan. We have been able to get strikes into Bosnia this morning, and he reports very successfully on the results of those strikes. We will continue these strike opertions for the foreseeable future. We do have some video .... Group Capt Murray, Air Ops, explains 5 video clips of attacks on various installations: 1: command and control communications node at Jahorina; an F-16 aircraft dropping 1,000-lb laser-guided bomb. We consider the target destroyed. 2: ammunition storage depot at Hadzici; the target was a storage building within the depot. 3: command and control facility, a bunker -- conducted by an F-16; direct hit. 4: another ammunition storage depot at Visegrad; attack aircraft, US Marine Corps F-18; direct hit. 5: another ammuniton depot, Sarajevo area; French Mirage, 1000-lb. laser-guided munition; a direct hit. There will be copies of the tape available after the briefing. Adm. Smith. Thank you Trevor. And I'd like to make one final comment, that we continue to devote a great number of our assets to the search for, and eventual rescue, of the French pilots. Now I'd be happy to take your questions. Q (AP): NATO and the UN have said the Bosnian Serbs have to learn their lesson and understand that both of you are serious about the un-negotiable conditions, but some of the conditions have been around over a year and a half... like the 20 km exclusion zone. Do you think at this point you're going to need to step up the firepower to make them get that message? What's it going to take for them to get the message clear? A: I'd like to hear the answer to that today. But that's clearly up to the Bosnian Serbs. We began the strike operations, then there was a temporary suspension of those during a period of negotiations between Gen. Janvier and Gen. Mladic. There were some conditions then decided by the political parties; those conditions were presented to Gen. Mladic by Gen. Janvier on the 3rd of Sept.; the instructions for carrying them out were articulated in a separate letter from Gen. Smith to Gen. Mladic, neither of which have been specifically answered by any indications of desire on Mladic's part to comply, and certainly his actions would not suggest that he is willing to comply. I don't know how long it will take, but can assure you of the evidence of our resolve which you have seen on these videos. Hopefully, the Bosnian Serbs are watching them as well and they will get the idea that they don't want any more of this any more than we want to deliver it, but we will continue to do so as long as is necessary. Q (Stars & Stripes): There has been notice that the UN is pulling out about 10,000 troops from Croatia, and that only about 2,000 will remain. Can you tell us how many of those will be U.S. troops? A: U.S. troops are only involved in a hospital in Zagreb right now with respect to Croatia, so the UN disposition of forces and troops and their eventual number remaining in Croatia would not effect the U.S. in the sense of troops on the ground. There could be some effect on the hospital there -- that's a decision that Gen. Janvier and the UN have yet to make, so really I don't know the answer to that. Q: (ANSA) Has NATO assessed the impact it may have by taking sides with one faction and weakening the other faction? A: I don't think this is taking sides. What we're attempting to do is cease the kind of behavior that is inimical to the international community. You simply cannot stand by and watch that occur forever. No, I do not consider myself to be taking sides. The inernational community has seen the actions of the Bosnian Serbs as certainly not that which we'd expect and we've laid done conditions we expect them to abide by, and when they do, the problem will be solved. Q (Reuters): Can you tell us how long the strikes will continue today and can you give us any idea on the number of sorties that have been carried out since you resumed the airstrikes? A: We have flown around 15 hundred (1,500) total sorties in the entire air operation since it initially began. Those consist of the strike operations as well as close air support, suppression of enemy air defense, combat air partrol, search and rescue, airborne command and control, NATO AWACS, tankers, the whole bit. So there's quite an array of numbers of flights. I cannot break that down for you here -- how many strikes have occurred or how many aircraft have participated in air-ground strikes. As far as the continuation of the operations, I've said before that the duration of the operation is really a function of the Bosnian Serbs. Q (Boston Globe): My understanding is that some of the heavy weapons around Sarajevo had actually been moved into Serb-held suburbs that are civilian areas -- if we presume that the Bosnian Serbs continue digging their heels and defy your airstrikes, isn't there a possibility that they will continue to lob shells at Sarajevo, using these weapons, which will be in civilian areas that your planes will not be able to strike without civilian casualties -- what will you do in order to silence those guns? A: I think I'd rather let the Bosnian Serbs try to figure out what I'm going to do. I'm not going to answer that specifically, but that would be a grave mistake on their part. Q (ABC): Are there any signs that the Bosnian Serbs are defending themselves or preparing themselves for further strikes on the ground? A: One of the things that we looked at very closely night before last was whether the movement that we saw of heavy weapons was in fact a repositioning of those heavy weapons or a withdrawal. It is not clear to me that they were withdrawn at this point. So the possibility does exist that there would be some repositioning and we're watching that very closely. Q (AP): Have you seen any seen any reaction in terms of force from the Bosnian Serbs -- are they retaliating, or what are they doing exactly? A: The shelling in Sarajevo has effectively ceased at this point. There were some exchanges last night but it's not clear to me what the conditions were or how many there were. But so far there has been restraint in that respect. Q (AFP): How is all this impacting on the search and rescue missions for the French pilots? A: Those are two independant operations. We are continuing as I mentioned to put every asset necessary toward that mission; it continues throughout the strikes. Other than that, I prefer not to get into that, there are some very very sensitive details as you can imagine. I would just as soon not talk operationally about that other than to tell you that we are committed to try to locate and rescue those pilots, and that activity will continue. Q: (AFP): Are the targets being hit now part of the original list of 25 you described the first day? A: There were initially 23 targets, 2 were added. Let me just say that numbers of targets at this point don't carry a great deal of meaning and I'm not going to get into how many more targets because it is a very very dynamic situation which Gen Janvier and I discuss virtually on a day-to-day basis. The target list will be a dynamic process, we may add some, we may take some off. It would be very confusing for me to try to define how when and why targets are added or subtracted, but there are plenty of targets, we have plenty of work left to do. Q (AFP): What about the response on the ground from the Bosnian Serbs -- have your planes been engaged by enemy radar? A: There have been some indications of some Bosnian Serb radars, but little, because part of the process is to suppress those and I think we're being reasonably succcessful with that. We do have reports of triple-A and there have been some shoulder-fired weapons fired, so we have been engaged and we'll continue to be engaged. The point I would make from that is the realization that our pilots are not operating in a benign environment and yet they're getting the kind of strike damage that we want to be able to see and report to you later on, which you've observed on the video. Let me one more time tell you that the target process, of developing targets, is extraordinarily laborious. It starts with plans, goes to Gen. Ryan and Gen. Smith, comes to Gen. Janvier and me, and our single biggest concern frankly is the potential for collateral damage. So we will erase a target, or put targets on and strike only parts of them if there's the potential for unacceptable collateral damage. Q: Mladic has said he would attack civilian targets if your action continues, so what would be your reaction if he does that? A: I would like for him to wonder that and not me tell you. Q (AP): What can you tell us about collateral damage? Have you inflicted any, what is it, and going back to the targets, the average person who a week ago read that you had 23 or 25 targets, after a series of repeated strikes over this past week, will wonder if NATO is capable of getting those targets, are they still going back and hitting them, have you obliterated any on your list? A: First of all, a target does not necessarily mean a single building or a single aim point. You've seen at some of the ammunition depots for example, there may be as many as 16 or 18 different aim points within that target set. That's why it's very difficult to get into numbers of targets, because if I started worrying about numbers of targets, numbers of aim points, how many of been hit, how many have been damaged or destroyed, then we'd really get into calculus that I don't think you want to worry too much about. Let me just say this: we select targets which we think have military significance and carry a very limited possibility of collateral damage. We strike within that target complex a number of aim points; those are decided again in a collaborative process. We have decided what level of damage we hope to achieve. For instance, when you were looking at the radar site, our objective would be to make it non-functional. I think it's fair to say that what you saw probably resulted in a non-functional radar. So we're looking at that sort of battle damage assessment. If it's non-functional, we may chose not to go back. If it is non-functional, but we assess that they could repair it in a short period of time, we may chose to revisit. The process of developing aim points within target sets, and assess the level of damage... is a matrix; to get into that would be like a mouse runnning through a maze and I'd just as soon not do any more than I've done. Q: Any indication they've repaired any of the targets you took out last week? A: There are some things that can be repaired, they can restore things; as an example, if you hit a communications node, and you take out a piece of their capability for communications at one place, they could degrade to another form of communication, or they could quickly run another wire in and bypass and they'd restore the communication, perhaps not to the same level they had previously, but there would be some capability. Let me address the issue of collateral damage, it's an important one. First of all I told you that we select targets and we try very hard to select only those which give us some confidence that we can strike them with the potential for very very little collateral damage. I will not guarantee you, I would be irresponsible if I tried to convey to you, that when you're dropping large bombs off aircraft that are travelling at 500 knots plus, that some of those bombs don't hit where they're supposed to hit. Some precision-guided munitions, frankly, don't guide. Sometimes weather will create a situation where, just prior to impact, the aim point will slip, or you lose lock. Some pilots just simply don't hit what they're aiming at, and some of the aircraft we're flying don't have precision guided munitions, so if you combine the fact that we have weather to deal with, we have very small targets in some cases, we have precision guided munitions that aren't always 100% perfect, and we have pilots who are humans, that have the potential for sometimes making a mistake, then I cannot guarantee you that there will not be collateral damage. I will guarantee you, however, that it is clearly one of the very top considerations in target selection. Q. But you didn't exactly answer my question. In terms of what collateral damage and why it happened - have you inflicted any? A. I would expect that there's probably some, but I haven't had an opportunity to determine how much or to what degree, because our obvious concern right now is to try to see if we can get reconnaissance of those targets that we've hit. If a bomb comes off an aircraft and it goes stupid, then we will try to determine very quickly whether it was the aircraft system, or whether it was the bomb itself, or whether it was some switch problem, and we try to correct that before we send that aircraft out again. Those are the kinds of steps that you take. The pilots know when a bomb comes off the aircraft, whether it's guided or whether it just went stupid, so we will do that. There are some cases where, if an aircraft is loaded up with precision guided munitions, there are certain things in the systems within the aircraft which must work. If some of those things don't work, they don't drop. Q (AFP): You've talked about damage, and earlier on about the weather, but would it be fair to say that you haven't been able to inflict as much damage as you would like, in the last 24 hours, since you started the second phase of the mission, because of the weather conditions? A: It is not my desire to inflict a lot of damage, it is my desire to stop this as quickly as I can. That said, we have laid out a certain number of targets and the weather impeded our progress down that target list. So we have not struck as many targets as I would like to have struck, given the weather last night. Q (AP): But the Serbs have been doing the most damage with small mobile things like mortars and small cannon; have you been able to neutralize any targets like that? A: Yes, in fact some of our close air support assets have been engaging those kinds of targets. The Rapid Reaction Force on the ground have been engaging some of those targets. So the answer to your question is yes; I can't give you a number, and you're exactly right, they are extraordinarily difficult targets to find. That's the reason that I don't think it's profitable to go after "onesies and twosies" -- that is, try ot take out a small mortar or piece of artillery buried in the side of a a hill. What you try to do is strike the essential military support structure that provides the things that go to that gun to make it work and that's basically what we're doing. Q (S&S): Considering the fact that the weather has given you so many problems, do you see it improving any time soon? A: I'm afraid the weather is like grey hair -- it's there and there's not much I can do about it, we'll just have to deal with it. Q (AP): Not to be repetitive, but what is exactly collateral damage -- does that mean hitting civilian targets by mistake or does it just mean going off target---? A: It's both of those. Let me give you an example. If we had a building that we wanted to strike and we were irresponsible and we chose a building that was in the middle of a large civilian housing complex; 1, if there isn't some room around it, you haven't given yourself very much margin for error. If a bomb going against a target like that came off the aircraft and instead of guiding down the path you thought it would guide down, it goes straight down and goes off this way, which is possible, then it could go considerably far off course. Now we've not seen that that I know of, but if it were to hit a thousand meters off target, and into an urban area and blow up six houses, that obviously is collateral damage, which we truly hope will never occur. Collateral damage could also be striking the Hadzici ammo facility, or storage area, or Pale ammo depot, or something like that, and the shock wave from the bomb exploding or the secondary explosions you would get from the bombs going into the ammo dump would cause glass to break in buildings sometimes pretty far away. That's collateral damage, but in my view as long as we can limit that in terms of the number of people who are injured as a result of that, then it's acceptable. Hopefully that sort of addresses it -- collateral damage is a very very major issue, believe me. Q: I want to know if today the Italian Tornadoes will participate in the attack. A: The answer to that question is yes. We're delighted to have the Italian aircraft now integrated into the Deny Flight organization. We expect them to be characteristically excellent in their performance. Q (Boston Globe): Looking at your videos, the places that you've chosen have been ones that are easy for your pilots to locate -- they're out in an area, you can see them on the screen. But the area that you're targetting, for example, Pontiziach (??), is famous for the honeycombed underground storage sites that were used during World War II. How much of the support structure is in an area where it's visible for you and how much of it is hidden away? A: I guess I could try to get into that, but I don't know if I'd ever get out of it. Let me just tell you that we have a pretty good idea of what we want to accomplish in these operations. And whether it's visible to us or not, at this point I think we're making progress towards achieving the level that we desired. So I'm satisfied that we know enough about existing targets to affect the military capability if we continue this process. Thank you very much for your interest.