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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #96, 98-08-06

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


935

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, August 6, 1998

Briefer: James B. Foley

STATEMENTS
1		Ethiopia: Expulsions of Eritreans

IRAQ 1-2 Chairman Butler's Report to Security Council Today 1,2-3 Memorandum of Understanding Between Iraq and UN Secretary General 2,3 Iraqi Behavior and Compliance 3 MOU and Oil For Food Program 4-5 Prospects for Use of Force 5 Chairman Butler and UNSCOM Team Performance 5-6 Prospects for Lifting Sanctions

SERBIA (Kosovo) 6 Secretary Albright's Message to President Milosevic 6-7 Prospects for Military Intervention 7 Ambassador Holbrooke's Comments re Cooperation

BOSNIA 7-10 German Refugee Policy/Return of Bosnian Refugees

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 10 Palestinian Authority's Cabinet 10-11 Secretary Albright's Conversations with PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 11-12 Reports of Two American Oil Company Workers Kidnapped 12 Status of Departure of Americans 12 Situation in Kinshasa 12-13 Rwandan Troop Deployments

CAMBODIA 13 Update on Election Results

CHINA 13-14 Reported Warning to US re Taiwan

KOREAS 14 US-Republic of Korea Non-Proliferation Task Force Meeting

COLOMBIA 14-15 US Meetings with President-Elect Pastrana


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #96

THURSDAY, AUGUST 6, 1998, 1:20 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon, later than usual; I apologize. Welcome to the State Department. I have no announcements to announce; but I do have an announcement that we'll post after the briefing concerning the expulsions of Eritreans from Ethiopia by which the US Government is expressing concern.

With that, George, I'll go to your questions.

QUESTION: The White House is saying that the announcement yesterday by the Iraqis is totally unacceptable; but Mr. Butler says he doesn't see a crisis situation developing. I suppose those two statements aren't mutually exclusive, but could you shed some light --

MR. FOLEY: Are not, did you say?

QUESTION: Are not mutually exclusive. Could you shed some light on what the thinking is here?

MR. FOLEY: We're not calling it a crisis at the moment simply because the events have just happened in the last 24 hours, and we're certainly going to need time to digest the latest events and to analyze them. In particular, we want to see the results of Chairman Butler's report to the Security Council today; we want to consult with other members of the Security Council to determine how the international community is going to respond.

I think one cardinal point, though, to keep in mind is that if you read the statements coming out of Baghdad yesterday, there is an obvious effort - and it's not the first time - on the part of the Iraqis to characterize this as a confrontation between Iraq and the United States; and we categorically reject that characterization. The fact of the matter is that the confrontation, if there is one, is between Iraq and the UN. Iraq is subject to Security Council resolutions; Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding earlier this year with the Secretary General of the United Nations; Iraq is apparently reneging on its commitments to the Secretary General. So it is decidedly an issue, in the first instance, between Iraq and the United Nations.

But just to review where we are today - and I would caution you that we won't be making definitive characterizations today in advance of completion of the Security Council meeting with Ambassador Butler. But what I can say is that clearly, the Iraqi action does violate the February 23 Memorandum of Understanding signed by Secretary General Annan and Iraq. It also violates Security Council resolutions, including 687 and 1154.

Clearly the Iraqi goal is to force the international community to abandon the sanctions regime created in 1990. The Iraqi leadership wants to regain control of Iraq's economy without disarming. As we've always said, they want to have their cake and eat it too - to retain their weapons of mass destruction programs and escape from UN sanctions. They can't have it both ways. That's been the case since the end of the Gulf War and that's not going to change. The aim of the international community is to face the Iraqi leadership with that stark choice: the need, if they want to see sanctions lifted, to definitively abandon their programs of weapons of mass destruction and that is not going to change.

We will not allow Iraq to succeed in breaking the sanctions. We will oppose any change in the sanctions regime until Iraq fully complies. We are confident that we will have the international support necessary to achieve this aim.

QUESTION: Does the United States believe that this is just Iraqi behavior as usual and Iraq's trying to call the UN's bluff and the international community's bluff again and playing a game of chicken, if you will?

MR. FOLEY: Certainly, it's part of a pattern. We've seen this time and again. I think the conclusion is inescapable -- we've certainly reached that conclusion on previous occasions - that Saddam Hussein does not want to give up his programs of weapons of mass destruction; for various reasons, these programs are dear to him. At the same time, he abhors the sanctions regime. The sanctions regime has succeeded in keeping him in his box, keeping him from threatening his neighbors, keeping him from overcoming the isolation that his invasion of Kuwait brought upon him in his regime.

So certainly from time to time, he does try to challenge the inspection regime and try to provoke crises with the hope that the support for the sanctions regime will diminish or that the sanctions regime will be overcome. But again, he does this from time to time, having failed in the interim, to come clean on his weapons of mass destruction. I think it is always a risky business to try to put yourself in Saddam Hussein's head to try to analyze whether this is someone operating on a rational basis. Certainly his aims are clear-cut: he wants to get out from under sanctions. But why he chooses a particular moment to do what he has done on previous occasions is difficult to gauge.

I think we can expect erratic behavior, unpredictable behavior on his part; but what we ought to expect from the international community -- what I can assure you you can count on from the United States - is steadiness of purpose. We are going to ensure that the sanctions regime remains in place and that the status quo does not change, absent real compliance on the part of Iraq.

I think it's only speculative at this point, but clearly, Secretary General Annan's agreement -- the Memorandum of Understanding reached with Iraq back in February - put Iraq on the spot. If you'll recall, the United States applauded the Secretary General's efforts, supported the Memorandum of Understanding because it called for compliance on Iraq's part with UN Security Council resolutions. But we also made the additional point that we felt that the Memorandum of Understanding needed to be tested to test Iraq's bona fides, its willingness to comply.

Chairman Butler of UNSCOM actually put Iraq to an honest test by offering an accelerated work program plan of action by which Iraq would have the opportunity to answer the remaining questions; to allow UNSCOM to verify the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction; and, therefore, enable and accelerate consideration of the lifting of sanctions.

I think, again, it's speculative at this point, but the fact is that they were put to the test, and that's a test that Iraq is clearly unwilling to meet and to pass; and having been placed in that position perhaps explains why yet again, as you say, not for the first time Saddam is trying to provoke a crisis.

QUESTION: Jim, just real quickly, does it seem to you - to the US - that he's more obstinate this time around than he has been, let's say, in February?

MR. FOLEY: It's too early to say.

QUESTION: What could he gain? Is he trying to gain time to hide the evidence, say of his warheads and his - the gases that have been analyzed in those warheads or what?

MR. FOLEY: Again, it's only speculation at this point. It would seem, on the basis of this having happened many times before, that his aim is to escape from sanctions. He's sick and tired of the isolation; he's sick and tired of the inability of the Iraqi regime to rebuild its power potential - its power projection potential; he wants to flex his muscles and re-enter the international stage. That seems to be what's behind this, as also behind previous occasions of recalcitrance.

QUESTION: Is there any direct link between the oil-for-food deal and his living up to the MOU?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not sure I understand the question.

QUESTION: Well, in other words, if he does scrap the Memorandum of Understanding, is it still possible that the oil-for-food operation could continue separately?

MR. FOLEY: I'd want to check before giving you a definitive answer; I'll give you what my understanding is, which is that that program will continue, because we always maintained that the oil-for-food program was a separate issue from the inspections regime, from the overall sanctions regime. We regarded the humanitarian plight and needs of the Iraqi people as an imperative that we needed to respond to, and that the Iraqi people indeed should not be punished for Saddam Hussein's misbehavior and worse on the international scene. So my understanding is that the oil-for- food program will continue.

Of course it's a carefully monitored program; it's a program that ensures that while on the one hand, humanitarian assistance, food and medicine is able to go to especially Iraqis in need - pregnant women, children, the elderly and across the board - at the same time that those moneys are carefully monitored by the United Nations to ensure that there is not diversion to Saddam Hussein's weapons programs or other unjustified ends.

QUESTION: You've said that we're not in a crisis yet. Before Mr. Annan's visit to Baghdad in February, the aircraft carriers were on station in the Gulf all prepared to act. Will you draw a comparison between now and then; what are the differences now?

MR. FOLEY: I think the difference now is simply that we're only 24 hours into the situation created by the Iraqi announcement. As I said, our focus now is on the United Nations, is on the Security Council and what we, together with our friends on the Security Council, decide to do in response. It's too early to say what those responses might be.

But we're not calling it a crisis because, frankly, we don't want to play into Saddam Hussein's hands. Clearly, he's in a box; he's trying to squirm his way out; he's trying to provoke a crisis, provoke some kind of a response that he thinks would allow him to create diversions and perhaps lessen support for the sanctions, which is, again, his aim - namely, to get the sanctions removed.

We're certainly not going to play into his hands. We're going to ensure that we have the capability - and we do have the capability, a robust one - in the Gulf, which is superior to the force levels and capabilities we had there before the last crisis, last fall. We're going to ensure we have what we need to meet any contingency if we deem there to be a threat to our interests or a threat to Iraq's neighbors. So we certainly don't rule out any options. But we're going to take this cautiously. We're going to act in a way and in a pace that's in conformity with our interests; and we're not going to allow Saddam Hussein to call the shots or to dictate our moves.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - what you were saying there about the forces that we have on hand. Are you saying that the forces that the United States has on hand in the Gulf are equivalent to what were there in February or whenever that was?

MR. FOLEY: No, I didn't say that. I said they were superior to what was there before the crisis - the last crisis occurred, beginning in October. We had a subsequent build-up, and there have been force adjustments. But my understanding is that the residual force in the region is indeed more powerful than that which we had prior to last October and November. We certainly have an extra strike capacity. I refer you, though, to the Pentagon for the actual details.

QUESTION: I will ask them, but do you know if it includes a carrier task force?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, it does.

QUESTION: Jim, you talked about steadiness of purpose and you don't want to call this a crisis; but in the past, the US has essentially been forced to play into his hand by responding on more than one occasion - not just last winter. How do you refrain from doing that without --

MR. FOLEY: Well, you've seen, certainly, that in various and previous crises, we've had to build up our forces in the Gulf. What we have done is to ensure, following the last crisis - diffused by Kofi Annan's agreement in Baghdad - we've ensured that we maintained, while coming down from those high levels, that we've maintained a capability, as I said, superior to what was there in firepower prior to last fall. So we maintain the range of options that we can turn to if necessary on short notice.

QUESTION: Notwithstanding that answer and notwithstanding your finely worded statement that you're not letting him call the shots, it still is a reactive policy, is it not? I mean, the amount of force you have in the region now is not greater than what you had after the build-up; it perhaps is greater than what it was before the build-up, but --

MR. FOLEY: I think, Charlie, that the key element is the strike capability that we have there. I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon for the specifics, but the President has assured that we have a real-time capability to respond to any contingencies that could occur in real time. We certainly have reinforcement capabilities as well. But the point about reactive, I would argue the contrary. I think that our policy, dating back to the end of the Gulf War, spanning two Administrations has been steady. The key element is the sanctions regime and the willingness of the international community to back up the sanctions regime. That's what's put Saddam in isolation; what's kept him in a box; and which has not varied. He has reacted - and I say that he's been the reactive one from time to time - to try to escape this. He has never succeeded in escaping the containment that we've successfully maintained; and that is not going to change in the current circumstances either.

Other questions on this issue?

QUESTION: You said that the US is confident of the support of its allies. What do you think of the Russian comments putting part of the blame on Richard Butler for this crisis?

MR. FOLEY: We have full confidence in Chairman Butler and the UNSCOM staff. They have proven themselves to be professional, objective and dispassionate disarmament experts. We have full confidence in both Chairman Butler and his UNSCOM team.

We think that, indeed, Chairman Butler has gone the extra mile to lay out a work plan and the possibility -- and he's been explicit on this - a road map that could lead Iraq to the lifting of sanctions if they made that existential decision to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs. We've not seen any indication on the Security Council of any nation questioning the need for Saddam Hussein to give up his weapons of mass destruction before there is a consideration of the lifting of sanctions.

QUESTION: One more. What is the likelihood now, considering this confrontation, of a lifting of the sanctions the next time they come up for review in October?

MR. FOLEY: Well, it's obvious that if Saddam Hussein is arresting cooperation with UNSCOM or in some ways trying to subvert the UNSCOM regime or stopping inspections -- we understand that there is some willingness to allow ongoing monitoring, but that is obviously willfully insufficient - but if he's arresting the continuation of the inspection regime, then he has succeeded, in one sense, in delaying the possibility that sanctions relief will be considered. And that is not the first time that he has acted contrary to his stated interests.

But again, I think this is understandable if you go back to the premise with which I began my response, which is that he wants sanctions relief, but he wants to keep his weapons of mass destruction programs. Until he has solved that conundrum, he will only find the prospect of sanctions relief moving further into the distant future.

QUESTION: New subject - has the Secretary sent President Milosevic of Yugoslavia a message warning that he could face NATO air strikes if he doesn't back off in Kosovo?

MR. FOLEY: There were, I believe, press reports concerning a letter that were untrue. There was not actually a letter that Ambassador Hill delivered to President Milosevic yesterday; there didn't need to be a letter. The question is not the vehicle, the question is the message. I can tell you it was a very forceful message in which the Secretary expressed her shock and dismay over the effects of the ongoing Serb military offensive in Kosovo in which she, through Ambassador Hill, talked about the imperative need to end the offensive actions; to allow Kosovar Albanian displaced persons to return to their homes; to allow humanitarian agencies, non- governmental organizations access to displaced persons, to civilians, to do their humanitarian work.

Ambassador Hill conveyed to Mr. Milosevic Secretary Albright's strong view that the ongoing Serb offensive and the unacceptable actions that have taken place in the context of that offensive only increase the chances of there being military action on the part of NATO; it increases the heat on him -- President Milosevic. Ambassador Hill conveyed that warning in very clear terms to President Milosevic - that he is increasing the possibility of Western military intervention unless he halts the offensive, allows displaced persons to return to their homes, allows them to receive humanitarian aid, allows humanitarian access and creates the environment necessary for negotiations to start and go forward with the prospect of success.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that? Are we still saying that Milosevic - that the Serbian troops should also withdraw from Kosovo?

MR. FOLEY: Well, that has been a demand of the international community in the form of the Contact Group going back many months, and that hasn't changed.

QUESTION: And one further thing on that - NATO, according to some analysts - the Kosovar Albanians are looking at the prospect of NATO military involvement as a chance for them to actually gain a move toward independence. They're sort of leaning on this NATO, rightly or wrongly, looking at the NATO possibility of involvement as a sort of green light for their independence movement. How do you respond to those --

MR. FOLEY: Wrongly. We do not seek military intervention; we seek a diplomatic solution. Ambassador Hill's highest priority at the moment, in addition to trying to ensure that the humanitarian situation is urgently addressed, his highest priority is to do whatever he needs to do on both the Serb and the Kosovar Albanian side to get negotiations started. We want to see those negotiations take place, and to see them succeed. We do think that there's a chance that this can happen, provided that the Serb offensive ends and that President Milosevic creates the environment conducive to negotiations.

I can't, for obvious, reasons, talk about scenarios of military intervention. Certainly NATO is currently looking at a range of options to develop flexible ways to use air power, for example, with the aim of ensuring that we can meet any contingencies and to remind Mr. Milosevic that, indeed, military action will be forthcoming if there's not an improvement. But I can't describe what form it would take and what the timing would be; but I can say that it would aim to support the political and diplomatic objectives of the international community, which do not include independence for Kosovo.

QUESTION: Jim, Dick Holbrooke said last night that one of the missing factors that is making it difficult, he says Milosevic wants to cooperate, he wants to negotiate, but there's such disarray and division among the Kosovars in finding some representative group of people who can negotiate with Milosevic. Does the State Department see Mr. Holbrooke as being right on about this?

MR. FOLEY: I would say two things about that. First of all, President Milosevic has said that he's willing to negotiate. That is somewhat encouraging; it's belied by the actions of the Serb military and police forces currently in Kosovo. On the Kosovar Albanian side, Ambassador Hill is working very hard. I believe he's gone back to Pristina today - I'm sorry, he's in Skopje today, and he'll be going to Pristina tomorrow for intensive political discussions, the aim of which is indeed to try to help the Kosovar Albanians put together a negotiating team that's an effective one, that represents all Albanians, that can take decisions and can move towards peace.

It's not an easy effort, but he achieved some progress, I believe, in the last week or so. There is what looks like an agreement in principle; the devil is in the details, and he's working on them. But he's working hard, and we're hopeful that we can succeed on that side. But the chances of success are dimmed by the ongoing Serb actions in Kosovo, which have to stop. That is our number-one priority at the moment.

QUESTION: New subject. I think you're familiar with the --

MR. FOLEY: I'm ready for you.

QUESTION: Good - the exchange between Germany and the United States on the US allegations that Germany is dumping Bosnians and therefore spoiling chances for democratic transition in the September elections. Anyway, the German Interior Minister is back and he's saying that the US accusations of dumping and coercive repatriations are absurd, and that in fact --

MR. FOLEY: Is this a quote from today or --

QUESTION: This is today. Yesterday was the --

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that.

QUESTION: -- Commissioner for Refugees; today is the Interior Minister.

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen those comments.

QUESTION: Anyway, he's saying that Germany's policy is still one of voluntary return. Do you have evidence that there has been coercive repatriation by Germany of Bosnian refugees, so-called "dumping"?

MR. FOLEY: I have kind of a long answer for you. Let me make, as a preliminary point, what is an important point, which is that Germany has been extremely generous in hosting large numbers of refugees from the former Yugoslavia and providing substantial humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Germany has accepted more refugees from the former Yugoslavia - a total of approximately 450,000 - than any other country. Of these, approximately 350,000 came from Bosnia. Over time, many have voluntarily returned. So far this year, 75,0000 Bosnian refugees have returned from Germany - 25,000 in July alone. About 140,000 currently remain in Germany. Most of these are from areas where they would now be in the ethnic minority were they to return.

We have expressed our concern to the German Government regarding the policy of returning Bosnian refugees to areas other than their original homes by a combination of time-limited financial incentives and, in some cases, direct deportation. I don't have figures for you on that, but I have talked to our experts on the matter and am assured that there have been instances of direct deportation.

There is, however, a heavy incentive policy. I think that, as you'll see as I continue my remarks, our concern is about more than the modalities of their return; it's about where they're going and the effect of their return. So I think our focus is a little different. This policy appears to be at variance with the internationally agreed-upon policy of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin.

The UN High Commission on Refugees, the High Representative in Bosnia, Mr. Westendorp, and the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina have all expressed similar concerns on this issue. These are not United States concerns as such.

International policy set by the Peace Implementation Council, the High Representative and the UNHCR is clear: refugees and displaced persons should be able to return to their original homes. Our particular concern at the moment is that uncoordinated refugee returns could impede our peace implementation efforts in two ways. First, refugees returning to areas other than their original homes often take up residence in the homes of other refugees or displaced persons, undermining our efforts to facilitate minority returns and rebuild multi-ethnic communities. Secondly, returnees are often not properly registered in their temporary residences for the upcoming elections, which has been leading to problems for the OSCE elections supervision effort.

Germany is a key partner with whom we cooperate across the board on a full range of policy issues. We have worked together closely in Bosnia, where we have had considerable successes. We certainly share Germany's interest in helping refugees return home as quickly as possible, and appreciate greatly Germany's humanitarian assistance to refugees in Germany and in Bosnia. We will continue to work closely and in cooperation with the German Government on this issue. We hope sincerely that the German Government will review its policy in light of the concerns that we and others have expressed and coordinate the refugee return process very effectively with the UNHCR, the Office of the High Representative and the Bosnian Government.

QUESTION: Specifically, do you have independent evidence that the Germans are doing what you say they are doing?

MR. FOLEY: I answered that question.

QUESTION: Would you provide numbers?

MR. FOLEY: As I said, we understand that about 75,000 Bosnian refugees have returned from Germany this year so far through August 6; and of these, about 25,000 in July - a pretty significant number in July.

QUESTION: Yes, but are they coercive, non-voluntary?

MR. FOLEY: I did, if you'll check my remarks, answer that. As I just mentioned to Jim, what we've said is that there's a time-limited financial incentive program, and there have been instances of direct deportation as well. I don't have figures for you as I indicated.

QUESTION: This is complicated and I want to make sure I get it right. Again, quoting the German Interior Minister -- and if you don't have a direct response for this, maybe you could get one. He says that of the 75, 000 refugees returned to Bosnia in the first seven months of this year, only 1,200 were forcibly expelled and most of those had been convicted criminals. Does that agree with -

MR. FOLEY: I thought you were questioning my statement that there were forcible returns.

QUESTION: Well, he says that there were 1,200 but those were special exception cases - convicted criminals basically.

MR. FOLEY: As I said, I don't have the figures for you, but I think our point, as I indicated, is not the focus on the modalities of their return, but rather on the effect of the return of displaced persons and refugees to areas which are not their original homes; that what needs - after all, we understand Germany's concern and the burden - the heavy burden that they've borne - a heavier burden than anyone else. We understand their desire to deal with this problem. But Germany, as do we and other members of the international community, have an equal stake in the kind of Bosnia that we hope to leave behind at the end of the international involvement there.

The aim is a single Bosnia-Herzegovina with two multi-ethnic entities. Actions which are uncoordinated, which send refugees not to their original homes but rather to places where they are in a majority and complicate the efforts to return other minorities to those places play into the hands of the hard-liners and move us away from the creation of a truly single Bosnia with two truly multi-ethnic entities. We think what needs to be done is to achieve a phased and orderly return process. We want to work with the German Government and with others on this.

This is really maybe the single most challenging aspect remaining in the area of Dayton implementation is refugee returns. It's not an easy issue; it requires working with the entities and the governments involved and we hope to make progress on this, but we're not going to be able to make progress on this if we further add to the problem of displaced people not returning to their homes of origin.

QUESTION: I have one final question. Did the Secretary take this up with Gerhard Schroeder yesterday in their meeting?

MR. FOLEY: The issue did come up, yes.

QUESTION: The Palestinian Education Minister, Hanan Ashwari, resigned, as you know, I'm sure; and she criticized Arafat for what she cited as corruption in his government and also the lack of progress in the peace process. What does the United States think about her resignation and do you feel as though it's going to harm what work -

MR. FOLEY: There has been a formation of a new Palestinian Authority Cabinet, and our view is that this is an internal matter for the Palestinians to decide. I wouldn't have any comment on the revised cabinet or on any particular cabinet member or former cabinet member.

QUESTION: Democratic Republic of Congo -

MR. FOLEY: Do we have anything more on the Middle East?

QUESTION: Can you tell us what's happening as far as the US is concerned with the talks; and also bring us up to date on any conversations that the Secretary has had with either the Prime Minister or the Chairman?

MR. FOLEY: Secretary Albright has spoken to both Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu in the last few days or so. These were useful conversations in which she urged both leaders to make additional efforts to achieve an agreement. We certainly think it is important that they do so. We are trying to get an agreement which would enable resumption of permanent status talks. If we conclude that this is not possible, we will say so and explain why; but we're not there yet fortunately.

We believe it is still possible to reach agreement. I would characterize the conversations as positive in the sense that there's a belief on all sides that while differences remain and differences have not been bridged, it is yet within their grasp to reach agreement and to eliminate those differences. So the Secretary urged them to keep at it; they agreed to keep at it; and we have no substantive news to report. We're keeping our eye on it; we're staying in touch with both sides in order to determine whether an agreement can or cannot be reached and if we reach the conclusion that an agreement can't be reached, we will say so; but we're not there yet.

QUESTION: Do you agree with reports in the Israeli press that the conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu was less than friendly?

MR. FOLEY: I can't characterize the private conversation between Secretary Albright and Prime Minister Netanyahu. We don't have illusions that though the gaps are not large, that they may turn out to be unbridgeable. That would be unfortunate, but we'll draw the necessary conclusions if that is the case.

We have not concluded that agreement can't be reached. The Secretary thinks that if they keep at it, they make concrete proposals, they deal with each other directly, that it is still possible to close those remaining gaps. But I can't give you a forecast. We're not abandoning this current phase of our effort, but we're not far from declaring our judgment on it. But don't ask me when, in terms of hours or days. Obviously we're in the end phase of our current effort, but we want to see them reach agreement. That's what's important, not the procedure, not what we say or do; it's important that they reach agreement and it is still possible.

QUESTION: Did they agree to have another meeting?

MR. FOLEY: I can't comment on the substance of their talks. The Secretary urged them to keep at it, in the vernacular, as I said, and that's our understanding of what they're going to do.

QUESTION: Is it okay to change the subject?

MR. FOLEY: It's okay with me.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Your assessment of the latest events in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the capture today of two American workers who work for the Chevron Corporation - do you know anything about that, if they're still alive? And my two-fold question would be, James Rubin has called the DRC a strategic location because of its oil and mineral resources. Is that worth a continued US economic presence there, despite the violence?

MR. FOLEY: We consider, as Mr. Rubin said the other day, that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a strategically important country in Africa - not only because of its mineral resources, but because of its human potential and because of its size and its potential impact on surrounding countries. So I wouldn't reduce it to one element.

Your report about Chevron employees being in danger or kidnapped is not something that I've heard, so it's something that we'll look into after the briefing and get back to you if we have anything. We're very concerned about the security of Americans - that's our number-one concern everywhere in the world. We issued an announcement, I believe, a couple days ago advising Americans not to travel there, advising Americans - this was a travel warning issued on August 5 - Americans to depart the country if they are able to do so. The embassy is in contact with the American community through the warden network. What I can tell you is that today the airport remains open. There was, I think, a Sabina flight that took out about 25 - is that right - American Embassy personnel and dependents.

Thus far, only about 15 to 20 private Americans have expressed a desire to leave. Again, we're urging them to leave; we're in communication with them and communicating to them the possibilities of leaving. There are about 500 private Americans in the Democratic Republic of Congo - about 300 are in Kinshasa, 200 in the provinces. Again, we're continuing to make, through our embassy, arrangements for the ordered departure of all embassy family members and employees in non-emergency positions from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The departing employees are headed for the US, but the plans of private American citizens departing are unknown. American citizens are not obligated to inform the embassy of their destination, but are encouraged to do so if they depart.

As to the situation itself, our information is that Kinshasa remains tense; however, no gunfire was reported today in the city. The government has reportedly lifted the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew, which has been in effect since Monday. Our embassy reports that Congolese of Tutsi origin are being rounded up in Kinshasa and taken to various holding areas. You'll have noted a statement that I issued last evening in which the United States expresses our concern about the deteriorating security situation - in particular urging the government in Kinshasa to afford the necessary rights and protections to all Congolese citizens and to resolve the internal situation by peaceful means.

Clashes between Tutsi and non-Tutsi military forces continue in Eastern and Southwestern Congo, including Kisangani and Kitona. I think you'll have noted also in the statement that I issued yesterday that we reported our concern over reports that Rwandan troops are involved in military operations in support of the Congolese military rebellion against President Kabila. I reiterate what we said yesterday, which is to urge all countries in the region to respect the territorial integrity of the Congo, refrain from becoming involved in the conflict and respect international law.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the magnitude of the Rwandan troop deployment in the east?

MR. FOLEY: Several days ago, the Rwandan Government publicly denied involvement in the fighting, and claimed that its troops were not in the Congo. We have seen reports and heard of eyewitness accounts of Rwandan troops in the Congo, but we cannot confirm that. They have said they're not involved. We urge them privately, publicly last night, and I repeat publicly today, not to involve themselves in across the border. This is an internal Congolese military rebellion as best we can judge. We oppose violence, be it domestic origin or regional origin. This is not the way to solve the massive problems facing the Congo today. We think that elements in Congo need to work toward national reconciliation, toward addressing the problems of democratization and development by peaceful means.

QUESTION: Does this mean the US doesn't support Kabila's allegations that Rwanda is, I guess, supporting or making the Tutsis in the region rally against Kabila?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I was very careful to say that we've seen reports, we've heard of eyewitness accounts that at least in the eastern portions that there may have been Rwandan troop involvement. They have denied that. We have not been able to independently confirm it, but we've made clear that this is something that should not happen; and that's where we are today. We're obviously monitoring this very closely, and hope that there are no developments in that direction.

QUESTION: New subject -- can you comment on Cambodia's election results?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. I understand what was released yesterday from the National Election Commission were what they call preliminary final results. It sounds like a contradiction in terms, but nevertheless, the important point is that Cambodia's National Election Commission is conducting a recount of the ballots in several districts in response to complaints of polling and counting irregularities from opposition party leaders Sam Rainsy and Prince Ranarridh. International observers including representatives of the US National Democratic Institute are present for all the recounts.

We are encouraged that the Cambodian authorities are investigating these charges; however, until allegations of election irregularities have been resolved and final results announced, it is certainly premature for us to discuss where we go next on Cambodia. In terms of the formal declaration, it's important to recall that the final results will be announced by the Constitutional Council in keeping with the Cambodian constitution.

QUESTION: Do you know when that might be?

MR. FOLEY: I couldn't tell you.

QUESTION: On China - China and Taiwan on or about the 28th of last month, did the State Department receive some notice from the Chinese Government in the form of a warning concerning giving umbrella military protection or selling military weapons to Taiwan - something that may have been pointed at the United States Government specifically?

MR. FOLEY: No, I'm not aware of any such demarche.

QUESTION: Nothing?

MR. FOLEY: No.

QUESTION: This would not be a demarche - this would like a press statement or something like that.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not aware of it.

QUESTION: Nothing?

QUESTION: Korea - yesterday and the day before yesterday, you had a meeting with the South Korean Government regarding missile development. Today you had another session regarding whether you lift the sanctions on North Korea. Do you have any -

MR. FOLEY: Another session with whom?

QUESTION: Another session regarding sanction -

MR. FOLEY: With whom? The US and --

QUESTION: With South Korea in Hawaii.

MR. FOLEY: My information is that the US-Republic of Korea non-proliferation task force met August 4 and 5 -- I'm not aware that they were meeting today -- in Honolulu. This was the fifth round of our non-proliferation task force, which was broadly mandated to discuss the wide range of issues relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The talks covered the full range of non-proliferation issues of mutual interest in great depth and they were very constructive.

Any other questions?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: They discussed the range of issues - implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the proliferation threat from the North Koreans and missile non-proliferation issues, including the Republic of Korea's interest in the missile technology control regime.

QUESTION: Has a new day dawned in relations with Colombia, especially regarding the press conference with Mr. Pickering participating and Mr. Pastrana and a few others? I believe that was on Monday. Are things really upbeat and have relations changed?

MR. FOLEY: We're certainly encouraged by the statements and the contact we've had with President-elect Pastrana. We don't want to comment on his plan of action before he takes office - I believe it's tomorrow - but we're sending an important high-level delegation down there as witness to our desire for a really close, productive, cooperative relationship. We believe it's turning a new page for Colombia, and certainly a new page towards better relations between the United States and Colombia.

QUESTION: Mr. Pickering, as the hero of El Salvador in the '80s - is he taking a hands-on role in the Colombian matter?

MR. FOLEY: Mr. Pickering is involved in - as Under Secretary of Political Affairs -- in the range of our bilateral relationships around the world, including Colombia. He takes an interest wherever we need his able hands, you can be sure of that.

Is that it?

QUESTION: Who's heading the delegation?

QUESTION: McLarty.

MR. FOLEY: George Gedda is, I'm sure, a reliable source on this, but I'll try to verify after the briefing.

Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 2:10 P.M.)


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