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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #117, 98-10-27

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1055

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, October 27, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

SERBIA (Kosovo)
1		Schedule of NATO Activities Today/Expected Statement by
		  Secretary Albright
1-5		Assessment of Serbian Compliance: Force Withdrawals /
		  Movement of Police / Dismantling of Checkpoints /
		  Movement of Military and Police Equipment / Movement of
		  Monitors / Displaced Returning Home / Humanitarian Access
3		Ongoing Diplomatic Activities
5-7		KLA Activities / Ceasefire / Security Situation

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 7-8 Timetable for Agreed Actions by Parties 7 Secretary Albright's Calls to Chairman Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Sharon 8,9 US Opposition to Unilateral Actions 8 Types and Amount of US Assistance 11-14 Reported Private Assurances Given to Parties to Wye River Negotiations 13 CIA Role / Reporting 16-17 Regional Participation in the Peace Process

AFGHANISTAN 9-10 Taliban Offer to Try Osama bin Laden

IRAQ 10-11 UNSCOM Report on VX and Iraqi Missile Fragments

RUSSIA 15 State of President Yeltsin's Health

SPAIN 15 Secretary Albright's Meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister 15 --Discussion of Kosovo / Balkans / Pinochet Extradition

COLOMBIA 16 State Visit of President Pastrana

TURKEY 16 Turkish Restrictions on Bosporus Transit

BURMA 16 Situation in Burma / EU Sanctions Extended


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #117

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1998, 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing.

Let me give you at the top a description of what I expect the schedule to be. With respect to Kosovo, as you all know, the North Atlantic Council is now meeting. That meeting is expected to break shortly. After NATO officials have spoken to the results of that meeting, I would expect Secretary Albright to come here to the briefing room to talk to you about that. I suspect others in the Administration will be talking as well. But I wanted to let you know that at the outset; tentatively, that could be in the next hour, hour and a half to two hours.

With that announcement, let me go to your questions.

QUESTION: You may have seen reports where Yugoslavia claims they have complied and made all the necessary withdrawals. Is that correct; have they?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't want to prejudge the decision that NATO is about to make. But let me say that clearly, the message that NATO has been transmitting to Milosevic appears to be translating into concrete changes on the ground. There have been major efforts towards compliance that have occurred overnight, significant force withdrawals underway including the dismantling of checkpoints, the movement of our monitors. I just spoke to Shaun Byrnes, the leader of our monitoring mission who indicated they have counted over 4,100 police personnel moving out of Kosovo or into established garrisons late yesterday.

They also recorded major movement of military and police equipment out of Kosovo, including the dismantling of police checkpoints. The military has moved many tanks out of hardened positions. In short, the disengagement procedures discussed by Generals Clark and Naumann over the weekend with President Milosevic are now underway in force.

In addition, we are seeing a change in the villages where the police have left in substantial numbers some of the key villages and villagers are returning to their homes. As Shaun Byrnes put it to me, instead of seeing black smoke from burning houses, he is seeing white smoke from people who have returned to their houses. That doesn't mean that in any sense that the situation is over. There are still many thousands of people in the hills. But in terms of the humanitarian side, humanitarian organizations are getting the access they need. The police presence is drastically reduced; checkpoints are gone. The people that are going to make the ultimate judgment whether they come home are starting to come home in larger numbers. There have been, as I said, thousands of police that have left and major movements of military equipment, pursuant to the specifications laid down by Generals Clark and Naumann in their meeting with President Milosevic.

NATO obviously has to assess this information, and will be making a judgment with respect to the question of the use of force and where we go from here. I would expect them to be in a position to describe that decision to the world in a relatively short period of time.

QUESTION: Just a technical point - the State Department is able now to speak to the precise number of policemen moving. Is that because you have a monitoring system or because there was - are there other reasons you couldn't do this in the past?

MR. RUBIN: What I am providing to you is real-time information that is observed by the verifiers. The monitors are making judgment of what they can see. I am not giving you a complete order of battle or giving you a snapshot of where every Serb unit is. I am providing you, as you ask each day, for information as best we can assess it. So, the head of our monitoring mission, Shaun Byrnes, has been providing this information to some of your colleagues on the ground, and I wanted to give you the same information that he has been providing.

That doesn't mean that we are in the position of giving an exact snapshot in this forum; but I am trying to give you examples of things they have been able to observe and estimate, essentially with their own eyes. Let's bear in mind that what is happening here is that Kosovo is becoming a place that the West, NATO, and the rest of the world is involving itself in in such a way that President Milosevic can no longer say it's his own province and he can make his own decisions there. The monitors are coming into place; the mission is going to get up to some 1,500, pursuant to the pledges; the overflights are taking place; people are in the field; humanitarian workers are there. Kosovo has been internationalized, and that is something that President Milosevic has sought to avoid.

I would also point you to the accounts of your colleagues which specify the deep concern on the part of some of the Serbs there who can see the difference between what is going on today and what's been going on in recent weeks.

QUESTION: It was slightly figurative but Kosovo is still Yugoslavia's province, and indeed --

MR. RUBIN: Internationalized in -

QUESTION: Before that you said it was not his province; well, it is.

MR. RUBIN: First of all, I meant province in the figurative sense. Thank you for correcting me. What I am describing there is that he is not in a position to do whatever he wants in Kosovo any longer.

QUESTION: What is it you all are asking NATO to do?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let's wait to see. NATO is about to act. At a minimum I think I've said before that we want to make sure that the pressure is maintained on President Milosevic -- the military pressure that has played such a constructive role in getting a change in the situation on the ground and moving from a situation where there was a humanitarian catastrophe to a situation where those risks have been eased. But as Ambassador Holbrooke is fond of saying, this crisis is not over because there is a political crisis in Kosovo that will be with us for a long time.

With respect to how NATO will choose to organize itself in the air, on the ground, and with respect to the use and execution of air strikes, I will prefer to leave that for the NATO authorities to specify; and then we will have plenty of time to comment on it.

QUESTION: Looking ahead a little bit, you just said that the crisis is linked to the political crisis. How do the verifiers and all the various overflyers and other monitors that you have and the military set-up there, how long do they sort of stay deployed?

MR. RUBIN: For a long time. Let's bear in mind what we're talking about here is moving to a intensified shuttle diplomacy that Ambassador Hill will conduct, where he will work on an agreement from both sides on an interim solution so that Kosovars control institutions important in their daily life -- including police, schools, health care and other matters. The agreement would also include early elections for a Kosovo Parliament and an executive. These are things that we do envisage the OSCE being involved with. We don't expect those to happen overnight.

QUESTION: So until the interim agreement is signed or initialed, the current posture remains?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: That is, the pressure posture remains.

MR. RUBIN: It's possible and likely that the verifiers will be around for quite some time upon signing of an interim agreement. This won't end. This is going to be an ongoing process where we'll move from international monitoring and verification of the compliance with the international community's resolutions that is being assessed by NATO right now to a situation, ideally, where an agreement were achieved on an interim solution so that the political crisis that underlies all these problems can begin to be resolved so that we can - the people of Kosovo can look forward to a better life for a long time to come rather than just a temporary halt to the humanitarian catastrophe they were facing.

QUESTION: Jamie, you mentioned our colleagues reporting on the ground, quoting Mr. Byrnes, one of the stories that's coming in several newspapers at least is that the Serbs will be allowed to have more forces in certain places than were there in February; for example, in the border areas. NATO has decided to sort of allow for some changes there. Is that accurate?

MR. RUBIN: I am not in a position to comment on the specific details laid down by General Clark and General Naumann. But let me say what the goal of Resolution 1199 was; and that was to stop the repression, to stop the marauding, to stop the killing and to stop a situation that was making it impossible for people to live in their villages and sending them off to the hills.

It was not to prevent Serbian authorities from protecting their border.

With respect to whatever detailed units were agreed upon, I will have to leave it to NATO authorities to specify. But I certainly can describe the intent of the resolution that was involved.

QUESTION: Another thing - clearly in the last ten days there have been violations of NATO's initial demands. Have you tallied them in any way? I mean, do you have some overview of the extent to which the Serbs were not complying? I don't mean just numbers, but police checkpoints, destroyed villages, attacks and things like that.

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure that our monitors have recorded in their daily reports what they've seen and what they know. We are describing to you a general trend; we are not providing to you every specific piece of information, good or bad, that we know. We're seeking to provide you a snapshot of what we can assess as best we can assess it at a given time.

Clearly, there's been major movement in the right direction. The message that NATO has sent to President Milosevic has translated into substantial changes for the people living on the ground - meaning police out, troops out, displaced persons back into their villages and a better climate for people to live in.

I do not have a tally for you of every good or bad action pursuant to the resolution that has been provided.

QUESTION: There's an organization that calls itself the Society for Threatened Peoples in Germany, which is a human rights group. They've done a compilation, which I've got a copy of today, that says that up until today the Serbs had 200 police or army checkpoints or positions out there. I was just wondering, is that at all within the ball park of what's happened?

MR. RUBIN: I would have to check with Mr. Byrnes on that. I can tell you that he told me just a few minutes ago that there has been a major reduction in checkpoints; particular checkpoints, he said, that were at a place called Komorane, which had been one of the most well-known and focused-on checkpoints is gone. The police units have pulled out of Malesavo, where they had a number of checkpoints. Police stations are gone from two villages at Dragobilje and Ostrozub - the police stations are gone from those places; so presumably, their checkpoints are gone as well.

I cannot tell you how many total checkpoints they had. I have no way of assessing the reliability of the information you've asked about.

QUESTION: A lot of that has probably happened today, then. Another point that they mention is that in Baice, apparently there was an attack even this morning at about 8:00 a.m. in which three houses were burned down. Does that --

MR. RUBIN: That would be consistent with the information I'm providing you. None of what I am saying to you is that the situation in Kosovo is peachy keen. On the contrary, it remains tense. This is a crisis situation for Kosovo and will remain so for a long time to come, until we are able to get the parties to the negotiating table and resolve these political conflicts as best we can.

QUESTION: In the phrase that you've been using for the past few weeks, is the trigger still cocked?

MR. RUBIN: Well, NATO will be making a decision as how to describe the current state of the authority to use military force; and I don't want to prejudge that. Prior to its decision, of course, it is.

QUESTION: Any attempt to quantify the extent to which displaced people have returned home?

MR. RUBIN: My understanding of those numbers is that there still remain something like 30,000 people; although Mr. Byrnes said he's had trouble getting enough resources to go in and count all of them. Something like 30, 000 is our best estimate who remain without shelter; 15,000 or so in the recent weeks have returned home. Let me just see if I can find the specific reference to that here.

It appears that only 20,000 to 25,000 internally displaced persons out of an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 last month are still in the hills with little or no shelter. The humanitarian workers and the observers and verifiers are enjoying full and unfettered access to IDPs.

QUESTION: I thought those numbers were much higher in terms of numbers of displaced.

MR. RUBIN: Well, you need to distinguish between displaced within Kosovo, refugees outside to the other countries. The numbers go into the hundreds of thousands when you talk about people displaced internally who were not in the hills without shelter and when you talk about refugees in other areas, other than Kosovo.

QUESTION: We had some information earlier about Malesavo -- that the police had moved out of their checkpoints and out of their positions there. That is or that was always a pretty much Albanian ethnic area, with almost no Serbs living there. That's where the KLA set up its positions long ago this year and basically took over. How do you avoid a recurrence of that very thing - essentially another security force going in there, namely the KLA?

MR. RUBIN: We would be surprised if the KLA didn't seek to move into areas where the Serbs left. That's simply a reality of Kosovo; that's part of the continuing crisis of Kosovo - that there are too many guns and too many people willing to use those guns.

Let's bear in mind what we were trying to do here. Resolution 1199 was designed to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. In order to resolve the problems of Kosovo, we need to get a political solution at the negotiating table.

We have had very strong contacts with the Kosovar Liberation Army and made very clear to them that they cannot use this opportunity to start the fighting all over again. So far they have not interfered in the process of Serbian withdrawal. The commanders of the UCK are encouraging IDPs to return to their homes in areas being vacated by the Serbs.

We continue to have contact with UCK representatives and are pressing them to maintain the cease-fire; to guarantee the safety of international personnel; and to cooperate in efforts to gain Serbian compliance with Resolution 1199. So we're very aware of the complexity and difficulty of this situation. But again, we are trying to urge them in the strongest possible terms not to take action that will redound to the great disadvantage of their fellow Kosovars and also prevent the Serbs from leaving and put us in a situation where there are provocations and violations and retaliations. We're trying to avoid that. But we are quite - we're not sanguine about the possibility that there will be such actions. But we are trying to minimize them to the extent possible.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - hostile actions against the Serbs. Just simply setting up checkpoints, taking over roads, closing off regions, which is what they did essentially.

MR. RUBIN: Right, that would be inconsistent with -- they've made clear to us in our contacts with monitors and diplomats and verifiers who are in regular contact with the UCK, if that were to happen, humanitarian organizations would not be able to do their jobs. So we are going to be looking for freedom of movement for the verifiers, the humanitarian organizations and others, and that means freedom of movement from checkpoints by both sides.

QUESTION: Serb civilians were blocked from going from one town to another by KLA checkpoints throughout the whole spring and summer.

MR. RUBIN: We want freedom of movement for the people of Kosovo, for the humanitarian organizations and the verification units.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, do you mean you don't mind if the KLA assume the functions of the local police as long as they don't, for example, restrict the movements of people coming in and out --

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's not a question of what we mind or what we don't mind. I'm trying to be realistic --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - the reality that they will act as the local police force --

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say local police. I think we accept the reality that in the absence of the presence of Serbs, there are going to be the presence of Albanians in some of these towns. But let's bear in mind, these towns didn't have a security problem before. The security problem came about when the Serbs came in and started marauding and slaughtering people. So they don't need to be protected, nor were they able to protect the people from that when it happened.

The protection is the deterrence provided by verification units in Kosovo that will let the international community know if Milosevic reneges on the direction he's been moving. So I think the people of Kosovo should recognize that the UCK or the KLA wasn't able to protect them before from what happened, and aren't going to be able to do so in the future. What we need is a political solution so that an agreement can be struck where the Kosovar Albanians are permitted to have their own police force as well as their own institutions in the area of healthcare and education and other aspects of self-government.

QUESTION: Another subject? About the Middle East, of course - has there been filed either with Israel or with the CIA an action plan by the Palestinians on arresting terrorists and all? Because an action plan - some even call it a time table - was promised during the talks.

MR. RUBIN: Do we have the agreement here? My understanding is that the agreement envisages that being done in the first week --

QUESTION: That's right.

MR. RUBIN: Today is Tuesday. I would not be in a position to answer the question as to whether some discussions hadn't begun or not. But again, the time frame is by Friday.

Secretary Albright has been in touch with Chairman Arafat yesterday; she spoke to Foreign Minister Sharon earlier today. I would expect her to be in touch with the Prime Minister during the course of the day to talk about implementation and how we can be of assistance in facilitating implementation.

It will be hard for me to give you each day an update on what steps have and haven't been taken; other than to tell you that would be required, I believe, in the first seven days.

QUESTION: Maybe it's in the agreement, but is it supposed to go to Israel - the plan, do you know?

MR. RUBIN: Whatever the agreement says on that, I'll have to check for you.

QUESTION: Do you think you could take one more swing at me for - is it a hard deadline, is it a goal? Is it you'd like to see it met but it may not be practical? What's the current --

MR. RUBIN: Well, the goal is to get the permanent status talks started as soon as possible -- pursuant to the agreement, they'll start ten days from last Friday - and then to be of assistance, the United States will be of assistance where we can to try to bring them towards agreement on these excruciating issues that will require painstaking negotiations.

The President has committed to bring the parties together at the appropriate time to see if we can be of assistance. I would expect the Secretary to be involved in this; I would expect Ambassador Ross to be involved in this; Aaron Miller, Martin Indyk, the other members of the Middle East peace team. We'll have to see exactly when we play what role.

With respect to the completion, what we are looking for is the parties to make a good faith effort to negotiate. I don't want to speculate on what will happen if they're unable to finish the work, despite such a good faith effort, by May 4.

QUESTION: But I mean, you are willing to say something, are you, about - well, maybe I ought to rephrase the question. You have said something about unilateral declarations of statehood. What if they don't meet the May 4 deadline. I know that's hypothetical; but it's also likely. If they don't make the May 4 deadline, would Arafat then be free to make any kind of declaration he feels like?

MR. RUBIN: As regards the possibility of a unilateral declaration of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudge or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the United States opposes and will oppose any such unilateral action.

QUESTION: Irrespective of May 4, or May 5 or May 3?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: Speaking of assistance, in a more precise sense the President mentioned that the United States would be willing to provide financial assistance to both sides. Has this building or any other part of the government begun putting together an estimate about how much money would be involved eventually?

MR. RUBIN: Work is going on in that area; people are assessing it, talking amongst themselves - perhaps some consultations with Israel and the Palestinians. At the appropriate time, we would want to consult with Congress about any such assistance. Clearly, it will be substantial. But I don't think there is an American number at this point.

QUESTION: The Israelis were quoting a figure of something like $1 billion to finance the further redeployments. Is that in the ball park?

MR. RUBIN: Clearly, this would be substantial, but we don't have an American figure at this time. Clearly, the numbers are going to be substantial, but I don't want to confirm or deny any particular figure until we've developed one.

QUESTION: To go back to unilateral acts, I may have missed this, but I haven't yet seen any clarification of whether you see the ban on unilateral acts as covering Israeli settlement activity. It's really become a point of dispute.

MR. RUBIN: We have made clear that unilateral actions, including in the area you specified, that prejudge the outcome of the negotiations is something the United States will oppose. The memorandum itself recognizes the necessity of a positive atmosphere of the permanent status talks. Both parties are aware of our view on this subject. So we've made quite clear, whether it's a unilateral declaration or a unilateral action, when it prejudges the outcome of what are expected to be very difficult permanent status negotiations, we're opposed to any such measures.

QUESTION: When you say opposed, do you mean opposed beyond merely saying that it's unhelpful as you've said in the past?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're against them is what I mean.

QUESTION: Does that go further than saying they're unhelpful?

MR. RUBIN: You'll have to make your own judgment about that.

QUESTION: Could that have a - settlements, for example, supposing they decide to risk your displeasure, would that have an impact on the financial aid eventually to be turned over?

MR. RUBIN: Can we come up with a number first and then we'll worry about what --

QUESTION: No, regardless of the number.

MR. RUBIN: I don't intend to make any new policy on that subject.

QUESTION: I understand that the US will oppose any unilateral action. The question is whether the Israelis and the Palestinians promised the United States that they will not do these unilateral actions.

MR. RUBIN: We've provided you a copy of the agreement; we've specified publicly our interpretation of the agreement. Both sides are aware of our views on these subjects. With respect to any private conversations we had with either side, I don't intend to discuss them publicly.

QUESTION: Regarding the offer from a leader of the Taliban, Mr. Muttmayan to have Mr. bin Laden tried or have his case reviewed in the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, I take it is this a satisfactory step that the United States would agree to provide some kind of information or evidence; or is that too risky or what?

MR. RUBIN: We understand that the Taliban issued a decree on October 25 empowering their Supreme Court to accept evidence concerning Osama bin Laden and review it within the framework of Islamic Shari'a law.

As we have stated previously, we prefer not to respond to a hypothetical question, which we regard this to be at this time, regarding a possible trial of Osama bin Laden. We believe that bin Laden should be brought swiftly to justice for his crimes. We have made it clear to the Taliban on several occasions that it must stop harboring terrorists such as Osama bin Laden.

With respect to the US providing evidence, we consider that wildly premature speculation at this point. With respect to any bill of indictment in the United States of Osama bin Laden, that would have to be referred to the Department of Justice.

QUESTION: So basically this Department is panning this offer from Mr. Muttmayan at this point; is that correct? Saying no thanks?

MR. RUBIN: You can draw your own conclusions from what I just said.

QUESTION: Jamie, do you have anything on the VX gas report?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, on the VX let me say - and then I gather we're going back to another subject or clarification with assistance of all those necessary?

According to the report UNSCOM delivered to the UN Security Council after discussion in New York by 21 experts from seven countries on the results of tests of Iraqi missile fragments, all tests in all countries are conclusive and valid. The tests prove the existence of degradation products of the following: VX; VX stabilizer; a nerve agent of either the G or V series of chemical weapons; and an undeclared decontaminant which is most effective against chemical weapons.

The experts agree that there is evidence that Iraq loaded nerve agents - some of the most horrible weapons in the world - including VX into its missile warheads. The experts unanimously concluded that the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declaration. It is time for Iraq to provide a full and accurate account of their weapons of mass destruction -- particularly the deadly nerve agent, VX. The onus is on them to reverse course, to fulfill their obligations and to give a true accounting of its weapons of mass destruction programs and to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and to allow inspections to continue.

In short, these findings make clear that Saddam Hussein did produce VX weapons contrary to what he said; that he produce these most horrible weapons, even though he said he didn't. It shows the urgency and necessity of Iraq coming clean on what they built, what they have, so that the international community can confirm disarmament of those provisions, without which sanctions cannot be lifted.

QUESTION: Where do you see this going from here, Jamie?

MR. RUBIN: Well the Council is going to be reviewing these findings. I would expect there to be further discussion on it. This can't but hurt Iraq's case that somehow it's up to the international community not Iraq to take the next step. We have made clear that in the absence of renewed cooperation by Iraq with UNSCOM that we are not going to allow this comprehensive review that they want to go forward; but with renewed cooperation it can go forward.

QUESTION: Jamie, with this evidence that you say is conclusive and valid - or that all tests were conclusive and valid, is it your impression or your view that Saddam Hussein's Iraq poses a greater or same danger to the region or to the world?

MR. RUBIN: We had no doubt that he had produced such weaponry; it was just he was the only one that said it wasn't so. So it's not changed our view of the danger of Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: And that view is that --

MR. RUBIN: That until Iraq is disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction, until Iraq complies with international Security Council resolutions that demonstrate its peaceful intentions, that sanctions must remain on indefinitely because he is a threat to the region and a threat to the world.

QUESTION: The focus has been on (inaudible) assurances to Israel. The Internet has a letter that Secretary Albright purportedly gave or wrote to Prime Minister Netanyahu. I wondered, are there assurances to the Palestinians in print, too? Are there written assurances to the Palestinians? And will these letters - or letter -- be made public and given an official government stamp of veracity?

MR. RUBIN: Certainly I am not going to be in a position of responding to every piece of information that appears on the Internet or any other source. We are providing you the information that we have decided to provide, pursuant to the Wye River negotiation. I will try to answer your questions as best as I can on American positions. If there are private exchanges, they are designed to stay private; and therefore, they wouldn't be provided to the public.

QUESTION: I'll try to break this down. Have there been letters of assurances --

MR. RUBIN: I will try to get an answer for you on what private assurances exist - either topics or a number -- for the record. But I don't have any ability to answer your question right now.

QUESTION: If they are private, which is another way of saying secret, that sort of amends the notion that everything transacted at - I almost said Camp David - at the Wye would be made public.

MR. RUBIN: I don't remember anybody ever saying that.

QUESTION: Well, all right, I don't want to get into it. (Inaudible) - Kosovo and time is running. I mean, I thought that what we heard -- there will be an agreement, there will be letters, there will be understandings, et cetera, et cetera - all would be a package and sort of implicit in that is that's what we're doing and it's no secret --

MR. RUBIN: -- to each other and there may be letters that are exchanged that aren't public. Governments are allowed to have private communications with each other.

QUESTION: Are they part of the agreement?

MR. RUBIN: I don't understand.

QUESTION: Well, are they a part of the agreement complex? In other words, do they support the published part of the Wye agreement?

MR. RUBIN: We certainly wouldn't say anything privately that was inconsistent with the agreement publicly.

QUESTION: Well, it could be irrelevant?

MR. RUBIN: Sorry?

QUESTION: Letters could be irrelevant to the agreement itself. I'm asking a simple question: do they support the agreement?

MR. RUBIN: They're consistent with them; I don't know how to state it any more than that.

QUESTION: Anyhow, if you do hear, at least the fact, if you can tell us whether there are assurances to the Palestinians, because --

MR. RUBIN: I'll try to get an answer. I'm sure that they'll be published all over the place, but that doesn't mean we'll necessary want to comment on them.

QUESTION: Well, they're a little less inclined to find reporters to tell things to than the Israelis are. So the letter from Albright --

MR. RUBIN: I haven't found that.

QUESTION: Well, it's pretty true. By the way, their press office was never occupied throughout all the nine days. It was an interesting situation. But Albright-Netanyahu letter is getting circulated --

MR. RUBIN: I have no comment on it.

QUESTION: I'm not asking you to comment. I'm asking you if you could tell us at least, if not now, is there an assurance to the Palestinians as well?

QUESTION: Jamie, I don't know if you've answered this in the past about - is the CIA determinations on compliance, is that going to be made public during the course of the 12 weeks? Who's done what --

MR. RUBIN: There are no limits to your appetites. No, I would expect not.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of the --

MR. RUBIN: I'm sorry, let me amend the answer in the following way. There has been a misperception that I think Mr. Tenet sought to clarify in today's newspaper. The CIA doesn't make judgments; the CIA provides information and facilitates cooperation - provides the facts and the information and reports to the State Department and other agencies of the government for judgments to be made about compliance with the agreements and making political judgments.

So there's been a slight misperception on that. But the information that's provided by our experts has never been provided publicly before. I wouldn't expect it to be now.

QUESTION: Forget them making it public. The question, which you had to wrestle with yesterday and which Congress is making an issue of - and we both know they've always had a role, so we don't have to go over that again. This agreement is bottomed on the notion that the CIA will have an enlarged verification role. The CIA, hey, Israel, you can do this stuff because the CIA's going to be on the job making sure this stuff is done. Now, whether they make the judgment or provide the information for someone else to make the judgment, you're not disputing the CIA will be far more active than it ever has been in the past.

MR. RUBIN: I would point you to the article and the view of Mr. Tenet, as this is fully consistent with things it's done before. Experts will obviously play a role in fighting terrorism; that's a greater and greater priority for the United States - that is, fighting terrorism and particularly in this region. So I would expect there to be more activity to fight terrorism.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of President Yeltsin's health?

QUESTION: In this discussion of letters that have been sent, some of which are being revealed, you didn't seem to want to exclude the possibility that there are secret assurances contained in letters. Now, I don't suppose you just want to let that impression sit out there, do you?

MR. RUBIN: If I look back at the transcript about the letters, I'll have no clue what you said or what I said. All I'm telling you is, I'm not commenting on any letters.

QUESTION: My question is, are there secret assurances in letters? Can you tell us --

MR. RUBIN: If they were secret, I wouldn't want to comment on them.

QUESTION: So there could be secret assurances in letters?

MR. RUBIN: We can go back and forth and it will end up with me saying, no comment. But if you'd like to continue, that would be fine with me.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to comment on the question of private communications.

QUESTION: No, but in the past, government spokesmen have been able to tell you what they said or they say we can assure you what you see is what there is - there are no secret assurances to the parties.

QUESTION: There were letters of assurances after the Hebron agreement, and we're in the same position today as we were then, which is that the Israeli one leaked within five minutes and the Palestinian one, until this day, is unknown.

MR. RUBIN: Well, some countries or some entities have different approaches to their dealings with the media. I don't know whether that applies in this case or it doesn't apply. What I know is that I am not now in a position to tell you what private assurances were made, what subjects were dealt with, whether there were secret assurances. I'm just not going to address the question in any meaningful way.

QUESTION: Well, you can still pick from a variety of other options. I mean, this didn't begin with Hebron; it began in 1973.

MR. RUBIN: Do you enjoy this?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, I don't enjoy this, but I'm waiting --

MR. RUBIN: Because I don't; I definitely don't.

QUESTION: No, I'm waiting - it's all right, it will be the last from me anyhow. But I'm waiting for the familiar, and if I don't hear it then I know I haven't heard it; so I've got to ask the question.

MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to provide no meaningful information on this question.

QUESTION: You're doing very well so far.

(Laughter.)

But I'm waiting for the familiar statement that nothing was told to one party that wasn't told to the other party. And if you can't say that, that's significant; because if there are secret agreements or if you're not going to reveal whether there are, then the next question is, did one side hear things that the other side didn't?

MR. RUBIN: I will take this elaborate exchange and I will read through it and try to ascertain what questions in it I will approach the authorities with, and try to get you answers best I can.

QUESTION: Fair enough.

MR. RUBIN: But maybe afterwards we can decide more specifically what the questions are that are likely to yield answers - other than what is our secret assurance to one country or another or another entity.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the state of the health of President Yeltsin?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to President Yeltsin, let me say that on October 26 President Yeltsin canceled a planned trip to Austria for health reasons. President Yeltsin's spokesman said that doctors advised against travel and that the Russian President needs more time to recover from bronchitis which allowed asthenia to develop.

We understand President Yeltsin is now in a Moscow sanitarium. We wish President Yeltsin a speedy recovery. Prime Minister Primakov has a full mandate to move forward on an economic policy. We do not believe, therefore, this development will or should get in the way of the economic decisions that are going on there to put Russia back on a firmer financial footing.

President Yeltsin remains Russia's popularly-elected president. We will continue to work with him on that basis.

QUESTION: On another subject, the Secretary is seeing the Spanish Foreign Minister today. Does that involve the Pinochet business?

MR. RUBIN: They will discuss topics of concern, primarily Kosovo and the situation in the Balkans. I would be surprised if it didn't come up in some way, but in our view, Pinochet's extradition is a legal matter for Spain, the United Kingdom and Chile to resolve.

QUESTION: Is the United States ready or planning to investigate the assassination of American citizens during Pinochet's regime?

MR. RUBIN: I indicated yesterday that we have provided information to - there has been contact and cooperation between the Spanish judges investigating General Pinochet and the US Department of Justice for over one year, pursuant to a 1990 US-Spanish Legal Assistance Treaty, in connection with their investigation of General Pinochet. The Justice Department is the designated central authority of the United States under the treaty. Any questions you have about what we may be doing should be directed at the Justice Department.

QUESTION: Can I ask a question? Do you have any comment on the upcoming visit of the President of Colombia?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the visit of President Pastrana, let me say that this is a state visit and questions should naturally be directed toward the White House. But let me say that we see this as a strengthening of our relations with Colombia. This is the first state visit of a Colombian president to the US since 1975.

Since President Pastrana's electoral victory this June, we have discussed a broad range of subjects with him, including the combating of narcotics trafficking, the protection of human rights, Colombia's peace process and economic development. We are sure that these issues will continue to be discussed in the visit.

QUESTION: Maybe you don't have anything on this. The Turkish Government has announced restrictions on oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus --

MR. RUBIN: I gave a lot of information on that yesterday.

QUESTION: Oh, you did.

MR. RUBIN: And I'll get you the transcript for that.

QUESTION: Jamie, with regard to Burma, apparently sometime in the past couple of days there was a meeting in Chilton, England, among certain US ambassadors to discuss our strategy toward Burma. I was wondering whether you could comment - is there any new policy toward Burma emerging from that? Have we made any approaches toward the SPDC?

MR. RUBIN: Well, with respect to Burma, I know it's something that Secretary Albright feels very strongly about and worked very hard on in her last trip to Asia and in New York when issues arose with respect to Aung San Sui Kyi and the restrictions she was facing.

As you know, the European Union just announced a decision to continue their present sanctions and to widen their visa ban to encompass transit visas and to cover senior Burmese officials in the tourism section. The US and the EU have similar policies, including banning the issuance of visas to senior officials.

What I can say is that we are certainly looking for ways to step up the pressure - have been doing so for some time. But I have no specific new program of action to offer you.

QUESTION: Can you give us any more about the Arab reaction to your appeals that they engage in the peace process?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary strongly believes that the Arab-Israeli peace process is not a spectator sport. It is important that all those who support the peace process, especially those in the region, do their part for peace and not remain on the sidelines.

The Wye River memorandum marks an important breakthrough in the peace process. Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Netanyahu have taken considerable risks for peace and they need our support. Implementing this memorandum will require the help of all states in the Middle East. We ask that our friends and allies in the region now come forward to support this process and help us in our ongoing efforts to reach a comprehensive peace.

What we are looking for, in the first instance, we expect the Arabs to lend their political and financial support to the Palestinians, who obviously need to see a greater and greater peace dividend if the peace process is to stay strong.

We also believe that Arab re-engagement in the normalization process with Israel would lend vital support to the Israelis and the Palestinians as they carry out this agreement. This is extremely important - that the Israelis see greater and greater engagement with their Arab neighbors as they make the tough decisions for peace.

With respect to various comments that some countries have adopted as skeptical or a wait-and-see attitude, clearly we have concerns in this area. We intend to work closely to promote greater and greater support from Arab countries for the steps that I outlined.

But as we move ahead, we look forward to the cooperation of our friends and allies such as Egypt, in helping to mobilize the political and financial support necessary to make this process a success.

So in short, there's a lot of work to do; a lot of people have a lot of work to do. There are steps the Arabs can take to increase normalization with Israel, increase support for the Palestinians that will redound to the advantage of all the peoples of the Middle East peace. Everyone needs to get off the sidelines, get into the game and do their part.

QUESTION: When you refer to wait-and-see attitude, were you referring to before you started this initiative or since you started this initiative?

MR. RUBIN: We are aware that the current public posture of some of the countries is a wait-and-see posture. We are trying to move quickly to move forward on these steps that I described to you. Secretary Albright will be in touch with her counterparts and other diplomats will be in touch with their counterparts to try to push on this front.

I don't have any new actions -- this just started a few hours ago - to report to you.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:35 P.M.)


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