Read about Hellenism (by Vlassis Agtzidis) Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923) Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923)
HR-Net - Hellenic Resources Network Compact version
Today's Suggestion
Read The "Macedonian Question" (by Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou)
HomeAbout HR-NetNewsWeb SitesDocumentsOnline HelpUsage InformationContact us
Friday, 19 April 2024
 
News
  Latest News (All)
     From Greece
     From Cyprus
     From Europe
     From Balkans
     From Turkey
     From USA
  Announcements
  World Press
  News Archives
Web Sites
  Hosted
  Mirrored
  Interesting Nodes
Documents
  Special Topics
  Treaties, Conventions
  Constitutions
  U.S. Agencies
  Cyprus Problem
  Other
Services
  Personal NewsPaper
  Greek Fonts
  Tools
  F.A.Q.
 

USIA - Fact Sheet: The Chemical Weapons Convention, 97-04-04

United States Information Agency: Selected Articles Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The United States Information Agency (USIA) Gopher at <gopher://gopher.usia.gov>


FACT SHEET: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(White House says U.S. ratification a "top priority") (1480)

(The following fact sheet, entitled "The Chemical Weapons Convention," was issued by the White House on April 4.)

The Chemical Weapons Convention is a global treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons. The CWC will ban the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. It will enter into force April 29, with or without U.S. participation. The CWC has long enjoyed strong bipartisan support, including from President Bush, General Brent Scowcroft, General Colin Powell and Senator Richard Lugar (R-In).

Chemical weapons pose a threat not just to our military but to innocent civilians, as last year's poison gas attack in the Japanese subway showed. Certain aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its law enforcement requirements and nonproliferation provisions, will strengthen existing efforts to fight chemical terrorism. The President has assigned top priority to ratification of the CWC by the U.S. Senate. The CWC is a central element of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy that will strengthen U.S. national security and contribute to global stability.

President Clinton said at the United Nations this fall, "I deeply regret that the United States has not yet voted on the Convention, but I want to assure you and people throughout the world that I will not let this treaty die and we will join the ranks of nations determined to prevent the spread of chemical weapons."

Under the CWC, each State Party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to:

  • develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
  • use chemical weapons;
  • engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons; and
  • assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

In addition each State Party undertakes, all in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, to:

  • destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;
  • destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party; and
  • destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Today, we suspect some 20 countries have or may be developing chemical weapons. These weapons are attractive to countries or individuals seeking a mass-destruction capability because they are relatively cheap to produce and do not demand the elaborate technical infrastructure needed to make nuclear weapons. It is therefore all the more vital to establish an international bulwark against the acquisition and use of these weapons.

The CWC is the most ambitious treaty in the history of arms control. Whereas most arms control treaties in the past have only limited weapons, the CWC requires their outright elimination. Parties to the Convention must destroy any and all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities.

The CWC will penalize countries that do not join. Entry into force of the CWC will isolate the small number of non-participating states as international pariahs and inhibit their access to certain treaty-controlled chemicals. Since many of these chemicals are not only required to make chemical weapons but have important uses in commercial industry, the hold-outs will have economic as well as political incentives to join the treaty regime.

The Chemical Weapons Convention and Industry

America's single largest exporting sector is chemical manufacturing, representing $60 billion in exports. If the United States does not join, its closest allies and trading partners will be forced to apply trade restrictions to chemicals that originate in the United States, or are being shipped here. U.S. companies could lose hundreds of millions of dollars in sales and many U.S. jobs simply because the United States does not belong to the treaty.

The CWC is the first arms control treaty to widely affect the private sector. Although the United States does not manufacture chemical weapons, it does produce, process and consume a number of chemicals that can be used to produce chemical weapons. For example, a solvent used in ballpoint pen ink can be easily converted into mustard gas, and a chemical involved in production of fire retardants and pesticides can be used to make nerve agents. Thus, any treaty to ban chemical weapons must monitor commercial facilities that produce, process or consume dual-use chemicals to ensure they are not diverted for prohibited purposes.

The CWC provisions covering chemical facilities were developed with the active participation of industry representatives. The verification regime is intrusive enough to build confidence that member states are complying with the treaty, yet it respects industry's legitimate interests in safeguarding proprietary information and avoiding disruption of production.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fred Webber, President and CEO of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, said, "We have studied this treaty in great detail; we have put it to the test. We think the CWC is a good deal for American industry.... The Chemical Weapons Convention protects vital commercial interests. I know because we helped design the reporting forms. And I know because we helped develop inspection procedures that protect trade secrets while providing full assurance that chemical weapons are not being produced... The Chemical Weapons Convention makes good business sense and good public policy... Our request...is simple. Pass the Chemical Weapons Convention."

The CWC and the Military

The CWC specifically allows Parties to maintain chemical weapons defensive programs and does not constrain non-CW military responses to a chemical weapons attack. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said in Senate testimony, "Desert Storm proved that retaliation in kind is not required to deter the use of chemical weapons." He explained, "the U.S. military's ability to deter chemical weapons in a post-CW world will be predicated upon both a robust chemical weapons defense capability, and the ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and overwhelming military force in retaliation against a chemical attack." As Defense Secretary Cheney said during the Gulf War, and as Secretary Perry has reiterated, the U.S. response to a chemical weapons attack would be "absolutely overwhelming" and "devastating."

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March, Lt. General Wesley Clark, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest... The nonproliferation aspects of the Convention will retard the spread of chemical weapons, and in so doing, reduce the probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, while foregoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the U.S. military retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a chemical weapons attack.... I strongly support this Convention and respectfully request your consent to ratification."

The Need for U.S. Ratification

With or without the CWC, the United States is already destroying its chemical weapons in accordance with a law Congress passed more than a decade ago requiring destruction of the bulk of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. That process is under way, with completion slated by the end of 2004. The CWC would require all other parties that possess chemical weapons to destroy their stockpiles by April 2007.

Senate failure to act before entry into force next spring will adversely affect both U.S. national security and economic interests. The United States would not be a member of the Executive Council that will oversee implementation of the CWC nor would U.S. citizens be eligible to serve as international inspectors or in other key positions relating to verification of the treaty. On the economic front, the U.S. chemical industry, with over $60 billion in exports, would be subject to the potential loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in sales and many jobs.

The CWC will put into place a legally binding international standard outlawing the acquisition and possession, as well as use, of chemical weapons. The Convention not only requires states parties to destroy their chemical weapons arsenals but prohibits them from transferring chemical weapons to other countries or assisting anyone in prohibited activities. Combined with restrictions on chemical trade in CWC-controlled chemicals with non-parties, these provisions will increase the costs and difficulties of acquiring chemical weapons for states that choose not to participate.

Universal adherence and complete abolition of chemical weapons won't be achieved immediately. But the Convention will slow and even reverse chemical weapons proliferation by isolating the small number of rogue state that refuse to join the regime, limiting their access to precursor chemicals, and bringing international political and economic pressures to bear if such states continue their chemical weapons programs.


From the United States Information Agency (USIA) Gopher at gopher://gopher.usia.gov


United States Information Agency: Selected Articles Directory - Previous Article - Next Article
Back to Top
Copyright © 1995-2023 HR-Net (Hellenic Resources Network). An HRI Project.
All Rights Reserved.

HTML by the HR-Net Group / Hellenic Resources Institute, Inc.
usia2html v1.01 run on Saturday, 5 April 1997 - 3:37:12 UTC